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ABSTRACT
‘OUR FEET ARE MIRED IN THE SAME SOIL’: DEEPENING DEMOCRACY
WITH THE POLITICAL VIRTUE OF SYMPATHETIC INQUIRY
Jennifer Lynn Kiefer Fenton, B.A., M.A.
Marquette University, 2019
This dissertation puts American philosophers and social reformers, Jane Addams
(1860-1935) and John Dewey (1859-1952), in conversation with contemporary social and
political philosopher, Iris Marion Young (1949-2006), to argue that an account of
deliberative equality must make conceptual space to name the problem of
‘communicatively structured deliberative inequality’. I argue that in order for
participatory democracy theory to imagine and construct genuinely inclusive deliberative
spaces, it must be grounded in a relational ontology and pragmatist feminist social
epistemology.
The literature has largely developed deliberative inequality in terms of access
(e.g., participation costs) and ‘impoverished capacities’ for political participation (e.g.,
political-process illiteracy; public debate skills). This literature has failed to appreciate
the communicative dimensions of deliberative inequality. Individuals who occupy
historically stigmatized social groups may participate at a communicatively structured
disadvantage in participatory forums not because of their own impoverished capacities,
but because of the identity-prejudiced stereotypes of their interlocutors.
Chapter 1 situates Young’s communicative democracy in contemporary
deliberative democracy literature and shows the inadequacies of liberal individualism,
assumed by much of traditional deliberative theory, for naming and addressing the
problem of communicatively structured deliberative inequality. Chapter 2 draws on
literature in feminist and resistance epistemologies as well as the social identity approach
within contemporary social psychology theory to flesh out the problem of
communicatively structured deliberative inequality. Here, I provide a relational ontology
of prejudice and examine it’s impact on one’s epistemic and deliberative standing.
Chapter 3 draws on the work of Addams and Dewey to develop a relational ontology of
political agency as well as the pragmatist feminist epistemology of communicative
democracy.
Addams and Dewey, like Young, saw exclusion as a serious social and political
problem, and they looked to democratic norms and practices as a resource for social
justice. Thus, Chapter 4 looks to Addams and Dewey’s writings and Addams’s leadership
at Hull House as a resource for communicative democracy, and more particularly, for
addressing deliberative inequality and imagining and constructing inclusive deliberative
spaces in light of the problem of communicatively structured deliberative inequality.
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1
INTRODUCTION
This dissertation puts American philosophers and social reformers, Jane Addams
(1860-1935) and John Dewey (1859-1952), in conversation with contemporary social and
political philosopher, Iris Marion Young (1949-2006). The dissertation brings these
figures together because, although they were separated by almost a century in time and
grounded in distinct philosophical traditions, they all saw exclusion as a serious social
and political problem. And they looked to democracy as a means for repairing exclusion
and as a resource for social justice. They all believed deeply that democratic norms like
political equality, transparency, reason-giving in decision-making processes, and the
inclusion of diverse social perspectives in those decision-making processes and
democratic discussion, could give us a way out of exclusion and a way into more
fulfilling social life with one another.
Ultimately, the dissertation develops a pragmatist feminist social epistemology
from the thought and activism of Addams and Dewey, and introduces this as both a
foundational contribution for Young’s communicative democracy theory, as well as a
resource for doing communicative democracy and realizing deliberative equality.
The title of the dissertation is inspired by Jane Addams’s opening words in
Democracy and Social Ethics (1902), where she acknowledges the facticity of human
interdependence. This fact of interdependence motivated her life’s work to promote
democratic values and facilitate inclusive social spaces where those values may be put
into practice. On this fact of interdependence she writes,
…As members of the community [we] stand indicted. This is the penalty of
democracy, - that we are bound to move forward or retrograde together. None of
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us can stand aside; our feet are mired in the same soil, and our lungs breathe the
same air. (Addams, 1902/2002, p. 112, the emphasis is mine)
This dissertation argues that the relational ontology that is emphasized in this
appreciation for human interdependence, is a foundational feature of communicative
democracy, and ultimately, is what enables for it to be a facilitator of social justice.
Democracy as such must be understood as far more than a mere aggregation of personal
preferences. Adolescents often “take it to a vote” thinking themselves civilized, mature,
and democratic. But the fact that preferences are widely held is not an indication that
those preferences are reasonable or that they are just. Democracy reduced to popular
elections or special interest politics, or on the other end of the spectrum, democracy
surrendered to elitist representative protections, ultimately both collapse into a form of
rule that is based in power.
But democracy fulfilled through inclusive and vibrant public discussion, that goes
all the way down to our most basic institutions (e.g., the family, the workplace), bases the
legitimacy of decision-making not in power, but in reason-giving, discussion across
difference, coordinated activity, and ongoing cooperation. Democracy as such is not just
a form of political machinery, but it is an ethics and an epistemology. It is as Dewey
remarks in a great deal of his work, a way of life. To say that democracy is an ethics and
an epistemology is to say that it is a way of interacting with, communicating with, and
knowing one another. And to say that democracy is a way of life is to say that norms of
political equality and inclusion must govern all of our social interactions, so that through
the implementation of these procedural values, human beings may more fully participate
in all of social life. This requires working to make physical and procedural space, as well
as communicative space, for all individuals to participate in the formation and ongoing
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evolution of the institutions, practices, values, and relationships that frame their lives and
possibilities.
The problems modern democracies must solve are complex. Inclusive democratic
communication about these problems is sometimes messy and disorganized. But with the
right attitude, these processes can also be creative and cooperative and celebrate, rather
than deny, difference. The decisions we make in these contexts are difficult, fallible, and
experimental. But they are also open-ended and forward-looking, and because of this,
they celebrate continued conversation with one another.
This dissertation argues that the ability to accurately identify and define these
complex social problems and to begin strategizing remedies for them is enriched by more
inclusive democratic communication, in both our formal political institutions and in all of
our modes of interacting with one another. This mode of inclusive, participatory,
collective decision-making makes us better and more fulfilled people. We become better
and more fulfilled in this rich sense not simply because we participate in campaigns or
because we “rock the vote”. Rather, because we interact with one another in ways that
honor their political agency through having discussions and not simply backing decisions
with force, through including diverse perspectives at the table, and through
communication at that table that honors one another as epistemic and deliberative equals.
This dissertation makes the case that doing the deep sense of deliberative equality
that I have alluded to thus far, is much harder to realize than we would like to believe.
Oppression impacts one’s access to formal deliberative forums. One can be
formally barred from a deliberative forum on the basis of her gender. Or, the costs to
participate in a deliberative forum may be too high for someone in poverty (Cooper,
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2006, p. 69). For example, a town meeting that is scheduled at 7PM on a Tuesday may
require a single mother who works second shift to take off of work to attend the meeting,
often without pay, and to find and perhaps pay for transportation to the meeting and
perhaps even childcare. For those who live in poverty, the costs of participation are too
high in this case, and this is a result of their marginalization.
Even assuming that one’s access to participation in a deliberative forum is not
formally blocked, and even assuming that participation costs are not too high for citizens,
one’s membership in a stigmatized group can still detract from her inclusion in
deliberation because oppression has hidden, communicative dimensions. Young explains,
“Where there are structural inequalities of wealth and power, formally democratic
procedures are likely to reinforce them, because privileged people are able to
marginalize the voices and issues of those less privileged” (Young, 2000, p. 34, the
emphasis is mine).
One’s membership in a social group that has historically been stigmatized or
marginalized, can shape how the problems she brings forward for public consideration
are framed, whether her anger at such problems is interpreted as righteous indignation or
lunacy, whether those problems even make it to the agenda for deliberation, and
ultimately, whether an individual is seen as a knower by her peers. These are the
communicatively structured dimensions of deliberative inequality, and they impact the
power of one’s participation, that is, her epistemic and deliberative standing.
In this project I am particularly concerned to provide an account of
communicatively structured deliberative inequality, inequalities that result not from a
lack of access to participatory forums nor from a lack of capacity to participate in those
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forums (certainly both of these are very real concerns for social justice theorists
concerned with inclusion, democracy, and deliberative equality), but rather from a lack of
epistemic and social standing to be received, included, acknowledged, and genuinely
respected and heard as a deliberator and as a political equal.
I have much in mind here what Miranda Fricker has introduced as “testimonial
injustice” where “prejudice on the hearer’s part causes him to give the speaker less
credibility than he would otherwise have given” (Fricker, 2007, p. 4). Fricker is
especially concerned with testimonial injustices rooted in identity prejudices, “prejudices
against people qua social type” (ibid.). She takes as a central case of this, “the injustice
that a speaker suffers in receiving deflated credibility from the hearer owing to identity
prejudice on the hearer’s part, as in the case where the police don’t believe someone
because he is black” (ibid.). I suspect that this form of epistemic injustice is precisely
what present-day women have in mind when they recount having been “mansplained”.
What participatory democracy theory is in need of is an appreciation for the
power of prejudice and epistemic injustice in our communicative lives and on our
deliberative standing. So to take the example of women as a social group, women who
have both formal access to participatory forums (e.g., legally protected rights for
participation, institutions that welcome their participation, and agents that encourage it)
and strong communicative capacities for participation in those forums (e.g., good
academic backgrounds, strong critical thinking skills, affinity for leadership, good public
speaking and communication skills) may still participate at a communicatively structured
disadvantage in those forums not because of their own doing or failings in capacities, but
because of the identity prejudices of their interlocutors. Call this form of deliberative
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inequality, identity-prejudiced communicative inequality. Call the harm that results from
this inequality, deterioration in one’s deliberative standing.
So what is identity-prejudiced communicative equality? Why does it matter to
me? And why does it matter for us? Put simply, identity-prejudiced communicative
inequality is to be made to feel small because of who one is, that is, because of one’s
membership in a stigmatized social group or economic class. Identity-prejudiced
communicative inequality arises when one is made to feel small in communication with
others because of her interlocutors’ identity-prejudiced habits of interacting with her. Her
interlocutor’s identity-prejudiced habits of interaction are based in an assumption that she
has nothing of much importance to say, and that her observations about her social world
are not reliable or are simply not of any real epistemic significance for forming social
knowledge and for making decisions.
Sadly, some members of our society have been made to feel so small for so long
that they can no longer imagine themselves as knowers, or as participants in democratic
and social life. Some individuals are not regularly made to feel small because of who they
are, but they have been made to feel small in various ways throughout their life, and they
tap into that in order to be compassionate allies for those who are regularly made to feel
small. Many individuals who have been made to feel small in this way actively protest
this marginalization of their epistemic and deliberative standing. They protest and resist
this in creative and brave ways.
This project looks to these experiences of lost and wounded deliberative standing,
as well as to individual and communal attempts to re-legitimate deliberative standing in
communicative interactions and democratic spaces, as an inspiration for communicative
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democracy theory. I view my project as one small part of a developing body of academic
thought and activism that recognizes and attempts to respond to José Medina’s call to
action for democratic societies:
In democratic societies, given their commitment to free and equal epistemic
participation, there is a prima facie interest and obligation to detect and correct the
systematic disparities in the epistemic agency that different members of society
can enjoy and the inequalities associated with them. (Medina, 2013, p. 4)
Young’s critique of deliberative democracy comes out of her wider critique of
liberal individualism that is expressed throughout much of her work. But on my analysis,
this critique of liberal individualism is itself based in a relational ontology and social
epistemology that she leaves largely unarticulated. Young primarily justifies
communicative democracy in terms of social justice and inclusion, but she leaves the
epistemological dimensions of her undertaking somewhat less developed.
As a whole, the dissertation aims to provide an account of such an ontology and
epistemology through drawing on recent work in feminist and resistance epistemology,
the social identity approach within social psychology theory literature, and through
looking to the historical thought and practice of American philosophers of democracy and
social reformers, Jane Addams and John Dewey. Ultimately, the dissertation introduces a
pragmatist feminist social epistemology for communicative democracy. I argue that for
participatory democracy theory to imagine and construct genuinely inclusive deliberative
spaces, it must have a relational conception of political agency, a relational account of
prejudice, and be grounded in a pragmatist feminist social epistemology. I look to the
thought of American philosophers and social reforms, Jane Addams and Dewey, to help
me construct this relational framework and pragmatist feminist social epistemology, as
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well as for resources for strategizing transactional and institutional remedies for identityprejudiced communicative inequality.
Chapter 1 situates Young’s communicative democracy in contemporary
deliberative democracy literature. Deliberative democracy can be broadly defined as a
body of democratic thought that bases the legitimacy for lawmaking in the public
deliberation of citizens, and in so doing, promotes reason over power in politics
(Benhabib, 1996; Gutmann and Thompson, 2004; Young, 1996, p. 122). Deliberative
democrats theorize deliberation as an open and inclusive exercise or process where
citizens who are free and equal engage in reasoned discussion with one another for the
purposes of resolving public problems and forming agreed-upon policies.
This chapter shows the inadequacies of liberal individualism, assumed by much of
traditional deliberative democracy theory (hereafter, deliberative theory), for naming and
addressing the problem of communicatively structured deliberative inequality. Young is
particularly concerned that the underlying individualism assumed by deliberative theory,
particularly owing to its roots in classical liberalism, problematizes deliberative theory’s
commitment to political equality and inclusion. Traditional deliberative theory idealizes
too narrow an account of democratic participation through its construction of
deliberation, an account that emphasizes consensus, impartiality, and correctness. Young
is critical that this picture of deliberation is itself a problem for inclusion, full democratic
participation, and deliberative equality.
Not all democratic theorists have assumed classical liberalism as a starting place
for democracy. Quite to the contrary, American pragmatists Jane Addams (1860-1935)
and John Dewey (1859-1952), rooted democracy in a relational ontology, and as a result,
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developed a robust conception of democracy as a resource for realizing social justice in
contexts of diversity, pluralism of values, social inequality, and oppression. Both Addams
and Dewey were committed to a relational ontological foundation for democracy. They
developed a deeply participatory and inclusive conception of democracy and put it into
practice at Hull House, the social settlement that Addams founded with Eleanor Gates
Starr in Chicago in 1889. They were also both ahead of their time in how they thought
about prejudice, social grouping and inequality, and the communicative dimensions of
oppression. Thus their work is rich with resources for enriching Young’s communicative
democracy.
Young is sensitive to the communicative dimension of deliberative inequality,
particularly it’s more implicit dimensions. In her earlier work she argues that oppression
persists in “body aesthetic dimensions” in society, what she explains as “interactive
habits, unconscious assumptions and stereotypes, and group-related feelings of
nervousness and aversion” (Young, 1990, p. 148). Young anticipates the contemporary
implicit bias research here. As this body of research has attempted to show, these quieter
dimensions of oppression significantly impact one’s epistemic standing in democratic
communication. In her later work, Inclusion and Democracy (2000), Young pushes
deliberative theory towards a more robust communicative picture of democratic
participation that is more apt to enable for deliberative equality. She does not, however,
develop this problem of the implicit dimensions of communicatively structured
deliberative inequality in significant or systematic detail in this later development of
communicative democracy (2000).
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Chapter 2 attempts to fill this gap in communicative democracy, and fills out
Young’s relational ontology by constructing an account of communicatively structured
deliberative inequality that is based in a relational account of prejudice. I draw on thought
in feminist and resistance epistemologies, as well as empirical research in social
psychology to do this. This chapter serves as a bridge between Young’s communicative
democracy and Addams’s and Dewey’s contributions. Young briefly points to social
psychology theorists working in the social identity approach in her discussion of social
groups in “Five Faces of Oppression” (1990, p. 45; citing Turner, et. al., 1987). The
social identity approach, based in Henri Tajfel’s empirical research in the 1970’s, poses a
challenge to the social psychology corpus: that the social dimension of human
psychology has been lost within a great deal of social psychology research and theory,
namely because of the individualistic assumptions held among researchers and theorists
about both the nature of identity and of prejudice. Following after Tajfel’s school, John
Turner has introduced a relational account of prejudice that is important for grasping the
significance of identity-prejudiced communicative inequality and for conceptualizing the
relational ontology at the heart of Young’s communicative democracy. Interestingly,
Addams and Dewey’s ontology and thought on prejudice anticipates this research. The
chapter concludes by pointing towards these historical insights.
Both Chapters 3 and 4 of the dissertation look to Addams and Dewey’s
conceptions and practice of democracy as a resource for communicative democracy.
Chapter 3 continues the ontological work of Chapter 2 by examining Addams’s thought
on group moralities and Dewey’s thought on prejudice. Addams exhibits her sensitivity
to communicative inequality in both her practice and in her discussions of group
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moralities. And Dewey offers a progressive account of prejudice that is also consistent
with an appreciation for what I am calling identity-prejudiced communicative inequality.
In Chapter 3 I also begin to fill in the epistemology of communicative democracy
by showing that Addams and Dewey saw communicative inequality as a social and
political problem and that they envisioned democracy as a robust social epistemology
with the resources to remedy this problem and promote a more inclusive, participatory
body politic. Addams and Dewey are concerned that human subjectivity hinders the
production of social knowledge, and they believe this is further problematized by modern
industrialist society, group moralities, and prejudice. Democracy as they envision it and
attempted to put it into practice at Hull House, is an ethical and epistemic way of relating
with others that breathes into life the norms of political equality, reasonableness,
publicity, and importantly, inclusion in contexts of diversity, pluralism of values, social
inequality, and oppression.
The final chapter of the dissertation builds on the historical foundation established
in Chapter 3 to show that not only were Addams and Dewey concerned with deliberative
equality and it’s communicative dimensions, but they actually strategized ways to realize
their robust conception of democracy in spite of it. Here I look to Addams and Dewey’s
writings and Addams’s leadership at Hull House as a resource for communicative
democracy, and more particularly, for addressing deliberative inequality and imagining
and constructing inclusive deliberative spaces in light of the problem of communicatively
structured deliberative inequality.
As a whole, my project aims to provide a pragmatist feminist social epistemology
for communicative democracy. I build this account from Charlene Haddock’s Seigfried’s

12
recent recovery of Jane Addams and John Dewey’s philosophy of perplexity and method
of sympathetic inquiry (Seigfried, 1996, 2002). Here I also explore the benefits of
thinking about sympathetic inquiry as a type of hybrid epistemic-moral political virtue for
democracy.
This dissertation is a form of epistemic resistance to identity-prejudiced
communicative inequality in more ways than one. First, it establishes theoretical space in
participatory democracy theory for naming identity-prejudiced communicative inequality.
Second, it introduces two important projects for democratic theorists, practitioners, and
advocates: (1) imagining and constructing inclusive deliberative spaces in light of this
problem and (2) strategizing communicative practices and norms of interaction that can
themselves challenge identity-prejudiced stereotypes and mitigate their harmful effects
on individuals’ deliberative standing in communicative and epistemic interactions.
And finally, the dissertation is my own form of epistemic resistance and protest.
The project as a whole has come to symbolize, both in the problems it grapples with as
well as in the process of writing the thing itself, a journey of trying to be seen as a
knower, by others, as well as to myself.
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CHAPTER 1
THE RELATIONAL ONTOLOGY AND PRAGMATIST FEMINIST SOCIAL
EPISTEMOLOGY OF IRIS MARION YOUNG’S
COMMUNICATIVE DEMOCRACY
1. Introduction
This chapter demonstrates the value of a communicative conception of democracy
like Iris Marion Young’s for both identifying and responding to the challenges that
deliberative inequality pose for inclusion and democracy. I situate this discussion of
communicative democracy in the deliberative democracy literature, and I focus my
discussion of deliberative inequality to what James Bohman has termed
‘communicatively structured political inequality’ (Bohman, 1996, p. 117).
In this project I am particularly concerned to provide an account of
communicatively structured deliberative inequality, inequalities that result not from a
lack of access to participatory forums nor from a lack of capacity to participate in those
forums (certainly both of these are very real concerns for social justice theorists
concerned with inclusion, democracy, and deliberative equality), but rather from a lack of
epistemic and social standing to be received, included, acknowledged, and genuinely
respected and heard as a deliberator and as a political equal.
The chapter argues that informal norms of communication carry over into formal
deliberative realms, and in contexts of social inequality and oppression, this gives rise to
a form of deliberative inequality that has gone overlooked by traditional deliberative
theorists, namely, what I introduce as ‘identity-prejudiced communicative inequality’ in
Chapter 2.
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I have much in mind here what Miranda Fricker has introduced as “testimonial
injustice” where “prejudice on the hearer’s part causes him to give the speaker less
credibility than he would otherwise have given” (Fricker, 2007, p. 4). Fricker is
especially concerned with testimonial injustices rooted in identity prejudices, “prejudices
against people qua social type” (ibid.). She takes as a central case of this, “the injustice
that a speaker suffers in receiving deflated credibility from the hearer owing to identity
prejudice on the hearer’s part, as in the case where the police don’t believe someone
because he is black” (ibid.).
One of the many reasons Fricker’s attention to the epistemic dimensions of
injustice is important is because, much like pragmatists like Jane Addams and John
Dewey, it challenges categorical distinctions between ethics and epistemology as subdisciplines in philosophy. Fricker mourns, “It does seem…a pity that ethics has not
traditionally taken our epistemic conduct into its remit” (Fricker, 2007, p. 2). Something
of this sort can be said of deliberative theory as well: It does seem a pity that deliberative
theory has not traditionally taken our epistemic conduct, particularly epistemic injustices
that result from identity prejudices, into its remit. This is especially concerning because
of deliberative theory’s historical emphasis on the alleged epistemic value of
participatory democracy.
What deliberative theory is in need of is an appreciation for the power of
prejudice and epistemic injustice in our communicative lives and on our deliberative
standing. There is a both a practical and theoretical concern here. Practically, how does
the presence of identity-prejudiced epistemic injustice stifle deliberative standing and
foster deliberative inequality? And theoretically, how does the presence of identity-
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prejudiced epistemic injustice stifle attempts by deliberative theorists to justify the
legitimacy of democracy on the basis of its epistemic value?
Take for example the fact that women are far more likely to be interrupted than
men.1 This impacts the communicative possibilities for women in both informal
communications as well as in public space. In this case, a communicative inequality
arises as a result of gender-based norms of interruption, that is, as a result of gendered
habits of communication that are on some level, implicit and precognitive. I develop an
account of these identity-prejudiced communicative inequalities in further detail in the
following chapter of the dissertation. Various informal communicative norms like norms
of interruption “enable men to assume wide powers as speakers” (Bohman, 1996, p. 119).
Thus despite their access to formal deliberative forums, women’s talk gets less space to
be heard, gets distorted in “the various back-and-forth mechanisms of dialogue through
which public deliberation works”, and even gets dismissed altogether (Bohman, 1996, p.
118). Where this norm of interruption is in place, the fullness of women’s deliberative
standing remains an open question.
To review, women who have both formal access to participatory forums (e.g.,
legally protected rights for participation, institutions that welcome their participation, and
agents that encourage it) and strong communicative capacities for participation in those
forums (e.g., good academic backgrounds, strong critical thinking skills, affinity for
leadership, good public speaking and communication skills) may still participate at a
communicatively structured disadvantage in those forums not because of their own doing
or failings in capacities, but because of the identity prejudices of their interlocutors. Call

1

See Zimmerman and West (1975) and more recently, Hancock and Ruben (2014).
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this form of deliberative inequality, identity-prejudiced communicative inequality. Call
the harm that results from this inequality, deterioration in one’s deliberative standing.
Both Bohman (1996) and Young (1990; 2000) seem to have an appreciation for
these more communicative and implicit dimensions of deliberative inequality, but both
have also left this problem underdeveloped in their theorizing about political equality and
deliberation. Bohman makes mention of “implicit forms of unequal power, influence, and
resources that…continue to operate in the public sphere” in his account of deliberative
inequality itself (Bohman, 1996, p. 123). In her earlier major work Justice and the
Politics of Difference (1990), Young talks of the “body aesthetic” dimensions of
oppression, “interactive habits, unconscious assumptions and stereotypes, and grouprelated feelings of nervousness and aversion” (Young, 1990, p. 148). She even makes the
point that, “If unconscious reactions, habits, and stereotypes reproduce the oppression of
some groups, then they should be judged unjust, and therefore should be changed”
(Young, 1990, p. 150). Yet Young does not revisit this implicit dimension of
communicative inequality in her later major work specific to democracy, Inclusion and
Democracy (Young, 2000).
This chapter argues that Young’s conception of communicative democracy fares
much better than traditional deliberative models for both identifying and addressing
identity-prejudiced communicative inequalities. Young’s communicative democracy is
uniquely situated for this project because of two important reasons relating to how it
understands the nature of political agency: (1) it bases political agency in a relational
ontology; (2) it bases democratic communication in a pragmatist feminist social
epistemology that advocates for a broader understanding of deliberation as well as of
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democratic communication more generally than has been traditionally held by
deliberative theorists. Ultimately, Young’s communicative democracy pushes democracy
past formal deliberation towards a broader, more inclusive appreciation of democratic
communication processes.
The chapter contrasts Young’s robust, relational conception of political agency
with the individualistic one assumed by traditional deliberative theorists. As I
characterize it, this traditional approach assumes the ontological individualism and
veritistic epistemology of classical liberalism. As a result, deliberative theory has tended
to underemphasize the value of the educative and preference-transformative capacity of
deliberation. But as this chapter eventually argues, this underemphasized and
underappreciated aspect of deliberative democracy (i.e., preference transformation) is
crucial for making the kind of theoretical space in democracy theory that makes possible
the naming and identification of identity-prejudiced communicative inequalities as well
as for, more practically speaking, makes space for programs that aim to reduce such
communicative inequalities themselves.
Despite Young’s sharp criticism of actual deliberative theories, she views
deliberative democracy understood as an ideal as an important starting place for realizing
social justice and inclusion. Young is also drawn to deliberative democracy because,
unlike models of democracy based in social choice theory, deliberative theory bases the
legitimacy of political decision-making on reason-giving rather than on power (Young,
1996, 2000). Thus the chapter begins by examining the features of deliberative
democracy that Young is drawn to: political equality, reasonableness, publicity, and
inclusion (Young, 2000).
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In Section 3 of the chapter, I move through Young’s critique of deliberative
theory and her introduction of an alternative, more inclusive conception of participatory
democracy, what she terms, ‘communicative democracy’. Here I introduce three major
critiques and points of contrast between deliberative and communicative conceptions of
democracy: First, communicative democracy is critical of narrow constructions of
deliberation-as-argument, favoring a wider, more inclusive conception of deliberationrestructured-as-public-reasonableness. Here I develop Young’s critique that a
construction of deliberation-as-argument has the unintended consequence of violating
some of the very norms deliberative democracy idealizes, namely, inclusion. Young
broadens and restructures deliberation as public-reasonableness to account for this
problem. One important characteristic feature of deliberation-restructured-as-publicreasonableness, among other things, is that it does not assume that consensus must be a
starting place of, or goal for, deliberation.
A second critique and point of contrast, is that communicative democracy is
critical of the emphasis within traditional deliberative theory on impartiality and
correctness. Later I explore the individualistic ontology assumed in this emphasis on
impartiality and construction of deliberation-as-argument, as well as the veritistic
epistemology assumed in this emphasis on correctness. Rather than impartiality,
communicative democracy favors the inclusion of multiple social perspectives in public
processes. And rather than correctness, communicative democracy looks to those
inclusive public processes for identifying and framing public problems as well as
strategizing potential remedies for them.

19
A third critique and point of contrast between deliberative and communicative
conceptions of democracy, is that communicative democracy challenges us to broaden
our conception of democratic communication beyond deliberation altogether. Young is
uniquely aware of the identity-prejudiced and communicative dimensions of deliberative
inequality. Thus her account of communicative democracy introduces not only a wider
conception of deliberation-restructured-as-public-reasonableness, but also a wider
account of political participation. That is, communicative democracy does not isolate
political participation to deliberation, but looks to other alternative communicative
methods of political participation. Young introduces five additional communicative
methods in her work: greeting and acknowledgement of one’s interlocutors, rhetoric,
narrative (Young, 2000), and even questioning (Young, 1997) and protest (Young, 2001).
Young’s critique of traditional deliberative theory flows out of her wider critique
of liberal individualism itself. Young does not, however, develop this underlying critique
in a systematic way in any of her writings on democracy. Thus in Sections 4 and 5 of the
chapter, I make this contribution to her work and to the literature. The contrast between
deliberation-as-argument and deliberation-restructured-as-public-reasonableness rests on
a point of divergence between each respective theory’s underlying ontology and
epistemology. By way of critical contrast with the individualistic framework assumed by
deliberative theorists, I introduce Young’s alternative relational ontology and pragmatist
feminist social epistemology in the third and fourth sections of the chapter.
Section 6 examines the implications of an individualistic framework on how
political philosophers think about the value of participatory democracy itself. Here the
chapter articulates the overarching argument of the chapter, that communicative
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democracy is uniquely situated to name identity-prejudiced communicative inequality.
Besides making space to name and reflect on remedies for this form of deliberative
inequality, this pragmatist feminist framework for communicative democracy makes
space to make a powerful justification for the legitimacy of democratic institutions on
both epistemic and justice-producing grounds.
2. Deliberative Democracy in Context
Young is drawn to deliberative theory for its emphasis on four norms that she
finds valuable for theorizing justice in contexts of diversity, pluralism of values, social
inequality, and oppression: political equality, reasonableness, publicity, and inclusion
(Young, 2000). Her relationship with democratic theory was tenuous, however. She made
sharp criticisms of contemporary deliberative theory, yet she also saw deliberative theory
as an important starting place for theorizing social justice. Despite the flaws invoked by
deliberative theorists, deliberative democracy understood as an ideal puts forward four
specific norms that are necessary for theorizing justice in contexts of diversity, pluralism
of values, social inequality, and oppression: (1) political equality, (2) reasonableness, (3)
publicity, and (4) inclusion (Young, 2000). From these fundamental norms one can
derive further democratic values and practices like transparency to one’s constituents,
accountability of public officials, free expression, equal access to participation, and
expectations of reason giving in the justification of decisions. Thus Young takes
deliberative democracy as her starting place for theorizing its reincarnation,
communicative democracy.
There is a strong theoretical connection between democracy and justice where
democracy exists “under ideal conditions of inclusive political equality and public
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reasonableness” (Young, 2000, p. 17). Democratic institutions protect political autonomy
by ensuring checks and balances of power, maintaining transparency of public decisionmaking, and protecting various avenues for holding public officials accountable to
serving the public (e.g., protecting a free press). More than merely protecting political
autonomy, deeply participatory democratic institutions serve as an avenue for exercising
and developing one’s political agency. And epistemically speaking, inclusive democratic
processes like transparency, accountability, free expression, equal access to participation,
and expectations for reason-giving in the justification of decisions are the best means by
which a society discovers2 the most just policies.
The introduction of deliberative democracy theory in the 1980’s played a
significant role in clarifying democratic ideals and defending democracy against
alternative political institutions.3 Deliberative democracy can be broadly defined as a
body of democratic thought that bases the legitimacy for lawmaking in the public
deliberation of citizens, and in so doing, promotes reason over power in politics
(Benhabib, 1996; Gutmann and Thompson, 2004; Young, 1996, p. 122). Deliberative
democrats theorize deliberation as an open and inclusive exercise or process where
citizens who are free and equal, engage in reasoned discussion with one another for the
purposes of resolving public problems and forming agreed-upon policies.
2

It should be noted that this language of ‘discovery’ is one that the pragmatist feminist social
epistemology of communicative democracy that I defend in this dissertation will ultimately question. On
the pragmatist feminist epistemology of communicative democracy that I defend, terms like ‘designing’ or
‘generating’ might be more appropriate for expressing the open-ended processes of producing just policies
that this framework advocates.
3
Joseph Bessette is credited with the introduction of the term ‘deliberative democracy’ with his 1986
publication, “Deliberative Democracy: The Majority Principle in Republican Government”. Bessette was
concerned to resolve a tension between aristocratic and populist conceptions of democracy, and introduced
‘deliberative democracy’ as a third, reason-giving alternative to aristocracy and populism. Aristocratic
democracies tend towards elitism and populist democracies towards mob-rule, both power-based
institutions. In contrast, deliberative democracy introduces a reason-giving requirement that distinguishes it
from power-based conceptions of democracy. While Bessette introduces the term for the first time in the
literature, he roots the concept of deliberative democracy in the original intent of the framers themselves.
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Deliberative theorists introduce deliberation to qualify democracy and protect it
from charges of populism, or ‘mob rule’.4 Without the deliberative qualification there is a
tendency to lean towards elitism as a protection against populism. The deliberative
qualification demonstrates that despite their differences, both extremes (i.e., populism
and elitism) collapse into a form of rule that is ultimately based in power. A third way,
deliberative democracy, escapes this dichotomy by looking towards reason-giving and
deliberation processes rather than power, as the basis for political legitimacy.
It is helpful to explore the merits of deliberative democracy by way of contrast
with an alternative conception of democracy, preference-aggregative democracy. On an
aggregative model, “the goal of democratic decision-making is to decide what leaders,
rules, and policies will best correspond to the most widely and strongly held preferences”
(Young, 2000, p. 19). On such a model, individual citizens’ preferences are assumed as
fixed or given and may be formed in isolation from discussion with others, and decisionmaking processes are understood as competitive negotiations. As John Elster has
explained, “the goal of politics is [seen as] the optimal compromise between given, and
irreducibly opposed, private interests” (Elster, 1997, p. 3).
The aggregative perspective of democracy is embodied in contemporary social
choice theory, rooted in the work of French philosopher and mathematician Nicolas de
Condorcet (1743-1794).5 Social choice theory is a cluster of approaches that is concerned

4

For an early development of this argument in the literature, see especially Cohen (1986).
Condorcet was influential in early democratic theory for introducing a method of tallying the collective
outcome of individual choices expressed through voting. Condorcet’s approach was influential during the
birth of democracy because it served an important role in defending democracy against competing forms of
government on the basis of its epistemic powers to obtain a correct answer. Elizabeth Anderson (2006, 1011; citing Condorcet 1995 [1785]) summarizes Condorcet’s jury theorem nicely: “If voters (a) face two
options, (b) vote independently of one another, (c) vote their judgment of what the right solution to the
problem shot be (i.e., they do not vote strategically), and (d) have, on average, a greater than 50%
probability of being right, then, as the number of voters approaches infinity, the probability that the
5
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with the aggregation of individual preferences, usually expressed in modern democracies
through the secret ballet. Social choice theory takes as its goal the ordering of social
preferences of various alternatives, usually by way of assessing the results of a voting
procedure of some sort. While the results of preference aggregation processes are public
(e.g., election results), the decision-making process of each preference holder (i.e., a
voter) is not. Voters are not asked to share the reasons for their decision on ‘the secret
ballot’ and they are not tasked with basing their votes on any reasons. They could, after
all, flip a coin in the voting booth.
There are a number of reasons to be critical of aggregative models of democracy
on empirical grounds alone. Aggregative models assume that individuals are the best
judges of their own interests. But people are not infallible judges of their own interests
and often become better judges of their interests upon reflection, education, and dialogue
with others. Aggregative models also assume that individuals will defend their
[perceived] best interests. Relatedly, the model assumes that the preferences people
express in a voting exercise, for example, are a good guide to what they really do prefer
(Elster, 1986, p. 6). But people quite frequently vote against their own self-interest under
the influence of political propaganda. Or they do so as a result of other social and
economic factors like economic hardship or as a concession to a perceived lesser evil
than another alternative. Lastly and speaking to empirical problems for aggregative
models of democracy, political scientists have pointed to a host of mathematical
difficulties that arise when attempting to aggregate preferences.6 There simply is not a

majority vote will yield the right answer approaches 1 (and rapidly approaches 1 even with modest
numbers of voters).
6
For example, Arrow’s Theorem (Arrow, 1951/1963). Philip Pettit (2001) has also shown in his
discursive dilemma that how a collective decision is framed (premise-based or conclusion-based) can have
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settled enough account of its empirical reliability for it to serve as an epistemological
justification for the political legitimacy of aggregative democracy.
Beyond these empirical concerns, aggregative models fail on reasons relating
more blatantly to justice, and this critique is largely what makes deliberative democracy
such an attractive alternative for Young. The mere aggregation of individuals’
preferences is not indicative of promoting public goods and justice. Her point is
normative and pertains to justice, “Policies ought to be adopted not because the most
powerful interests win but because the citizens or their representatives together determine
their rightness after hearing and criticizing reasons” (Young, 1996, p. 122).
History and present are rife with examples of individuals preferring and agreeing
within groups to choose leaders and enact policies that conflict with democratic norms
themselves. For example, the result of the voting procedure could be one that restricts
freedom or equality of some members of society (e.g., majority opinions in the
antebellum south about slavery).7 Citizens’ preferences for particular leaders or policies
can be rooted in reasons relating to self-interest rather than to a conception of the public
good, and as a result, they can actually contradict a conception of the public good.

significant impact on the outcome of the aggregate. Condorcet (1785/1995) himself acknowledges this
problematic possibility in his note of the paradox of voting.
7
See especially Borgida, Federico, and Sullivan’s (2009) anthology, The Political Psychology of
Democratic Citizenship. Their collection is an excellent demonstration of the appreciation within political
psychology for various forms of deliberative inequalities, including communicative inequalities and in
particular, communicative inequalities based in the more implicit dimensions of oppression. Specifically,
they have included a number of publications from authors on issues of persuasion, group identity and
intergroup relations, and stereotype and prejudice. For an historical account of strategic racism and political
identity formation in U.S. politics, see also Ian Haney López’s (2014) Dog Whistle Politics: How Coded
Racial Appeals Have Reinvented Racism & Wrecked the Middle Class.
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This point is famously made by John Elster (1986/1997) in his influential paper,
“The Market and the Forum: Three Varieties of Political Theory.”8 It is also a point that
is commonly cited as an objection to democracy itself. However, Elster and other early
deliberative theorists draw attention to the fact that this objection is more appropriately
made of social choice models of democracy, not deliberatively qualified models. Elster’s
central concern with social choice theory is that uncoordinated private choices can lead to
outcomes that are far worse off for the body politic than what “could have been attained
by coordination” (Elster, 1986/1997, p. 4).9 That is, the central concern of politics is with
‘the common good’, and more particularly, “with the cases in which [that common good]
cannot be realized as the aggregate outcome of individuals pursuing their private interest”
(Elster, 1986/1997, p. 4). Thus a reduction of politics to ‘the aggregate outcome of
individuals pursuing their private interests’ defeats the very purpose of politics itself.
While individual preferences may coincide with the common good, there is no
necessary correlation between the two. Rather, it is as Joshua Cohen explains, “The
interests, aims, and ideals that comprise the common good are those that survive
deliberation, interests that, on public reflection, we think it legitimate to appeal to in
making claims on social resources” (Cohen, 1989/1997, pp. 76-76, the emphasis is mine).
Deliberation has this potential because of the reason-giving requirement inherent in the
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Along with Bessette’s “Deliberative Democracy: The Majority Principle in Republican Government”
(1980) and Cohen’s “An Epistemic Conception of Democracy” (1986), Elster’s (1986/1997) influential
paper was an important early work for initiating the contemporary deliberative democracy literature. Here
Elster makes a persuasive and influential critique of ‘the private-instrumental view of politics’, by which he
has in mind a preference-aggregative and social choice theory model of democracy.
9
Elster’s in depth critique provides a number of objections to the inadequacy of social choice theory as
a collective decision-making procedure. He organizes his objections into two sets: “First, that the
preferences people choose to express may not be a good guide to what they really prefer; and secondly, that
what they really prefer may in any case be a fragile foundation for social choice” (Elster, 1986/1997, p. 6).
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activity itself. Thus like Elizabeth Anderson, Cohen takes it that deliberative processes
are “constitutive, not accidental features of democracy” (Anderson, 2006, p. 11).10
So while the activity of voting, for example, is commonly perceived by the
populous as an expression of democracy, considered as a political action in isolation from
any kind of meaningful democratic communication (e.g., public debate, deliberation,
etc.), it actually has no way of holding citizens accountable to form preferences on the
basis of reasons concerning the public good rather than private, self-interested
preferences. That this is the case means that the process could itself function to bring
about grossly unjust results, throwing into question whether voting really is an ideal
expression of democracy. In Young’s words, “Indeed, the aggregate outcome can just as
easily be irrational as rational” (Young, 2000, p. 21). The normative argument here is that
power should not be backed by force – whether in the form of a monarch, an
authoritarian regime, or even popular vote – but rather, it should be backed by reasons
that are publicly accessible to all for consideration and debate.
The reason-giving requirement inherent in deliberative democracy makes it an
appealing alternative to aggregative models for a number of other reasons relating to
justice. Deliberative theorists commonly source deliberation as the basis for political
legitimacy. Developing out of consent theory and Rawls’ introduction of public reasons
in Political Liberalism (1993), deliberative democracy idealizes deliberation as a
normative justification for political coercion.11 Citizens consent to and submit their
autonomy to coercive political decisions by way of deliberation. Political decisions can
10

Anderson (2006) makes this point in her development of a Dewey-an epistemology of democracy.
Here she is contrasting deliberative democracy with the preference-aggregative mechanism embodied by
the Condorcet Jury Theorem.
11
On this, Bohman has poignantly remarked, “Consent is, after all, the main feature of democracy”
(Bohman, 1996, p. 4).
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be normatively defended on the basis that they are the result of public processes of
reason-giving and deliberation among free and equal citizens. So, to return to the
example of voting, voting is democratic not simply because it expresses the opinion of
the majority, but because it motivates discussion about the public good as a mechanism
for forming a majority opinion.
Deliberative theorists also point to the epistemic value of deliberation. Joshua
Cohen’s (1986, 1989/1997) and David Estlund’s (1997) work has been influential within
the contemporary deliberative theory literature for introducing an epistemic account of
the value of deliberation. Cohen’s early paper, “An Epistemic Conception of Democracy”
(1986), is widely referenced for having initiated the reason-giving requirement (i.e.,
deliberation) to epistemic justifications for democracy. While Cohen makes no use of the
term ‘deliberative democracy’ in this paper (recently introduced only six years prior by
Bessette, 1980), his paper is important for the deliberative democracy literature because
he introduces an account of voting that is deliberative in character in his introduction and
defense of a normative account of voting, which he calls ‘epistemic populism’.
Populism is defensible, Cohen argues, when it is conditioned on an epistemic, or
reason-giving, conception of the voting process. A vote is reason-giving when it consists
of three main elements, the last of which introduces the deliberative qualification for
epistemic democracy: (1) an independent standard of correctness (e.g., the common
good), (2) a cognitive account of voting, that is, the view that voting expresses beliefs
about what policies will in fact realize that independent standard, and (3) an
understanding of decision making “as a process of the adjustment of beliefs, adjustments
that are undertaken in part in light of the evidence about the correct answer that is
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provided by the beliefs of others” (Cohen, 1986, 34). While significant for the
deliberative democracy project, Cohen’s deliberative, epistemic democracy makes a
number of faulty assumptions that are an eventual subject of scrutiny in this chapter.
Some deliberative theorists have argued that another benefit of public, reasongiving processes is that they promote the perception of legitimacy among citizens.12 And
drawing on Mill, some theorists point to the educative value of “the public exchange of
arguments and reasons” (e.g., Christiano, 1997).13 On this perspective, deliberation
makes people “better informed…more skillful participants in the arts of politics” and
stimulates sympathies towards others (Zakaras, 2007). Drawing on the thought of John
Stuart Mill, Alex Zakaras argues that deliberation can stimulate the kinds of intellectual
and epistemic virtues (i.e., humility, imagination, and skepticism) that are necessary for
maintaining individuality and avoiding conformity to tyrannical traditions and norms
(Zakaras, 2007).
Deliberation requires that one’s preferences be made public and explained, and
this process requires that she appeal to reasons and that those reasons move beyond selfinterest to wider audiences, and thus make wider appeals to justice. This process requires
that one examine her preferences and transform them into publicly accessible reasons,
that is, reasons that are reasons for a wider, pluralist, public because they appeal to a

12

It is important to point out that this political psychological justification for the legitimacy of
deliberative democracy is descriptive and should be distinguished from normative legitimacy accounts. My
project assumes the value of both normative and descriptive justifications and does not attempt to defend
either or both.
13
Christiano’s mixed approach to the value of public deliberation does tend to emphasize the more
epistemic justification for deliberation. He does concede to the educative justification for deliberation,
however, writing that, “Democratic institutions and in particular institutions of discussion and deliberation
have a large impact on whether individuals have the opportunities to reflect on and come to a better
understanding of their interests and to arrive at a more reasoned point of view” (Christiano, 1997, p. 258).
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common interest, a common good, or justice more generally.14 The very activity of
politics itself (understood as involving some form of discussion or deliberation) tends to
focus participants towards discussion about and considerations of the common good and
through that, to generate conceptions of the common good (Elster, 1986; Cohen, 1989).
Young explains how this transformation takes place:
In the deliberative model political actors not only express preferences and
interests, but they engage with one another about how to balance these under
circumstances of inclusive equality. Because this interaction requires participants
to be open and attentive to one another, to justify their claims and proposals in
terms acceptable to all, the orientation of participants moves from self-regard to
an orientation towards what is publicly assertable. (Young, 2000, p. 27)
Young is drawn to the educative and preference-transformative capacity of
deliberation. Whereas the aggregative model assumes that preferences are fixed and that
the primary goal of politics is to aggregate them, deliberative democrats argue that one
important goal of politics is the education of one’s preferences through, and as a result of,
contact with others. In Estlund’s words, an aggregative model is an “incongruous means”
for creating justice, particularly because human preferences are not, as social choice
theorists wrongfully assume, pre-political and ‘given’, but are shaped, developed, and
nurtured through processes of public deliberation, and I will eventually argue, democratic
communication more broadly understood to include such things as greeting, rhetoric,
storytelling, comedy, the arts, protest, and even questioning and exploratory speech
(Estlund, 1997, p. 11).
Yet this educative feature of deliberation has been underemphasized in much of
the traditional, deliberative theory literature. Scholars fail to appreciate its significance
for the realization of democratic norms, and overlook it as having anything to do with
14

See especially Rawls (1993/1997).
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making political legitimacy justifications altogether. Joshua Cohen (1996) has even
expressly denied the significance of the educative capacity of deliberation. He asserts that
preference transformation is not a proper goal of deliberative democracy, but rather, is a
mere byproduct of it (Cohen, 1996, p. 100).
I think this unlinking of the educative capacity of deliberation from political
legitimacy justifications is a theoretical mistake with roots in the ontological
individualism and veritistic social epistemology of traditional deliberative theorists. I
revisit this point in the closing section of the chapter. It is also one reason why Young’s
conception of communicative democracy fares much better than traditional deliberative
models for naming the problem of identity-prejudiced communicative inequality, and
through this, creating space for strategizing resolutions for it.
3. A Youngian Critique: Beyond Deliberation-as-Argument Towards DeliberationRestructured-as-Public-Reasonableness
Young offers a formal critique of deliberative democracy in Inclusion and
Democracy (2000). But her earlier work in Justice and the Politics of Difference (1990)
lays important ontological and epistemological groundwork for this critique. Here I draw
from both of these seminal works on inclusion and democracy as well as other influential
writings to develop a Youngian critique of traditional, deliberative theory. As I analyze
Young’s thought, the various critiques that can be brought against deliberative theory are
unified by their problematic foundation in an ontological individualism and veritistic
social epistemology. And this is precisely what makes traditional constructions of
deliberative theory inadequate for conceptualizing and naming identity-prejudiced
communicative inequality.
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I use ‘veritistic’ in the sense that Alvin Goldman (1999) used it, to describe a
consequentialist epistemology concerned with knowledge outcome where knowledge is
understood as true belief and knowledge practices are, “evaluated in relation to their
contribution to veritistic value, to their truth-tracking potential” (Peter, 2007, p. 341).
This chapter contrasts this epistemology with Young’s epistemology, what I am
analyzing as a pragmatist feminist social epistemology.
Young is critical that deliberative theorists formulate too academic and elitist a
construction of deliberation understood as argument that enables, and in some cases even
promotes, exclusion. Bohman comments, “Deliberation, too, seems to be elitist, more
appropriate to university seminars and scientific communities than to the general public”
(1996, p. 3). This particularly academic conception of public deliberation has been
described by José Martí as, “a collective form of argumentation, where arguing consists
in exchanging reasons, for or against certain proposals, oriented to the goal of rationally
convincing others…and it is supposed to lead us, at least ideally, to rational consensus”
(Martí, 2005, p. 29).
Argument has a history of conditioning participation on meeting norms of
dispassionate speech and articulateness. The association of argument with dispassionate
speech has received notable scrutiny from feminist theorists and contemporary pragmatist
thinkers, scrutiny that it is outside of the scope of this project to reiterate in great detail. I
will mention two important conclusions from this body of literature that are relevant for
developing my project. The first is a point about the origin of the association of argument
with dispassionate speech and articulateness, and the second is a point about the strategic,
identity-prejudiced use of it to enforce existing power relations.
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First, the association of argument with dispassionate speech has complex
historical origins in Western philosophy, where reason has been elevated over the
emotions, and the mind elevated over the body. Joan Tronto attributes a great deal of the
stigmatization of the affective dimensions of moral decision-making and the
marginalization of women’s moral knowledge to social and economic changes of the
eighteenth century during which a transformation took place, “from the more organic,
integrated way of life of people into a way of life organized around the requirements of
wage labor and the market” (Tronto, 2009, p. 32). Tronto identifies this time period and
social context as influential for the introduction of the dichotomy between the private,
domestic sphere where women’s moral sentiments were welcome and the public, political
sphere where they were excluded in favor of more ‘impartial’ constructions of moral
reasoning.15
Young does not endeavor to conjecture the historical underpinnings of these
dichotomies. Rather, she takes the attitude that such things, “quite possibly [come] about
through a set of fateful, historical accidents” (Young, 1990, p. 127). Whereas there has
been a positive association of reason and mind with the masculine and elite, there has
been a negative association of the emotional life and body with the feminine and servant
and slave classes. Regardless of its basis, it presently problematizes inclusive democratic
practices.
The second conclusion from this literature that is relevant for my project, is that
under the cloak of ‘impartiality’, agents in positions of social power have historically
enforced this reason-emotion dichotomy inconsistently, for example, through favoring
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See Fenton (2015) for a more detailed account of this dichotomy as it pertains to resistance emotions
and corporate dismissal of activists’ moral claims on them.
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men’s anger as ‘righteous indignation’ and women’s as ‘hysteria’.16 To be clear, this kind
of inconsistent, identity-prejudiced enforcement of the reason-emotion dichotomy can
arise as a result of the enforcer’s gender-socialized communicative habits and biased
perceptions, biases that operate at a lower or more implicit level of consciousness and are
unknown to the agent. However, individuals sometimes strategically enforce the reasonemotion dichotomy in gendered, identity-prejudiced ways. In strategic enforcement, the
‘enforcer’ is, on some level, aware of the communicative success of these practices for
maintaining his dominant epistemic standing in the communicative context. In both
implicit and strategic instances of identity-prejudiced enforcement of the reason-emotion
dichotomy, these communicative practices function to maintain power in gender relations
or other group-based relations of power through both diminishing the deliberative
standing of the speaker whose speech is enforced by them, and more generally, through
communicating this diminished deliberative standing to bystanders or third parties to the
communicative act.
In non-democratic institutions like classist systems and monarchies, if political
decision-making power is based in reason, and if those in power are the only ones seen as
possessing reason, the maintenance of the reason/emotion dichotomy through social
norms and social enforcement and the acceptance of it by non-elites insulates the status
quo institutions, authority-figures, and practices from being challenged. Higher-status
social groups tend to occupy academic and elite classes that stand to benefit from the
maintenance of these opposing categories and stigmatization of one. One’s elite status is
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See especially Rachel P. Maines’s (1999) account of the history of social and political motivations
behind medical diagnoses of ‘hysteria’ in women during the Victorian era in her book, The Technology of
Orgasm: “Hysteria”, the Vibrator, and Women’s Sexual Satisfaction.
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maintained by way of contrast with the Other, “deviant and inferior” (Young, 1988, p.
285). Again, this power dynamic can function on implicit levels or be used strategically.
Similar to the norm of dispassionate speech, the association of argument with
articulateness (e.g., tone, grammar, regional accent, or diction) has complex origins in
classist systems where elites have more and better access to education, but it can also be
used strategically by academic and political elites to maintain quiescence. Norms of
articulateness tend to be culturally specific to the expression tendencies of the more
socially privileged (Young, 2000, pp. 38-39). Deliberation specifically has been styled
after Western institutions of scientific debate, modern parliaments, and courts. These
institutions have historically been male-dominated and were formed in “class- and racedifferentiated societies” (Young, 1996, p. 123).17
It is possible that participants in these Western deliberative institutions debated
under relative political, economic, and social power (though this is unlikely). Even were
this the case, it is problematic to extrapolate these norms of dispassionate speech and
articulateness onto a contemporary conception and practice of deliberation that operates
in a wider social context of social inequality and oppression. One should not need special
education or training in formal argumentation or familiarity with particular jargons and
methods of discourse for democratic participation. Borrowing from Mill, we ought not to
assume that the generality of epistemic norms, communicative norms, or of a practice
(i.e., deliberation-as-argument) is evidence “that it is, or at all events once was, conducive
to laudable ends” (Mill, 1869/1988, p. 4).
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See especially Haslanger (2002) and Longino (1989, 1990, 2002).
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The worry for Mill, echoed and enriched in Young’s own account of cultural
imperialism, is that closed, elite communities create epistemic, communicative, and
moral norms that are assumed as universal and are then imposed on others (Young, 1988;
Young, 1990). Because such norms and perspectives are part of the dominant culture,
they get assumed as universal and go unnoticed as perspectives. When at first these elite
communities are forced to become formally inclusive under the expansion of human
rights of participation, the norms are not questioned and get assumed as universal
standards of knowing, communicating, and conduct. The relevant points here are that the
communicative culture of traditional deliberative institutions – which to reiterate,
historically conditioned membership on white, male, elite status – is assumed as a
universally accessible and epistemically advantageous communicative culture, and it goes
unnoticed that this communicative culture is actually one among many in a given society.
To protect deliberation from the elitist creep of norms of dispassionate speech and
articulateness, Young introduces a more general requirement of reasonableness. Rather
than norms of dispassionate speech and articulateness, one need only meet a basic
expectation of reasonableness in discussion, which Young explains as, “being open to
listening to others and having them influence one’s own views, and expressing one’s own
claims upon them in ways that aim to reach their assent or understanding” (Young, 2000,
p. 38).
Although not significantly developed in her work, we can extract some
information about what Young has in mind for a wider and potentially inclusive
conception of deliberation-restructured-as-public reasonableness from one of her
intermediary publications, “Communication and the Other: Beyond Deliberative
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Democracy” (1996).18 Here Young briefly develops a broader account of public
reasonableness than is permitted by traditional accounts of deliberation-as-argument.
Here Young criticizes deliberation-as-argument for its overly idealized
deliberative procedure, which is agonistic and competitive (Young, 1996). Drawing from
Cohen (1989), Young explains this traditional conception of deliberation as reasoned
argument where, “participants come to a political problem with an open mind about its
solution” and are “not bound by the authority of prior norms or requirements” (Young,
1996, p. 122). They “put forward proposals and criticize, and each assents to a conclusion
only because of the “force of the better argument”” (ibid.). For example, Cohen assumes
deliberation-as-argument in his construction of an ideal deliberative procedure: “Reasons
are offered with the aim of bringing others to accept the proposal” (Cohen, 1989/1997, p.
74).
Under this traditional construction of deliberation-as-argument, “parties to dispute
aim to win the argument, not to achieve mutual understanding” (Young, 1996, p. 123).
This restriction of political communication to ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ reintroduces a power
dynamic to the democratic forum that is consistent with the power dynamic of force that
deliberative theorists are themselves critical of. Speakers who tend towards more
exploratory forms of speech are at an inherent disadvantage to participate in these types
of argumentative exchanges. The rules of the discussion ‘game’ have already been made
and they have not been party to this process.
To promote formal inclusion, deliberative theorists allege that political and
economic power is bracketed in this exchange. The faulty assumption here, however, is
18

This piece is ‘intermediary’ in the sense that it was published between what I have referred to as
Young’s two seminal works specific to inclusion and democracy, Justice and the Politics of Difference
(1990) and Inclusion and Democracy (2000).
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that the formal exclusion of political and economic influence in decision-making will
fully neutralize the power of individuals. But the account, as Young is keen to point out,
ignores the complex ways that political, economic, and social power impacts one’s
formal access to deliberative spaces, her capacity to participate in those spaces, and also
very importantly her deliberative standing in that space.
But given the complexity of public problems, why not instead of adversarial,
competitive communication, an “open reciprocal recognition of the point of view of
everyone” (Young, 1996, p. 122)? A wider and potentially more inclusive conception of
deliberation, restructured as public-reasonableness more broadly understood, will include
alternative modes of speech that while not formally structured as argument, introduce
perspectives on issues and problems that are reasonable.
Deliberative equality requires both that each have “the equal opportunity to make
proposals and criticize” and that “their speaking situation [is] free from domination”
(Young, 1996, p. 122). Restricting deliberation to argument makes space for deliberative
inequality on the basis of both elitist communicative conditions for participation, and
contentious domination in communicative activities where academics and clever citizens
intellectually bully less formally trained speakers. As Young explains, “Argument is not
the only mode of political communication, and argument can be expressed in a plurality
of ways, interspersed with or alongside other communicative forms” (Young, 1996, p.
125).
The fascination with formal argument is inherently elitist in more ways than one.
Beyond the fact that it establishes a threshold for participation that tends to favor the
communicative cultures of social elites and enables for identity-prejudiced strategic
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enforcement, it also idealizes consensus as both a starting place and a goal for
deliberation. There are a few reasons to worry about consensus as a starting place or goal
for deliberation. In pluralist societies characterized by diverse social experiences and
understandings, we cannot assume that this unification is so easy (Young, 2000, p. 41).
Furthermore, we cannot assume that when there is some unification on premises or on the
way a problem under consideration has been framed, that that unification is not itself a
result of social inequality.
Take for instance John Gaventa’s famous investigation of industrial power and
quiescence in the Central Appalachian Valley. He observes that despite great wealth in
the region, most Appalachian-mountaneers live in tremendous poverty yet have
extremely low political participation rates and are relatively unorganized as labor groups.
Common thinking in Appalachian studies at the time was that this inactivity, lack of
upheaval or rebellion, relative social stability, and quiescence can be explained by “the
culture or circumstance of the deprived themselves” (Gaventa, 1982, p. 40). Gaventa
argues against this trend in thought, that the political response of an oppressed group or
class (or lack of response) is often itself a result of a complex history of power relations
that are difficult to observe and operate in complex ways. The Young-ian point here is
that like quiescence, consensus must also be understood as a possible result of social
inequality and power. Borrowing from Gutman and Thompson, “If moral differences are
as deep and pervasive as pluralists [like Young] believe, they can be eliminated in
politics only by repression” (Gutman and Thompson, 2004, p. 28).
There are a variety of stages of formal argument that require some level of
consensus for continued participation in the communicative act, and identity-prejudiced
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communicative inequalities can impact the direction towards which the consensus
requirement is pushed on all of those levels. We can compartmentalize argument into
three parts in order to analyze the various stages at which the communicative practice of
argument is vulnerable to the elitist creep of a false consensus: (1) its starting place, (2)
its process, that is, as a style of discourse itself, and (3) its goal. First, argument begins
with a problem or issue that has already been selected and defined. In formal argument,
parties “cannot proceed unless there are some premises that all the discussants accept”
(Young, 2000, p. 37). Some level of consensus is required just for argument to get
started.
This reduction of deliberation to argument fails to account for the communicative
processes that generate the object of deliberation itself, that object being a problem that
interlocutors agree is a problem and on how it has been framed. That is, formal arguments
are constructed about problems that the parties to the argument agree are problems
worthy of dispute. The reduction of deliberation to formal argument ignores the
multidimensional ways that power operates in the formation of social consensus about
public problems. How has this problem under deliberative consideration come to be seen
as a public problem? Who has participated in defining it? How have power relations in
society shaped this definition process? Are there, for example, alternative ways that the
problem could be framed that go undiscovered or get dismissed because of identityprejudices towards the speakers who are bringing forward those framings? To borrow
from Bohman, “Inequalities of power enter into the very definition of the problematic
situation to be deliberated upon…in the way in which problems are defined and thus
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“framed,” often in such a way that the participatory success of powerful groups is
ensured” (Bohman, 1996, p. 117; citing Gamson, 1993).
Consider the current Black Lives Matter (BLM) movement of the 2010’s.
Activists are attempting to introduce a problem for public consideration. Judith Butler
sheds light on the underlying moral claims in the activist chant, “Black Lives Matter”:
It is a statement of outrage and a demand for equality, for the right to live free of
constraint, but also a chant that links the history of slavery, of debt peonage,
segregation, and a prison system geared towards containment, neutralization and
degradation of black lives, but also a police system that more and more easily and
often can take away a black life in a flash all because some officer perceives a
threat. (Yancy and Butler, 2015)
One challenge for the progress of the Black Lives Matter movement has been the
counter-activist movement of whites chanting, holding signs, or posting signs outside
their residences that read, “All Lives Matter”, “Blue Lives Matter”, and “We Back the
Badge”. This public response misunderstands and even distorts and dismisses the
problem being proposed by BLM. Butler explains: “It is true that all lives matter, but it is
equally true that not all lives are understood to matter which is precisely why it is most
important to name the lives that have not mattered, and are struggling to matter in the
way they deserve” (Yancy and Butler, 2005).
If we map a traditional deliberative paradigm and its assumption of consensus as a
starting place for deliberation onto this example, we have problematized the possibility
for deliberation to even get started. Parties cannot agree on whether there is a problem
worth considering at all, and because the counter-activist party enjoys a privileged
deliberative standing relative to social power relations with regard to race, this
perspective dominates the discourse.
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All this is to say that the very process of coming to define public problems is
itself a significant, communicative practice. Bohman (1996) has a modest appreciation
for this point. Drawing on the political science literature on framing and agenda setting,
he explains, “Power can be expressed in the way in which problems are defined and thus
“framed,” often in such a way that the participatory success of powerful groups is
ensured” (Bohman, 1996, p. 117; citing Gamson, 1993, pp. 6-8).19 Bohman concludes
that agenda setting is itself a deliberative activity and an indicator that a “basic threshold”
of political equality is operating in communicative space. That is, whether an individual
or group can even bring an issue or problem forward for public consideration is a good
empirical indicator of deliberative equality.
Despite her critique of consensus as a starting place for deliberation, Young does
not abandon some sense of unity in support of an utterly fractured body politic.
Importantly, her critique is only that too strong a conception of consensus as a starting
place problematizes deliberative equality. Young advocates a weak unity based on
meeting three conditions, two of which are normatively substantive: (1) Citizens need
only share in their having been ‘thrown together’ in regional proximity or through
economic interdependence as a starting place for political communication. Beyond this
basic condition of interdependence, such “people who live together, who are stuck with
one another” must share two very basic, substantive values: (2) “a commitment to equal
respect for one another” and (3) some agreement on “procedural rules of fair discussion
and decision-making” (Young, 1996, p. 126).
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See also Bachrach and Baratz’s (1970) work on agenda setting. Bureaucratic institutions can
themselves filter out various framings of problems, particularly those framings that draw connections
between the proposed problem and the structure of the institution itself. In such cases, Bachrach and Baratz
explain that a “non-decision” is produced.
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Deliberation-as-argument is vulnerable to the elitist creep of a false consensus in
its second stage because as a process of putting forward one’s reasons, defending them,
and interrogating the reasons of others, it assumes a consensus on an appropriate method
of discourse. As was demonstrated in my earlier exposition of norms of dispassionate
speech and articulateness, no such consensus among free and equal citizens in this
communicative method was ever had. Rather, in this stage of argument, an elitist
communicative culture is assumed as neutral and universally accessible, and non-elites
must conform to this as a condition for their participation.
One of the worries that motivates this critique is that in contexts of social
inequality and oppression, social elites can dictate how problems are framed as well as
what communicative methods and norms any discussion about those problems is
conditioned upon. Susan Dieleman (2015) has recently argued that Young senses an
additional injustice at work in political processes of problem-framing, definitionformation, and deliberation-uptake, namely, a hermeneutical injustice. Drawing on the
work of Miranda Fricker (2007), Dieleman maps Fricker’s conceptions of testimonial and
hermeneutical justice onto Young’s critique. Dieleman explains testimonial and
hermeneutical injustice,
Speakers – typically members of historically disenfranchised groups – can be
wronged [testimonially] as bearers and providers of knowledge because they
might be subject to identity prejudices that affect how credible we think they are
or [hermeneutically] because they might live in a society that hasn’t developed
the concepts needed to express their experiences or the interpretive tools needed
to understand their particular communicative style. (Dieleman, 2015, p. 794)
Whereas testimonial injustice attaches to the speaker in the form of identity
prejudices, hermeneutical injustice is structural and attaches to speech itself (Alcoff,
2010, p. 129). Social inequality and oppression can skew the very hermeneutical
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resources available to describe one’s social experiences to others. And whereas the elite
rarely find themselves without words to describe their experiences since their experiences
and expressions of those experiences have been normalized and assumed as universal,
“the powerless, on the other hand, must make do with the social meanings available to
them, many of which will be inadequate to the task of interpreting and communicating
their own experiences” (Dieleman, 2015, p. 801).
Young deepens her critique of consensus-based politics in her later work,
“Activist Challenges to Deliberative Democracy” (2001). Here she anticipates Fricker’s
conception of hermeneutical injustice perhaps most clearly in her account of a
‘discourse’:
A system of stories and expert knowledge diffused through the society, which
convey the widely accepted generalizations about how society operates that are
theorized in these terms, as well as the social norms and cultural values to which
most of the people appeal when discussing their social and political problems and
proposed solutions. (Young, 2001, p. 686)
Even where formal conditions of deliberative inclusion are met, a discourse may
limit the hearing that a particular person or group can get because their insights and
claims do not assume the dominant discourse, and the dominant discourse lacks the
hermeneutical resources to make sense of the insights and claims being expressed. What
is more, because a dominant discourse may include “falsifications, biases,
misunderstandings, and even contradictions” that frequently go unnoticed by those who
assume the dominant discourse, such discourses may also produce a false consensus
(Young, 2001, p. 685).
Young gives the example of a dominant discourse of poverty where “there seems
to be wide agreement that poverty should be conceptualized as a function of the failure of
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individuals to develop various skills and capacities necessary for inclusion in modern
labor markets” (Young, 2001, p. 686). Thus deliberative forums created to discuss ‘the
problem of poverty’ will have already smuggled a number of normative assumptions: the
myth that all have equal access to participate in labor markets, the assumption that justice
is merely a matter of distribution of resources and access to jobs (and not, as Young has
argued in much of her work, a question of participation), that labor markets are
themselves the best structure for economically organizing a society, and importantly, an
atomistic and individualistic ontology.
To take this example further, consider a common tension within communitybased organizations. An activist program planner for a community-based organization is
sensitive to the history of racial and gender inequality in the community she represents.
She has a more relational and institutional conception of poverty and its causes.
However, she is often compelled by board members and donors to address poverty
merely at a distributive level (e.g., in the form of a food pantry) and in a paternalistic
form, when she would much rather couple these relief-services with programs that aim to
boost the participatory political power of the organization’s constituents. In such cases,
major decision-makers for the organization assume the dominant discourse of poverty,
one of liberal individualism and a distributive paradigm of justice. Thus, one’s
participation in discussion about problem identification and program planning is
conditioned on conforming to that discourse.
Finally, deliberation-as-argument is vulnerable to the elitist creep of a false
consensus in the assumptions it makes about the goal of deliberation. The approach
assumes that the epistemic practice of argumentation is at it’s best, truth-conducive, and
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at a minimum, at least consensus-producing. That is, deliberation is seen as epistemically
valuable because at a minimum, it convinces others to consent to some remedy for a
problem and at best, because it discovers the correct answer to a problem. This first
alternative is problematic for the same reasons that it is as a starting place for
deliberation. Young’s general concern about argument-towards-consensus is that too
strong a commitment to this, “can incline some or all to advocate removing difficult
issues from discussion for the sake of agreement and preservation of the common good”
(2000, p. 42). When deliberative processes are framed by “longstanding and multiple
structural inequalities”, people may arrive at agreement that “is at least party conditioned
by unjust relations and for that reasons should not be considered a genuinely free
consent” (Young, 2001, p. 685).
This second purported goal for deliberation, discovery of a correct answer, is
problematic because it assumes that correctness is a possible goal for political decisionmaking. Besides rejecting the atomistic and individualistic ontology of liberal
individualism, communicative democracy must also be skeptical of the veritistic social
epistemology assumed in this final stage and goal of deliberation-as-argument. I develop
this point in further detail later in this chapter.
From the critique offered here of deliberation-as-argument we can arrive at a
more robust conception of deliberative equality than has been enabled by deliberative
theorists. It requires not just equal, formal access to participation in deliberation, but
equal participation in the identification and defining of public problems and in the
formation of the communicative cultures and norms that govern the deliberation process
itself. Here I have shown that deliberation-as-argument actually worsens deliberative
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inequality because it universalizes a particular mode of discourse most familiar to elites
and establishes it as a threshold for participation.
Here I have focused on problematic tendencies in the construction of deliberationas-argument related to consensus: it’s emphasis on consensus as a starting place and
possible goal of deliberation and it’s assumption of some sort of social consensus about
the necessity of this mode of discourse for political decision-making processes.
Recall that I have claimed that deliberative theorists assume a faulty
individualistic ontology and veritistic social epistemology in their constructions of
deliberation-as-argument. In the two sections that follow, I will develop alternative
relational ontology and pragmatist feminist social epistemology of communicative
democracy by way of critical contrast with this individualistic framework. This
framework struggles to identify and makes sense of communicatively structured
deliberative inequality, and more specifically, to name identity-prejudiced
communicative inequality. Thus, a deliberative theory that assumes this framework will
struggle to meet the strong sense of inclusion Young idealizes for democracy.
4. Young’s Relational Ontology
The relational framework of communicative democracy that I develop in this and
the following sections of this chapter will introduce and develop some important concepts
to deliberative democracy: the concepts of (1) social identity, (2) socially situated
standpoint and perspective, (3) epistemic standing. The pragmatist feminist conception of
communicative democracy that I am developing in this project appreciates the complex
ways that these three are impacted by one’s relative position in a given society where
there are relations of power, oppression, and privilege.
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Young develops her conception of identity from three traditions, all linked by
their deeply relational conceptions of identity: (1) the philosophy of Jürgen Habermas,
(2) the sociology of Stephen Epstein, and (3) the social psychology of John Turner.
Owing to Habermas, Young sees identity “not as an origin but as a product of linguistic
and practical interaction” (Young, 1990, p. 45; citing Habermas, 1987, pp. 3-40). One’s
social identity results from “an internal organization of self-perception concerning one’s
relationship to social categories, that also incorporates views of the self perceived to be
held by others” (Young, 1990, p. 45; citing Epstein, 1987, p. 29).
Young eventually turns to Turner’s social psychology to establish an account of
the social group because of their shared belief that “neither social theory nor philosophy
has a clear and developed concept of the social group (Young, 1990, p. 43; citing Turner
et. al., 1987). Borrowing from Turner, she explains, “Group categorization and norms are
major constituents of individual identity” (Young, 1990, p. 45; citing Turner et. al.,
1987).
It is worth noting that Turner’s research and thought eventually develops into the
social identity approach that is under consideration in Chapter 2 of this dissertation.
Turner studied under, and eventually researched and published with, Henri Tajfel,
pioneer of the approach. Tajfel introduces the concept of social identity in his research on
intergroup relations: it is “that part of the individual’s self-concept which derives from
their knowledge of their membership of a social group (or groups) together with the value
and emotional significance of that membership” (Tajfel, 1981, p. 255).
Young points out that on the classical liberal framework, social groups are
primarily thought of as either aggregates or associations of individuals. Both of these
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perspectives assume that identity is ontologically prior to one’s membership in a group.
Whereas the associative model thinks of individuals as individuals coming together with
the purpose of pursuing a shared goal that has been formed in isolation from one another
prior to their association, the aggregative model assumes an attributional account of
social groups as combinations of individuals based on similar and categorically essential
attributes (Young, 1990, pp. 43-44).
For example, the American legal system and political discourse around it uses the
language of ‘discrimination’ to talk of group-based exclusions, by which is meant,
“conscious actions or policies by which members of a group are excluded from
institutions or confined to inferior positions” (Young, 1988, p. 272).20 Young draws
attention to the roots of this narrow linguistic framework of ‘discrimination’: a faulty
conception of social groups as aggregates or associations. The language that dominates
political discourse in the U.S. does not have the ontological tools to conceptualize the
discourse of oppression as used by new social movements, a structural phenomenon that
results from power relations (Young, 1988, p. 270). Discrimination, aggregates, and
associations are all “methodologically individualist concepts” that fail to identify the
complexity of group identifications (Young, 1988, pp. 272-3).
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For an excellent example of the limitations of concepts of ‘discrimination’ and ‘disparate impact’ in
the American judicial system, see King, et. al., 2011. Their research sampled 219 cases from over 1,000
cases in employment law in (non-appellate, non-jury) federal district court cases between 2000 and 2008
where charges of discrimination were brought against employers or workplaces on the basis of race,
ethnicity, or gender. They found that while “scientists agree that contemporary discrimination is manifested
in [various forms of microaggressions]”, and that while “both targets and outsiders are aware of and
recognize contemporary forms of discrimination”, this was not reflected in case decisions (pp. 55, 70).
“Only behaviors that were clearly intended to cause harm to racial minorities or women (i.e., microassaults)
were consistently correlated with decisions in favor of plaintiffs” (p. 69). The authors also point to case law
the offers judges more discretion in assessing intent (e.g., McDaniel v. EagleCare, Inc., 2002) and hostile
work environment (e.g., Curry v. District of Columbia, 1999) as evidence that judges’ perceptions and
interpretations themselves may be limited by outdated conceptions of identity-prejudiced harms.
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Similar to the concept of ‘discrimination’, ‘oppression’ has historically been
conceptualized through the lens of liberal individualism as “the exercise of tyranny by a
ruling group”. Talk of oppressed groups commonly assumes an attributional account of
the social group where individuals are assumed as having chosen membership in the
group of say, African Americans, because of self-identified “essential attributes” (Young,
1990, p. 40). But this is actually backwards since unlike associations, social groups
“emerge from the way people interact” and relations of power that are outside of an
individual’s own processes of self-definition (Young, 2000, p. 90).
To borrow Young’s language, there is a certain “thrown-ness” about social group
membership. “One finds oneself as a member of a group, which one experiences as
always already having been” (Young, 1990, p. 46). And because sometimes these groups
emerge from relations of domination, “because one group excludes and labels a category
of persons”, one finds oneself thrown into a social group that is already “associated with
specific attributes, stereotypes, and norms” (Young, 1990, p. 46).
A problematic conclusion is sometimes drawn from the attributional account of
the social group: because many stereotypes and prejudices target (and identify and
define) group attributes, the thinking is that the elimination of groups through some kind
of “colorblindness” to individuals’ group membership can resolve problems of
discrimination and exclusion (Young, 1990, p. 46). But thinking about justice for social
groups in this way – by way of discrimination and the denial of difference – ignores the
socio-political histories of social groups, social statuses that such groups inherit, socialpolitical processes of being grouped and related patterns of domination, as well as the
ontological significance and meaning of one’s self-identification process with a group
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itself. By denying difference, this attributional approach denies the reality of group-based
sociopolitical, economic, and epistemic disadvantages or privileges that accompany
social group membership.21
Importantly, Young is concerned that even a progressive, politics of identity
assumes the faulty, individualist associative and attributional conceptions of the social
group.22 By contrast, the politics of difference that Young advocates understands group
differentiation, “as a function of structural relations rather than constituted from some
common attributes or dispositions of group members” (Young, 1997, p. 385). The basis
for affinity with a social group is not common attributes – indeed, such a perspective
permits the reification of attributional over-generalizations and the perpetuation of group
stereotypes – but rather, the basis for affinity with a social group is the fact that
individuals in a particular social group have some shared social perspectives of their
social reality as a result of their membership in the group.23
The strengths of this non-attributional approach to the social group is that it both
allows individuals to understand themselves in terms of their membership in a group (i.e.,
it does not deny difference), and leaves ontological space for individuals to redefine
themselves within those social groups (i.e., fluidity). The approach acknowledges the
underlying socioeconomic and political patterns of social relations between groups, as
21

To reiterate my earlier point, I do not here have in mind one’s epistemic capacities to know as much as
one’s epistemic standing in a discourse to be received as a knower. That is not to say that the former is not
a concern for social justice theorists. It is simply not the focus of the dissertation.
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Young develops this critique in fuller detail in her later work, where she considers the implications of
attributional constructions of the social group in the context of inclusion and democracy (Young, 2000).
Because the American political climate is one where interest-group pluralism and preference-aggregative
conceptions of democracy are assumed, justice claims by social groups for recognition (e.g., LGBTQ
rights) often get distorted as competitive and divisive claims for cultural domination. But Young clarifies,
“Most group-conscious political claims, however, are not claims to the recognition of identity as such, but
rather claims for fairness, equal opportunity, and political inclusion” (Young, 2000, p. 107). For Young’s
early examination of interest-group pluralism see also Young, 1990, Chapter 3 “Insurgency and Welfare
Capitalism.
23
See also Young, 1994, “Gender as Seriality: Thinking about Women as a Social Collective”.
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well as group member’s privileges and disadvantages relative to their membership and
those social relations. Thus it makes space for affirming, rather than denying, difference.
Young conceives of social groups as both relational and fluid. Groups are the
result of social processes, both between one another as well as within the groups
themselves among the individuals who identity with the group. And importantly, these
social processes of social identification and intergroup relations can evolve. Young’s
point of clarification is that “one first finds a group identity as given, and then takes it up
in a certain way… Those who identify with a group can redefine the meaning and norms
of group identity” (Young, 1990, p. 46).
Young’s introduction of an intersectional account of oppression in “Five Faces of
Oppression” (1988) – which eventually gets republished as Chapter 2 of Justice and the
Politics of Difference (1990) – is situated in this critique of liberal individualism and
account of social identity and the social group. Young points out in her later work,
“Considered relationally, a social group is a collective of persons differentiated from
others by cultural norms, practices, special needs or capacities, structures of power or
privilege” (Young, 2000, p. 90). This cultural feature of the social group, and the notion
that one has a unique social perspective and epistemic standing based in her cultural
affinity with a social group, is lost in aggregative and associative models of social groups.
On a relational ontology, oppression refers to structural phenomena that
immobilize or diminish[es] a group” (Young, 1990, p. 42). It often results from,
“unconscious assumptions and reactions of well-meaning people in ordinary interactions,
media and cultural stereotypes, and structural features of bureaucratic hierarchies and
market mechanisms – in short, the normal processes of everyday life” (Young, 1990, p.
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41). It is systematic in that its success relies on institutional processes, “which prevent
some people from learning and using satisfying and expansive skills in socially
recognized settings, or … inhibit[s] people’s ability to play and communicate with others
or to express their feelings and perspective on social life in contexts where others can
listen” (Young, 1990, p. 38).
Young’s relational ontology of the social group gives her the framework she
needs to define oppression a such, not the result of intentional and coercive tyrannical
power, but rather as the result of intergroup relations themselves. Young is careful to
clarify that this structural account does not deny the fact that “within a system of
oppression individual persons…[can] intentionally harm others in oppressed groups” or
deny that “specific groups are beneficiaries of the oppression of other people, and thus
have an interest in their continued oppression” (Young, 1990, p. 42). One’s oppression
does not necessarily correlate with a tyrant, domination (“that is, constraints upon
oppressed people to follow rules set by others”), or an oppressing group (Young, 1990, p.
38). But one’s oppression does often correlate with a social group that is privileged in
relation to one’s oppressed social group.
A problem arises for this structural and systematic account of oppression that
Young must tackle, however. Namely, how can such a theory identify oppressed people if
it resists attributional analyses of social groups? That is, the task is “to compare
oppressions without reducing them to a common essence or claiming that one is more
fundamental than another [and] one can compare the ways in which a particular form of
oppression appears in different groups” (Young, 1990, p. 64). To meet this burden, she
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introduces “five faces” of oppression: exploitation, marginalization, powerlessness,
cultural imperialism, and violence.
Young’s treatment of exploitation has roots in a Marxist critique of the labor
market where, “some people exercise their capacities under the control, according to the
purposes, and for the benefit of other people” (Young, 1990, p. 49). This results in more
than mere material deprivation, but in deprivation of self-worth. Within that market
system, people are marginalized if, “the [assumed] system of labor cannot or will not use
them”, for example, the elderly, mentally ill, disabled, or formerly-incarcerated (Young,
1990, p. 53). Young explains eloquently, here “a whole category of people is expelled
from useful participation in social life and thus potentially subjected to severe material
deprivation and even extermination” (Young, 1990, p. 53).
Young’s account of powerlessness reveals the implications of material conditions
on individuals’ social standing. Young defines powerlessness in terms of
“nonprofessionals”, “blue collar”, “manual labor”, and “working class”. By contrast,
those who occupy professional “white collar” jobs enjoy opportunities for the progressive
development of their capacities, some supervisory authority over others and themselves,
and respectability in broader social life (Young, 1990, p. 57). Powerlessness arises as a
result of various relations in the labor market, but it is more far reaching than one’s
professional life. Within bureaucratic organizations, most people “do not regularly
participate in making decisions that affect the conditions of their lives and actions”
(Young, 1990, p. 56). However, within those same organizations, power is dispersed
widely among many agents, and “the powerless are those who lack authority or power
even in this mediated sense” (ibid.).
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This last point about respectability in broader social life speaks to one’s epistemic
standing and is significant in application to one’s deliberative standing. To borrow from
Young,
In daily interchange women and men of color must prove their respectability. At
first they are often not treated by strangers with respectful distance or deference.
Once people discover that this woman or that Puerto Rican man is a college
teacher or a business executive, however, they often behave more respectfully
toward her or him. Working-class white men, on the other hand, are often treated
with respect until their working-class status is revealed. (Young, 1990, p. 58)
I have developed the fourth face of oppression, cultural imperialism, in my
exposition of deliberation-as-argument. People who experience cultural imperialism
frequently encounter “dominant meanings of a society” and as I have argued, dominant
discourses themselves, in ways where those norms are assumed as objective and impartial
(Young, 1990, pp. 58). This can, “render the particular perspective of one’s own group
invisible at the same time as they stereotype one’s group and mark it out as the Other”
(Young, 1990, p. 58-9). The fifth face of oppression, violence, is a face of oppression
because it, or the threat of it, is framed by a social context that systematically targets
members of a group on the basis of their membership in that group (Young, 1990, p. 62).
Young admits that distributive injustice may be a contributor to each of these
faces of oppression, but she clarifies that “none is reducible to distribution and all involve
social structures and relations beyond distribution” (Young, 1990, p. 9). In fact,
distributive explanations for oppression frequently “ignore the social structure and
institutional context that often help determine distributive patterns” – structures and
institutional contexts such as “issues of decision-making power and procedures, division
of labor, and culture” (Young, 1990, p. 15).
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Each of the faces of oppression share at least one common characteristic: they all
block individuals from full social or political participation by sustaining the institutional
and relational conditions for the deterioration of self-worth and ultimately, political
agency. We get a sense of Young’s account of political agency in this discussion of
oppression and domination. It consists of the capacities for (1) self-development, that is,
exercising and developing one’s capacities and expressing their experiences and (2) selfdetermination, that is, “participating in one’s action and the conditions of one’s action”
(Young, 1990, p. 37; citing Young, 1979). Assuming democracy, oppression ultimately
comes down to a question of participation. Each face of oppression blocks individuals in
some way from full social or political participation because the deterioration of selfworth and self-development of capacities limits the formation and exercise of one’s
political agency.
When Young turns towards deliberative theory in her later work (2000), she
worries that the individualistic ontology explored here is assumed within deliberative
theory itself. Thus the concepts of social identity, socially situated standpoint and
perspective, and epistemic standing never make it into the theory. As a result, traditional
deliberative theory cannot appreciate how these are impacted by one’s relative position in
a given society where there are relations of power, oppression, and privilege.
Within deliberative theory, the power relations that frame oppression and
privilege get reified by the democratic norm of impartiality. Perhaps owing to Rawls’
propensity for ideal theory and political thought experiments, some deliberative theorists
speak of deliberation as an activity that can be had in isolation from any actual
interlocutors. If one is impartial, she can merely imagine the possible arguments, consider
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them, and arrive at a solution for the problem. For example, Cohen commits his ideal
deliberative procedure to this in writing that, “Outcomes [of deliberation] are
democratically legitimate if they could be the object of a free and reasoned agreement
among equals” (Cohen, 1996, p. 73, the emphasis is mine). I take it by his use of ‘could
be’ that he has in mind some kind of armchair, deliberative thought experiment where
one imagines and considers the arguments of her interlocutor(s).
This norm of impartiality is especially prevalent in Estlund’s construction of
deliberation. In an attempt to avoid a veritistic social epistemology of democracy, Estlund
introduces what he calls a “moderate epistemic proceduralism” (Estlund, 1997, 2008).
Estlund worries that a veritistic social epistemology must eventually invoke “logically
prior” and procedurally-independent standards to evaluate the correctness of the results of
deliberation processes (Estlund, 1997, p. 180).24 Besides the fact that Estlund never seem
to escape the veritistic language of “getting it right” in his critique of a “correctness
theory of legitimacy”, many of the seven (7) “moderate needs” he sets out for
proceduralism are far from moderate.
For example, participants must, “accept and address a shared conception of
justice”, “evaluate arguments fairly”, and they must do so “irrespective of [their]
identit[ies]” (Estlund, 1997, pp. 190-1). Estlund fails to appreciate the fact that an
individual’s “personal, educational, and cultural variety of life experiences”, allotted for
in Requirement 6, sometimes make shared conceptions of justice difficult, particularly in
contexts of social inequality and oppression where marginalized participants may be
putting forward an alternative conceptions of justice itself for public consideration. When
one is blocked from full participation in social life and democratic processes because of
24

Estlund has Joshua Cohen’s (1986; 1989/1997) account in mind.
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oppression as I have developed it, her identity in that dominant system is a relevant
subject for public consideration. Moreover, the inclusion of identity-based experiences is
a necessary feature of challenging assumptions and forming wider social knowledge
about that dominant system. Finally, Estlund seems to theorize the possibility of social
inequality and oppression right out of his moderate needs for an epistemic proceduralism
since his final and seventh requirement is that, “participants’ needs for health and safety
are sufficiently well met that it is possible for them to devote some time and energy to
public political deliberations, and in general all are literate” (Estlund, 1997, p. 191).
Young’s communicative democracy breaks from this speculative tradition. For
Young, impartiality is the communicative space where powerful perspectives and
experiences get universalized and biases go unchecked. Whereas an individualistic
ontology requires impartiality and the stripping away of difference for political
knowledge and decision-making, a relational ontology looks towards inclusion as a
morally significant practice that results from the social fact of our relationality and
unique socially situated standpoint and perspective. And it looks towards difference as an
epistemic resource for the production of social knowledge in light of that relationality.
Young explains,
Do[ing] justice through public processes…entails at least two things. (1) First,
democratic discussion and decision-making must include all social perspectives.
(2) Second, participants in the discussion must develop a more comprehensive
and objective account of the social relations, consequences of action, and relative
advantage and disadvantage, than each begins with from their partial social
perspective. (Young, 1996, p. 385)
In this passage, Young’s advocates for the importance of both (1) developing an
understanding of individuals as socially situated and an appreciation for the inclusion of
diversely socially situated standpoints and (2) developing an appreciation for the
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structural relations that frame that socially situated standpoint. That we are constituted
relationally and occupy different socially situated standpoints within those relations
necessitates a need for more inclusive social inquiry processes. But those inquiry
processes must go beyond merely formal inclusion. They must be based in an
appreciation for the structural inequalities that frame individuals’ communicative
standing in those formally inclusive deliberative processes.
Young’s critique of concepts like discrimination is important to recall here
because it not only serves as the foundation for a relational account of the social group
and robust account of oppression, but it makes a further point about the communicative
dimensions of oppression. Within the language of liberal individualism, language that
dominates political discourse, there is a hermeneutical deficit, that is, a limited
vocabulary for people in oppressed social groups to make sense of their experiences or
get traction in having them heard.
Young anticipates Fricker’s concept of hermeneutical injustice here, explaining
that the very concept of oppression itself – understood not in terms of domination but as
new social groups understand it, namely, “systemic and structural phenomena that are not
necessarily the result of the intentions of a tyrant” – is one that struggles to get uptake
because the “political discourse [of liberal individualism] does not have a place in this
social ontology for structuration and social groups” (Young, 1988, p. 272). With Nancy
Fraser, Young is critical that some groups have “exclusive or primary access to …the
means of interpretation and communication in a society” (Young, 1988, p. 285; Citing
Fraser, 1987).
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This point is one that will resonate strongly with survivors of domestic violence
or victims of sexual harassment who were harmed before the 1970s when the very terms
used in the courts now to describe their experiences were not available.25 A more
contemporary example is found in the recent introduction of the term ‘mansplaining’
throughout feminist social media outlets.
5. Towards a Pragmatist Feminist Social Epistemology
The relationally based account of oppression in communicative democracy is the
foundation of a pragmatist feminist social epistemology. I develop this epistemology here
by way of critical contrast with some patterns of thought in traditional epistemic,
deliberative theory. Socially situated standpoint, or diversely socially situated
perspective, is the unique perspective an individual has as a result of her social reality and
social identity. An epistemology that is sensitive to the existence of a diversity of socially
situated perspectives within any given society idealizes inclusive deliberation processes
among those differently situated social perspectives as an epistemic resource. Rather than
idealizing “the melting away of difference”, such an epistemology will look to difference
as an epistemic resource (Young, 1990, p. 47). And it will also be sensitive to the ways
that social identity and oppression impact one’s epistemic standing in political
communication. As Elizabeth Anderson has explained,
Most of the problems democracies are asked to solve are complex, have
asymmetrically distributed effects on individuals according to their geographic
location, social class, occupation, education, gender, age, race, and so forth…We
therefore need a model of democracy in which its epistemic success is a product
of its ability to take advantage of the epistemic diversity of individuals.
(Anderson, 2006, p. 11)

25

See Fricker, 2007, pp. 150-152 who provides an exploration of this example as a kind of
hermeneutical injustice.
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A pragmatist feminist social epistemology should be contrasted with the veritistic
social epistemology assumed by traditional deliberative theorists. I use ‘veritistic’ in the
sense that Alvin Goldman (1999) introduces the term, as denoting a consequentialist,
truth-tracking epistemology. A veritistic social epistemology understands knowledge in
the traditional sense of ‘true belief’. It will be concerned with evaluating social practices
on the basis of their knowledge-producing results, that is, whether they “have a
comparatively favorable impact on knowledge as contrasted with error and ignorance”
(Goldman, 1999, p. 5).
The focus of the deliberative, epistemic democracy project has tended to be the
enhancement of political legitimacy justifications. The argument goes that democratically
formed decisions, particularly those conditioned on deliberation, tend towards higher
epistemic accuracy and reliability than those made by alternative authoritarian political
institutions. José Martí explains the epistemic conception of deliberative democracy that
comes about as a result of this work:
Deliberative democracy is justified, and the political decisions made through a
deliberative procedure are legitimate, because democratic deliberative procedures
have more epistemic value than the other democratic alternatives. And this means
that decisions made by such procedures are more likely to be right in general –
where rightness must be some process-independent and intersubjectively valid
standard-, than decisions made by other democratic procedures. (Martí, 2005, p.
33)
Fabienne Peter (2007) has pointed out that much of traditional deliberative theory
tends to assume the correspondence theory of truth that underlies Goldman’s veritistic
social epistemology, that “what makes sentences or propositions true are real-world
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truthmakers” (Goldman, 1999, p. 68).26 Goldman himself points to the similarities
between his account and deliberative theory in a chapter on epistemic democracy. Citing
Estlund’s (1990) and Cohen’s (1986) cognitive accounts of voting:
The rough idea [of epistemic democracy] is that the aggregate of votes by a large
body of voters has a strong propensity to be accurate, or correct, if each voter has
even a slight propensity toward correctness. This entire approach is predicated on
the idea that voting involves a judgment that can be accurate, or true, an
approach that would be congenial to the epistemic project before us. (Goldman,
1999, p. 316)
Goldman’s epistemic democracy is primarily interested in investigating those
institutions and social practices that harm or enhance voters’ accuracy, what he calls
“voter core knowledge” (VCK). He characterizes VKC as, “the main type of knowledge
that is critical to the task of voters”. Voter core knowledge is “correct” if the voter
answers the voter’s “core voter question” (CVQ) accurately: “Which of the two
candidates, C or C’, would, if elected, produce a better outcome set from my point of
view?” (Goldman, 1999, p. 323). Goldman defines “outcome set” as the “complex
combination of outcomes” that may result from a particular candidate who is elected.
Such outcomes might include the cost of living, the crime rate, the cost of healthcare, etc.
There are any number of combinations of outcome sets and the actual outcome set is one
among them. Each voter is assumed to have some “intrinsically valued outcomes”, and “a
preference ordering over the outcome sets” (Goldman, 1999, p. 322). Goldman specifies
that in an “optimally functioning democracy”, voters will answer the CVQ correctly, that
is, each individual voter will vote for the candidate whose actual resulting outcome set
correctly correlates with her intrinsically valued outcome set (Goldman, 1999, p. 320).

26

To be fair, Goldman seems to endorse a correspondence theory of truth in a qualified sense that
requires “metaphysical clarification” and is a last resort on the basis of his view that rival theories “are
subject to crippling objections” (Goldman, 1999, p. 68).
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Ultimately, Goldman’s worry is that political science research in the past fifty
years has quite consistently found that “ordinary American citizens have minimal, even
abysmal, knowledge of textbook facts about the structure of American government, the
identity of their elected officials, and fundamental facts about contemporaneous foreign
policy” (Goldman, 1999, p. 317). The thrust of the concern is that voters frequently vote
in ways that are not consistent with their own self-interest. Thus Goldman’s primary
concern is advancing institutions and social practices that improve core information for
voters so that they may more accurately and reliably (epistemically speaking) advance
their self-interest. One example he provides for this is the journalistic use of “Ad Watch”
during campaigns to remedy the spread of mistruths and slanting by candidates
(Goldman, 1999, p. 337-8). Goldman suggests that “the press should comprise a set of
experts who would report, interpret, and explain political events in a way that serves the
veritistic interests of voters, especially their interest in core voter knowledge” (Goldman,
1999, p. 340). In such practices “reporters [would] examine campaign ads for truthfulness
and realism, trying to expose smears and misrepresentations” (Goldman, 1999, pp. 3378).27
Goldman defines the goal of democracy primarily on a social choice framework:
“A plausible interpretation of the idea that democracy is for the people is that democracy
aims to effect outcome sets that are relatively preferred by a majority of the electorate (or
as large a plurality as possible)” (Goldman, 1999, p. 326). That is, for Goldman,
deliberation gets entirely submerged into a social choice theory. As David Copp has
explained this, [Goldman] thinks that “the realization of democratic ends” requires that
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It is worth noting that such organizations do presently exist in service to American voters, and that
they were actively operating to fact-check condidates during the 2016 Presidential campaign.
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most voters get their relatively most preferred outcome set. He concludes that the success
of democracy in its own terms depends on voters’ having core knowledge” (Copp, 2002,
pp. 208-209; citing Goldman, 1999, pp. 326, 329). Against this, Copp (2002) has
poignantly argued, “that the goal of democracy is not to produce outcome sets that are
preferred by a majority. The goal is, rather, to equalize political power and authority”
(Copp, 2002, p. 212).
To build from Copp’s analysis, Goldman understands ‘correctness’ relative to a
voter’s preferred outcomes and outcome sets. That is, he thinks that the primary
epistemic problem for democracy is the frequency with which voters mistakenly vote for
candidates who do not actually cohere with their preferences. Certainly this is a problem
for modern democracies, but it is not the primary problem democracy attempts to
address.
Democracy is primarily concerned with checks and balances on power, and this is
preserved through the preservation of epistemic and moral norms of reasonableness,
political equality, publicity, and inclusion. Where the preferred outcome set of the
majority is some leader or policy that conflicts with democratic norms themselves, “the
failure of an election to produce an outcome set that is preferred by a majority is not
necessarily any failure of democracy” (Copp, 2002, p. 210). Thus a primary epistemic
problem for evaluating the epistemic success of a democracy will be how well it’s
institutions and practices prevent citizens from holding preferences that themselves
interfere with the realization of those norms. What Goldman – and all social choice
theorists, for that matter – misses is that the content of, and basis for, voter’s preferences
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is itself an important subject of inquiry for a social epistemology of democracy. Call this
the Relativistic Preferences Critique (RP Critique).
One worry with conceptualizing democracy on this kind of veritistic social
epistemology is that the account limits the epistemic value of democracy to the epistemic
accuracy of voting, that is, the ability to “recognize those nominees who are best in terms
of [voters’] preference orderings” (Goldman, 1999, p. 346). To be clear, Goldman points
to deliberation as an important feature for enhancing VCK (Goldman, 2000). He explains
“debates and other deliberative events” as one of many “players and institutional
structures that figure prominently in the flow of political information” (Goldman, 1999,
p. 334). A veritistic social epistemology of democracy ultimately assumes “that the
success of democracy depends on its producing outcomes that are preferred by the
majority of voters” (Copp, 2002, p. 208). But here Goldman understands deliberation
primarily as a mechanism for enhancing VCK and not at all in terms of the voters’
preferences and preference orderings themselves. Thus he instrumentalizes deliberation
to VCK because he never escapes a preference-aggregative conception of democracy.
Goldman misses the important point that deliberation has epistemic value far beyond the
enhancement of VCK. This is a risk for any correctness-oriented epistemology of
deliberative democracy.
Besides the RP Critique, a second worry for conceptualizing democracy on this
kind of veritistic social epistemology is that this emphasis on correctness in democratic
decision-making assumes a particularly naïve account of the nature of a public problem.28

28

It is important to point out, as Copp has, that Goldman does not deny the significance of evaluating
social institutions and practices on grounds other than knowledge consequences, that is, true belief: “His
idea is simply that since true belief is valuable, “the knowledge impact of various policies is worth
determining even if that impact is trumped, in certain spheres, by other values”” (Copp, 2002, p. 207; citing
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While Cohen’s and Estlund’s epistemologies of democracy escape the RP Critique
through conditioning the epistemic accuracy of democratic political decisions on some
form of deliberation, because they assume some version of deliberation-as-argument,
they both fail to fully escape a veritistic social epistemology.29
By contrast, Elizabeth Anderson (2006) explains the significance of a free press
and deliberation in terms of enhancing voter preferences and outcome sets themselves:
“A free press, public discussion and hence mutual influence prior to voting are
constitutive, not accidental feature of democracy…Discussion is needed prior to voting in
part to help voters determine what problems are genuinely of public concern. Without
such discussion, they have little to go on but their private preferences” (Anderson, 2006,
p. 11). Anderson has rejected a veritistic social epistemology of democracy in favor of
what I would call a pragmatist feminist one. She looks to Dewey’s experimentalist model
as the appropriate basis for an epistemology of democracy for its ability to address three
essential features of democracy: “the epistemic diversity of participants, the interaction of
voting with discussion, and feedback mechanisms such as periodic elections and protests”
(Anderson, 2006, p. 8).

Goldman, 1999, p. 6). However, this point does not remedy the fact that on the whole, Goldman’s
epistemology of democracy is inadequate for assessing what I have identified as the primary epistemic
problem for evaluating the epistemic success of a democracy, namely, how well it’s institutions and
practices prevent citizens from holding preferences that themselves interfere with the realization of those
norms. My project is concerned with preferences based in identity-prejudices and their communicative
dimensions (i.e., identity-prejudiced communicative inequalities). Thus while Goldman’s approach offers
some important resources for the epistemology of democracy, it is an incomplete epistemology for both
capturing the complexity of public problem and the kinds of political decision-making processes we need in
that context, and for conceptualizing deliberative inequality, and particularly, for naming the problem of
identity-prejudiced communicative inequality. As a result of this, it is inadequate then for justifying the
political legitimacy of democracy on epistemic grounds.
29
For example, Cohen explains that deliberation both increases “the likelihood of a sincere
representation of preferences and convictions” and “shape[s] the content of preferences and convictions as
well” (Cohen, 1989/1997, pp. 76-77).
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The earlier discussion of deliberation-as-argument emphasized the problematic
value of consensus and impartiality for the approach. Deliberation-as-argument also tends
to emphasize correctness as a possible and desirable goal for deliberation where “parties
to dispute aim to win the argument” (Young, 1996, p. 123). Deliberation-as-argument
assumes that correctness – “the existence of rightness in political decisions” – is a
possible and desirable goal for deliberation and that impartiality – “the possibility of
knowing which is the right (or impartial) decision” – is an indicator that such a ‘correct’
decision has been arrived at fairly (Martí, 2005, p. 29).30 For Cohen, “voting expresses
beliefs about what the correct policies are…not personal preferences for policies”
(Cohen, 1986, p. 351).
While this clarification gets Cohen out of the RP Critique, he must eventually
invoke procedure-independent standards on which to evaluate the “correctness” of chosen
policies (Estlund, 1997). Recall that Cohen assumes deliberation-as-argument in his
construction of an ideal deliberative procedure: “Reasons are offered with the aim of
bringing others to accept the proposal” (Cohen, 1989/1997, p. 74). Cohen’s assumption
here is that under some ideal deliberative conditions, voters will either accept the
proposal as correct or the deliberation processes will go to a vote.31 By contrast, Young’s
restructuring of deliberation-as-public-reasonableness looks towards achieving “mutual
understanding” and can be understood as a form of cooperative problem-solving (Young,
1996, p. 123).

30

This emphasis on consensus in conceptions of the common good and in justice is pervasive in Cohen
(1986, 1989/1997) and Estlund (1997).
31
Cohen does clarify, “The fact that [deliberation] may so conclude [with a vote rather than an agreedupon proposal] does not, however, eliminate the distinction between deliberative forms of collective choice
and forms that aggregate nondeliberative preferences” (Cohen, 1989/1997, p. 75).
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I want to briefly turn to the literature in applied ethics in public service to develop
this alternative conception of deliberation-restructured-as-public-reasonableness.
Caroline Whitbeck (1996) and Terry Cooper (2016) have argued that it is more
appropriate to think of ethical problems in public service less in terms of moral dilemmas
and more in terms of an engineering design problem. Unlike theoretical moral dilemmas,
real world ethical issues rarely occur in the form of either-or, but rather, are filled with a
multitude of ambiguities. There are any given number of resolutions for an ethical
problem, any given number of ways of defining an ethical problem, and competing roles
and obligations to consider. These problems are situated in organizational structures and
cultures that may be more or less toxic and may require serious revisions to be more
supportive of responsible professional conduct. Unlike modern moral philosophers
solving riddles in arm-chairs, professionals must also make decisions within timeconstraints and take into consideration practical consequences.
The analogy here is between this description of real world ethical issues in terms
of an engineering design problem to how we ought to think of public problems and
democratic deliberations around them. As in design, citizens must first identify the
various stakeholders to a problem and consult them as epistemic resources for identifying
and articulating it’s various dimensions. Much like deliberations in engineering design
problems, this inclusive participation is instrumental to citizens’ self-development
because it creates space for the expression of one’s political autonomy and it fosters the
social conditions for citizens to nurture their political autonomy through discourse with
others.

68
As in design where there are limited resources, time constraints, and competing
obligations to stakeholders, deliberations must be inclusive of the various stakeholders to
the problem, and those stakeholders must be seen as both epistemic resources and moral
authorities for designing and evaluating possible resolutions for the problem. This is
because as in design, the uniquely correct solution or remedy rarely just presents itself.
When the problem-solving communicative exercise is framed as a cooperative
rather than an antagonistic one (as it is in the design approach), this can motivate people
to consider the perspectives of others and be open to reconsidering their own perspectives
in light of that hearing. If it comes down to deciding between two possible remedies,
deliberators determine which alternative is better than the other. Group process of
defining the “better” and “worse” alternatives will inevitably bring to the forefront values
and assumptions that themselves can become subject to deliberations in the decisionmaking process. The language of “correctness” in such group processes is out of place.
In assuming a veritistic social epistemology, deliberation-as-argument
fundamentally misidentifies the goal and epistemic value of inclusive, participatory
political processes: to widen epistemic resources for engaging in the design approach.
Understood non-aggregatively, politics is not a process of working together (or quite
often, against one another) to discover the correct answer, but rather, it is a process of
working together to agree on a good answer. Deliberation-restructured-as-publicreasonableness is a cooperative process of identifying problems and imagining and
creating better and worse alternatives to those problems. In this process, the inclusion of
diversely situated social perspective and an awareness and appreciation for
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communicatively structured inequalities among participants, are epistemically significant
practices.
In contrast to a veritistic social epistemology, this proceduralist social
epistemology emphasizes “the intrinsic merits of intellectual practices” (Peter, 2007, p.
341). It defines knowledge as the result of an appropriately designed process of inquiry
and emphasizes the epistemic value of fair deliberative processes themselves and does
not instrumentalize the value of these processes on the basis of their epistemic production
(ibid., the emphasis is mine; citing Goldman, 1999). This view “dispenses with the idea
that a procedure-independent standard is necessary to assess the quality of the
knowledge-producing practices” (Peter, 2007, p. 341).
Peter captures the distinction between a veritistic and a proceduralist social
epistemology nicely through drawing on the feminist standpoint epistemology of Sandra
Harding and the philosophy of science of Helen Longino. Longino draws a distinction
between three senses of knowledge: (1) knowledge-producing practices; (2) knowing;
and (3) the content of knowledge, or outcome of knowledge-producing practices (Peter,
342; citing Longino, 2002). Traditional epistemologists view knowledge-producing
practices as a process of belief acquisition and define knowing and the outcome of
knowledge-producing practices independently of these processes of belief acquisition.
Against this traditional view, feminist standpoint epistemologists, feminist
philosophers of science, and pragmatist feminists hold that knowledge is situated in
various social constructs and institutions (e.g., cognitive styles, background beliefs,
relations to other inquirers). That is, what a person knows and how it is known is
uniquely framed by the perspective, or standpoint, of the knower. His or her socially
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situated standpoint significantly influences these varied epistemic perspectives. On this
framework, knowing and the outcome of knowledge-producing practices cannot be
evaluated independently of knowledge-producing practices themselves, because knowers
play an active role in constituting the object of knowledge.
While [on some level] it makes sense to think of VCK in veritistic terms as Cohen
does in his cognitive account of voting, deliberative epistemic democracy invokes a
category mistake in assuming this kind of veritism in its construction of deliberation.
This is because once deliberation becomes the primary epistemic feature of democracy on
the whole, rather than merely being considered instrumental to the voting act itself, we
are no longer in the business of evaluating ‘correct’ and ‘incorrect’ voter decisions.
Rather, the task before us is much more epistemically complex: identifying and analyzing
complex political problems, making complex public policy decisions, and analyzing voter
preferences themselves for their consistency with norms that maintain democratic
processes and participation (i.e., political equality, reasonableness – or reason-giving –,
publicity, and inclusion).
To return to a prior example, the social phenomenon of mansplaining reveals the
complex relationship between one’s social identity, socially situated standpoint, and her
epistemic standing in communicative practices. One’s socially situated standpoint as a
woman can shape her appreciation for social issues like gendered assumptions about
epistemic authority. Sometimes one’s socially situated standpoint has unique insights into
social realities (e.g., that mansplaining is an epistemic problem); sometimes it creates
‘blind spots’ to social realities (e.g., the existence of mansplaining itself).
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Such perspectives are deeply rooted in our social identities, which arise out of
social relations and historical patterns of domination and oppression. One’s epistemic
standing is her social authority to bring forward her socially situated standpoint in this
process and be heard in the social knowledge processes of identification and presentation
of social problems and in formulations of potential solutions for such problems. If one
has strong epistemic standing, her socially situated knowledge is generally trusted and
respected; if one has weak epistemic standing, her socially situated knowledge is
generally distrusted and disrespected through practices such as non-inclusion, dismissal,
or distortion. The strength of one’s epistemic standing may be relatively stable across
contexts, or it may vary depending on the social context and on what social identities are
more or less salient in that context.
The design approach discussed above embodies a pragmatist feminist social
epistemology. Building from the analysis of this chapter, we are now in a position to
define a pragmatist feminist social epistemology. (1) It will reject norms of consensus
and impartiality through situating itself in a relational ontology that is aware of the
unique socially situated perspectives of individuals as a result of their social locations
and social positions among social, political, and economic relations of power. (2) It will
emphasize the significance of the inclusion of these diverse perspectives, and it will do so
on both epistemic and moral grounds. Epistemically, inclusion enhances processes of
identifying problems and processes of designing political responses to them. And
morally, inclusion enhances individuals’ abilities to both practice and nurture their
political agency. (3) Flowing out of 1 and 2, a pragmatist feminist social epistemology
will construct democratic communication in broad ways that include rhetoric, activism,
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exploratory speech, and even dissent.32 (4) It will reject a veritistic social epistemology in
favor of a proceduralist one that emphasizes knowledge practices rather than knowledge
results. In so doing it will invoke pragmatist notions of experimentalism and “democratic
fallibility” (Medina, 2013, p. 5).
6. Conclusion: Communicative Democracy’s Wider Reach, Communicatively Structured
Deliberative Inequalities
We have seen that democracy theorists originally introduced deliberation as a
condition for democratic processes in order to protect democratic theory from the critique
that democracy is inevitably doomed to collapse into elitism or populism. This has been
part of a larger project aiming to defend democracy, understood and refined as
deliberative democracy, against alternative forms of government (e.g., monarchy,
authoritarianism, oligarchy, populism, etc.). Thus deliberative theorists have focused a
great deal of attention to specifying the ways that deliberation promotes the legitimacy of
democracy against alternative forms of government.
Deliberative theory has tended to underemphasize the value of the educative and
preference-transformative capacity of deliberation for making these justifications. Cohen
asserts that a deliberative conception is not “marked by the assumption that political
discussion aims to change the preferences of other citizens” (Cohen, 1996, p. 100). He
continues, “Though a deliberative view must assume that citizens are prepared to be
moved by reasons that may conflict with their antecedent preferences and interests, and
that being so moved may change those antecedent preference and interests, it does not
suppose that political deliberation takes as its goal the alteration of preferences” (ibid).

32

See especially Anderson (2006) for a development of the epistemic value of dissent in Dewey’s
philosophy of democracy.
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Cohen’s denial of a link between preference transformation and justifications for
deliberative democracy is admittedly confusing, particularly because he also emphasizes
that “democratic politics should… shape the ways in which the members of the society
understand themselves and their own legitimate interests” (Cohen, 1989, 69). So too, Jon
Elster calls the educative function of deliberation a by-product of political activity, an
essential byproduct that we should not turn into the main purpose of political activity
(Elster, 1986, pp. 19-20). As we have also seen, a veritistic and correctness-oriented, nondeliberative social epistemology of democracy like Goldman’s never tackles the central
problem for preference-aggregative constructions of democracy: the arbitrary nature of
voter’s preferences and their orderings.
From a social justice approach, however, the communicative processes of publicly
considering preferences, is itself the source of democracy’s epistemic value. On the
traditional deliberative epistemic model, how citizens’ preferences are formed, ordered,
changed, and evaluated is not a subject of consideration. But preferences are the result of
values, and values (e.g., racism) have epistemic dimensions. We expect people to have
good reasons for their values, so a deliberative epistemology of democracy must have the
resources for evaluating the epistemic origins of held preferences and preference
orderings themselves, so that it can confront preferences that conflict with democratic
norms (e.g., racism, epistemologies of ignorance).
Thus democracy must be interested in doing more than creating institutions and
social contexts that equip people with the ability to vote in a way that is consistent with
realizing their goals (i.e., outcome sets), it must also have the theoretical space to advance
institutions and social contexts that equip people with epistemic resources for
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interrogating preferences themselves to see that those are consistent with the maintenance
of democracy. Surely racism is not such a preference.
Recall that I have claimed that communicative democracy fares much better than
traditional deliberative models for both naming and making space to address
communicative inequalities, specifically identity-prejudiced communicative inequalities.
I have also claimed that this is because, unlike traditional deliberative theory.
Communicative democracy bases its conception of political agency in a relational
ontology and bases democratic communication in a pragmatist feminist social
epistemology. An account of deliberative democracy that takes communicatively
structured deliberative inequalities seriously will attend to the epistemic and normative
significance of the educative and preference-transformative potential of deliberation.
Here I want to briefly emphasize the epistemological significance for
participatory democracy theory of a minor point Young makes. One further criticism of
the emphasis on consensus within traditional deliberative theory I have not yet discussed
is important to bring up here. The assumption of a common good or shared understanding
as a starting place for deliberation “obviates the need” for the move from self-regarding
thought to enlarged thought and wider appeals to justice that democratic communication
requires (Young, 2000, p. 42). Practically speaking, the educative and preferencetransformative capacity of democratic communication may be precisely what democracy
needs for reducing deliberative inequality.
There is an important theoretical point to be made here also, a point that has gone
overlooked by traditional deliberative theorists: Once the problem of identity-prejudiced
communicative inequalities is acknowledged, the educative and preference-
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transformative capacity of deliberation becomes an integral aspect of reinforcing both (1)
justifications for democracy that appeal to the epistemic results of deliberation and (2)
justifications for democracy that appeal to the protection of citizens’ political autonomy.
This is because the value of deliberation-restructured-as-public-reasonableness as
an ideal communicative practice is that it creates space for the expression of one’s
political autonomy and it fosters the social conditions for citizens to nurture their political
autonomy through discourse with others. In doing so, it both protects and enhances
citizens’ political agency and their epistemic powers. Thus communicative democracy
marries two commonly detached justifications for democracy through its emphasis on the
epistemic value of the educative and preference-transformative capacity of deliberation
and democratic communication.
Whereas a veritistic social epistemology evaluates democratic institutions and
processes on the basis of their truth-tracking potential, a pragmatist feminist social
epistemology will evaluate democratic institutions and processes on the basis of a variety
of epistemic goods that are intrinsic to knowledge-producing practices themselves.
Young realizes that the strategic, identity-prejudiced enforcement of norms of
dispassionate speech and articulateness remains a worry for deliberative equality whether
the standard for deliberation is academic argument or broader constraints of
reasonableness. Thus she also argues throughout her work that deliberation is one among
a range of communicative activities with social value. So besides restructuring
deliberation-as-public-reasonableness, she also defends the epistemic significance of
alternative modes of democratic communication, namely, communicative activities such
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as greeting, rhetoric, narrative, and even questioning and protest (Young, 1997, 2000, and
2001)
Indeed the introduction of new language by social movement is one example of
an epistemic benefit of Youngs’ communicative democracy, one that traditional
deliberative theorists miss. Interestingly, Merriam-Webster provided a description of
“mansplaining” in their “Words We’re Watching” forum and have since March of 2018,
added it to their dictionary. They explain it as, “what occurs when a man talks
condescendingly to someone (especially a woman) about something he has incomplete
knowledge of, with the mistaken assumption that he knows more about it than the person
he’s talking to does” (Meriam-Webster, n.d.).
Such terms are often not introduced in formal deliberation processes, but rather,
are introduced by activists demanding for a hearing in deliberation processes that make
no space for their participation or lack the hermeneutical resources to make sense of or
give the charges political uptake. Such terms prompt and motivate the debate and public
deliberations that conceptually fill the terms out themselves. For example, during the
2012 presidential campaign, candidates commonly invoked language of “the 1%” and
“the 99%” that was popularized in the Occupy Wall Street protests of 2011 (Fenton,
2015).33
In this introductory chapter to the dissertation I hope to have established that
communicative democracy can more fruitfully envision deliberative equality by making
theoretical space to name the problem of communicatively structured deliberative
inequalities. As a theory of social justice, the strength of communicative democracy lies
33

Like his contemporaries, deliberative theorist Jon Elster misses this communicative potential for
activism because he pulls political theory apart from political activism far more than Young (Elster
1986/1997; Young, 2001).
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in the fact that it rests on a relational ontology and pragmatist feminist social
epistemology that makes room for concepts of social identity, socially situated
standpoint, and epistemic standing and appreciates how these are impacted by one’s
relative position in a given society where there are relations of power, oppression, and
privilege. This argument also introduces the theoretical framework for defending
communicative democracy as itself a theory of democratic legitimacy.
The pervasive and surreptitious nature of communicative inequalities brings to
light the fact that everyday communicative practices and norms have significant
implications for deliberative equality and social justice. The realization of communicative
democracy requires a shift in public consciousness about the very nature of democracy:
far from a mere political institution, democracy is an ethical and epistemological ideal.
In what remains of the dissertation, I attempt to “fill out” communicative democracy as
such. Chapter 2 of the dissertation does this by providing a more detailed account of
identity-prejudiced communicative inequalities.
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CHAPTER 2
IDENTITY-PREJUDICED COMMUNICATIVE INEQUALITY
1. Introduction
In Chapter 1 I developed a critique of traditional deliberative theory on the basis
of it’s assumed individualistic ontology and veritistic social epistemology, a framework
that emphasizes problematic norms of consensus, impartiality, and correctness. As a
result of this individualistic framework, traditional deliberative theorizing has often failed
to appreciate some important concepts that are significant for an account of deliberative
equality, namely, ‘social identity’, ‘diversely situated social perspective’, and ‘epistemic
standing’. Owing to this, deliberative theory has struggled to appreciate how these
phenomena are impacted by one’s relative position in a given society where there are
relations of power, oppression, and privilege. Thus on the whole traditional deliberative
theory misses the communicative dimensions of deliberative inequality, as well as how
these relations impact one’s standing in deliberative spaces, that is, one’s deliberative
standing.
This chapter provides an account of communicative inequality. Here I am
interested in investigating how people are communicatively situated, on the basis of their
social identities. I am particularly concerned that in contexts of social inequality,
oppression, and privilege, some peoples’ marginalized social identities serve as a basis
for their diminished deliberative standing (and some peoples’ privileged social identities
serve as a basis for their inflated deliberative standing). I am especially interested in
exposing some of the more implicit dimensions of communicative inequality since those
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have largely been underappreciated in deliberative theory and often go undetected in
deliberative spaces. I draw on literatures in feminist epistemology, resistance
epistemology, and social psychology to develop this account of communicatively
structured deliberative inequality.
Before moving on I want to make a few clarifications about how I will use some
important terms in this project. These terms denote concepts that are presently under
investigation, so my purpose here is not so much to offer a developed explanation of
them, as it is to provide a general framework of their relations with one another.
Communicative inequality denotes the communicatively structured dimensions of
deliberative inequality that are under consideration in this project. Communicative
inequality arises as a result of a wide range of communicative and epistemic practices
and habits that are situated in intergroup social relations of power where there is
oppression and privilege and group-based social inequality.
By ‘communicative’ I mean nothing out of the ordinary, only any activity (verbal
or non-verbal) among two or more individuals where at least one individual attempts to
convey information to another individual. As we will see in cases of being ignored,
silenced, or dismissed, only one individual is initiating a transfer or exchange of
information, but this does not entail that the silencing or dismissing interlocutor is not,
through his silencing and dismissal, engaged in some sort of communicative practice.
Thus in this type of context, only one individual is necessary for the interaction to be
analyzed as communicative. On my account, communicative interactions themselves can
function to communicate as well. To clarify, an individual’s communicative interactions
with another person can function to communicate information to bystanders, information
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that is particular to the relations of power and relative epistemic and deliberative standing
of participants in the original, communicative interaction.
One task for this chapter is to introduce examples of communicative and
epistemic practices and habits that sustain communicative inequality through looking to
empirical research as well as through drawing on the experiences of members of
stigmatized groups. Another goal of this chapter is to situate our theorizing about these
practices and habits and about deliberative standing in a relational ontology of prejudice.
I borrow some of the terms I use in this discussion from Miranda Fricker, specifically
‘identity-prejudicial’ and ‘collective social imagination’, but I develop them beyond her
usage (Fricker, 2007).
Communicative and epistemic practices and habits are identity-prejudiced when
they are (either explicitly or implicitly) informed by identity-prejudiced stereotypes.
Fricker defines an identity-prejudicial stereotype as, “a widely held disparaging
association between a social group and one or more attribute, where this association
embodies a generalization that displays some (typically, epistemically culpable)
resistance to counter-evidence owing to an ethically bad affective investment” (Fricker,
2007, p. 35). Identity-prejudiced stereotypes have origins in the universal cognitive
tendency towards ingroup and outgroup biases (i.e., ingroup favoritism and outgroup
prejudice), but they should be clarified from these intergroup processes in two senses: (1)
they operate in a specific social context of social inequality between two or more social
groups, and (2) they function in those intergroup relations to sustain the dominance or
elite status of one group over the other(s).
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On my framework, identity-prejudiced stereotypes are housed in the collective
social imagination, a concept Fricker leaves largely undeveloped. As I develop the
concept, the collective social imagination refers to what some social psychologists have
explained as, “a socially structured field within the individual mind” that consists of
stereotypes, categorical associations, and archetypes that support images of various social
identities, of one’s own social identity and perceived ingroup, the social identity of
perceived outgroups, as well as perceptions of the power relations between those groups
(Turner and Oakes, 1986, p. 250). This content of the collective social imagination is
socially informed and sustained through social interaction – a wide range of
communicative and epistemic practices and habits – and is neither exclusively cognitive
nor exclusively affective. This content has epistemic dimensions and implications in the
broad sense that it influences perceptions of the social world and knowledge practices
and formation, and it has ethical dimensions and implications in the broad sense that it
concerns social life, interaction, and communication. Thus in social contexts where there
are intergroup social relations of power, oppression, privilege, and group-based social
inequality, the collective social imagination is both informed by and sustains these
relations.
I want to clarify my use of the phrase “identity-prejudiced communicative and
epistemic practices and habits” a bit further. In this project I avoid making a categorical
distinction between practices and habits because I want to refer to a collection of
communicative and epistemic activities as a whole that may range on a spectrum between
volitional activity and ‘attention to’ on one end of a spectrum, and non-volitional activity,
habitual compulsion, and even more primal “modalities of body comportment” on
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another end of a spectrum (Young, 1980/2005, p. 32).34 I want to resist the dualisms
assumed in much of social psychology, between cognitive and affective processes in
attitudes like prejudice, and between explicit and implicit levels of conscious awareness
of such attitudes. Rather, attention and compulsory habituation are extremes on a
spectrum within the varied and the wide range of activities that diminish deliberative
standing and exacerbate communicative inequality.35
Suffice it to say for now that: (1) The collective social imagination consists of
identity-prejudiced stereotypes (among other things) that inform a wide range of
communicative and epistemic practices and habits; (2) Conscious awareness of the
identity-prejudiced stereotypes that inform these various communicative and epistemic
practices and habits varies among practices and habits and among individuals; (3)
Although philosophically interesting, whether identity-prejudiced stereotypes are held at
implicit or explicit attitudinal levels does not really matter for my purposes in this
particular project, since I am presently only examining the sociopolitical impact of them
on deliberative standing and am not constructing an account of ethical responsibility for
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In this paper, “Throwing Like a Girl: A Phenomenology of Feminine Body Comportment, Modality,
and Spatiality”, Young provides a feminist phenomenological analysis or women’s more inhibited uses of
their bodies and physical space. Young’s discussion of the phenomenology of gendered body
comportments here anticipates her later introduction of the “body aesthetic dimensions of oppression” in
Justice and the Politics of Difference (Young, 1990, p. 148).
35
Tamar Gendler’s (2008; 2011) work may be useful for challenging these dichotomies assumed within
social psychology between implicit and explicit attitudes, and between cognitive and affective conceptions
of these attitudes. Gendler introduces the concept of alief as a mental state that involves, “the activation of
an associative chain…that can happen regardless of the [explicit] attitude that one bears to the content
activating the associations” (Gendler, 2008, p. 650). It is, “associative, action-generating, affect-laden,
arational, automatic, agnostic with respect to its content, shared with animals, and developmentally and
conceptually antecedent to other cognitive attitudes” (Gendler, 2008, p. 641). But alief is neither like belief
nor like imagination, cognitive states which are both propositional, and Gendler makes the strong case that
it can persist in spite of our reflective beliefs. She also suggests that we “leave room for an analogous
notion that bears the relation to desire that alief bears to belief”, a type of presire (which she leaves to be
developed by others) (Gendler, 2008, p. 642). I suspect that much of this work might be incredibly fruitful
for challenging some of the dichotomies I am concerned with in the social psychology of prejudice, but
indulging this fascinating line of inquiry further is outside of the scope of the present project.
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such biases36; (4) Therefore, it would be better to refer to this wide range of
communicative and epistemic practices and habits as something like prabits for ease of
reference and to contest the dichotomies I have expressed concerns about.
To review, an identity-prejudiced prabit is any communicative or epistemic
practice, habit, or modality of body comportment that is based in identity-prejudiced
stereotypes. Identity-prejudiced prabits contribute to communicative inequality through
impacting the deliberative standing of interlocutors in deliberative spaces. They do this
through either [or both] depreciating the standing of some or inflating the standing of
others in ways that are uniquely connected to intergroup social relations of power where
there is oppression and privilege and group-based social inequality, and this connection is
had through, or by way of, identity-prejudiced stereotypes, which are sustained in the
collective social imagination.
The following section of the chapter (Section 2) situates my account in James
Bohman’s work on communicative inequality. While Bohman’s account is important
within deliberative theory for initiating a turn towards the communicative dimensions of
deliberative inequality, his treatment of communicative inequality is underdeveloped in
terms of some of the more recent work in epistemology and social psychology that
examines the relationships between oppression, knowing, and epistemic standing.
Thus in Section 3 of the chapter I turn to Miranda Fricker’s work on testimonial
injustice as a model for the basic structure of communicative inequality. Here I argue that
one’s testimonial standing (what Fricker has characterized in terms of ‘testimonial
excess’ or ‘testimonial deficit’), results from a wide range of identity-prejudiced
36

Although, very interesting attempts to examine responsibility for implicit biases have been recently
made. See especially Daniel Kelly and Erica Roeddert’s (2008) paper, “Racial Cognition and the Ethics of
Implicit Bias” and Jules Holroyd’s (2012) paper, “Responsibility for Implicit Bias”.
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communicative and epistemic practices and habits. I incorporate social psychology
empirical research and literatures in prejudiced communication to provide some examples
of these identity-prejudiced prabits.
In Section 4 of the chapter I raise concerns about individualistic constructions of
the collective social imagination and of prejudice. I worry that Fricker commits her
account to this and that contemporary empirical research often assumes it as well. Section
5 of the chapter responds to these concerns by making the case that the collective social
imagination must be understood in terms of a relational account of oppression that
understands prejudice beyond the universal cognitive tendency towards ingroup and
outgroup biases and in terms of the relations of power that inform what I have called
identity-prejudiced stereotypes. I look to the social identity approach within social
psychology as a mechanism for introducing this foundational relational ontology of
prejudice.
As was demonstrated in Chapter 1, Young relies on some of the thought that
eventually becomes the social identity approach in her development of the social group,
and Addams and Dewey anticipate some of this thought. Thus this chapter both offers an
account of communicative inequality and serves as a bridge between Young’s thought
and Addams’s and Dewey’s contributions.
2. Situating Identity-Prejudiced Communicative Inequality
In Chapter 1 I pointed to James Bohman’s work on deliberative democracy as an
exception to the individualistic limitations I assigned to traditional deliberative theory,
specifically because of his appreciation for the influence of oppression on one’s
deliberative standing. He explains,
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Cultural pluralism heightens the uncertainty of achieving deliberative uptake, as
well as the problems of gaining mutual recognition and respect…some groups can
make the case that such failure to convince others with their public reasons is part
of a larger pattern. (Bohman, 1996, p. 107)
Thus Bohman concludes rightly, “deliberative theorists must distinguish between
merely formal “opportunities” to deliberate and the capacity to make “fair use” of one’s
public reason” (Bohman, 1996, p. 122). He defines deliberative inequality as
“asymmetries of public capabilities and functioning that persist in most public spheres”
(Bohman, 1996, p. 110, the emphasis is mine). Bohman introduces a typology of
deliberative inequality consisting of three basic types: (1) power asymmetries, (2)
communicative inequalities, and (3) “political poverty” (Bohman, 1996, p. 110, the
emphasis is mine).
Like Young, Bohman worries that without particular protections, deliberation can
become elitist because some individuals “have greater cultural resources (such as
knowledge and information)” and are thereby “more capable of imposing their own
interests and values on others in the public arena” (Bohmna, 1996, pp. 112-3). And also
like Young, he sees a potential tendency towards elitism within deliberative democracy
that many traditional deliberative theorists miss, namely, that deliberation can itself
become the stage for unequal influences of social and economic power in a society.
In his account of communicatively structured deliberative inequality Bohman
seems to have in mind Young’s fourth face of oppression, cultural imperialism. For
example, he points out that the official language of political deliberation, or even a
dominantly accepted style of discourse (e.g., deliberation-as-argument) may favor
particular groups (Bohman 1996, p. 116). Bohman provides a contemporary example
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where a non-public discourse gets assumed as universal. Contrasting the civil rights
movement with the contemporary prolife movement he explains,
However, as opposed to the civic rights movement, [the prolife movement] has
not found public resonance and forms of expression outside of the churches from
which it originated. It has not succeeded in translating the movement’s reasons
into the public sphere; they remain non-public, however widely convincing and
widely shared among citizens. (Bohman, 1996, p. 137)
In such narrowly defined discourses, what counts as ‘public reasons’ and modes
of justification becomes restricted through the ideologies and interpretive frameworks of
the dominant group, and these are assumed as objective standards for justification in
political discourse (Bohman, 1996, p. 117). So to build on Bohman’s example, women
who wish to challenge some or all of the teachings or positions held within these
Christian communities, often have their speech constrained by a dominant discourse of
Christian fundamentalism, a discourse that restricts justifications for conduct to biblical
literalism (and problematically assumes the possibility for an impartial and infallible
reading of the text).
Recall my treatment of deliberation-as-argument in Chapter 1. Here I introduced
this as a type of cultural imperialism where one’s participation in a deliberative forum is
conditioned on meeting norms of detachment and assertive speech that are already
operative in the social context. However, when deliberation-as-argument is assumed as
the only appropriate discourse for a particular deliberative forum, it can function in this
space to harm one’s deliberative standing in a way that disproportionately impacts her
particular social group. In the case of deliberation-as-argument, one’s deliberative
standing is diminished by communicative and epistemic practices and habits that are not
directly the result of identity-prejudiced stereotypes, but that disproportionately harm her

87
as a result of her oppressed social identity. I will call the communicative and epistemic
practices and habits that function towards this type of group-based disproportionate harm,
disparate impact prabits.
Disparate impact communicative inequality arises because of communicative
forms of cultural imperialism where discourses (e.g., deliberation-as-argument) are
assumed as the only appropriate mode of discourse. In disparate impact communicative
inequality, one’s social identity is a salient feature of why her deliberative standing is
harmed (Bohman, 1996, p. 117). Disparate impact prabits get their force (to contribute to
communicative inequality) from functioning within a social space of intergroup relations
of power where there is oppression and privilege and group-based social inequality.
An account of communicative inequality should not be limited to communicative
forms of cultural imperialism, however, since this does not capture the identityprejudiced nature of some individuals’ deliberative standing. Argument is not itself
identity-prejudiced, nor is it the type of discourse that is prompted by identity-prejudiced
stereotypes. But many of the communicative and epistemic prabits that contribute to
communicative inequality are directly informed by identity-prejudiced stereotypes and in
such cases I will refer to them in terms of being identity-prejudiced prabits.
This is an important distinction that Bohman does not articulate clearly enough.
While his account of deliberative inequality identifies three forms, one of which is
communicative inequality (i.e., power asymmetries, communicative inequality, and
political poverty), Bohman’s introduction of a ‘capacity-based conception of deliberative
equality’ largely emphasizes the need to introduce institutional remedies for the third
form of deliberative inequality, political poverty. Political poverty is “a group-related
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inability to make effective use of opportunities to influence the deliberative process”
(Bohman, 1996, p. 125). Thus his attention to remedying the impoverished capacities of
marginalized individuals overshadows any consideration of the identity-prejudiced
dimensions of deliberative inequality.37
Bohman measures effectiveness in deliberation as the ability “to initiate a public
dialogue about an issue or a theme – a dialogue in which the deliberator’s reasons may
receive deliberative uptake” (Bohman, 1996, p. 125). He provides minimal examples to
clarify, but he seems to take it that deliberative equality largely rests on a society having
“the presumption of a set of minimum, shared public capacities” (Bohman, 1996, p. 127).
Here he appears to have in mind capacities that are both agential (e.g., personal skills and
abilities) and structural (e.g., participation costs). Thus on this capacity-based account,
deliberative equality can be enabled through introducing institutions and forums that
“eliminate inadequate functioning among their citizens” (Bohman, 1996, p. 128).
Bohman describes communicative inequality in terms of a restricted hermeneutics
where public conversation around problems is constrained for some social groups
because limited cultural resources exist in the dominant discourse for those problems to
receive uptake and be effective. But he concludes that the primary reason such
participants’ voices cannot be converted into influence in public dialogue is because,
“they lack a vocabulary in which to express their needs and perspectives publicly”
37

Some context is important here. Bohman uses this capacity-based conception of deliberative
equality as a way to mitigate a concern that policies that are intended to be correctives of social
inequality often miss the deliberative sources of social inequality. To borrow his example, we
ought to be suspicious of correctives for deliberative inequality like granting automatic veto power
to minority groups or representatives. Not only do these types of consequentialist correctives
conflict with basic norms of political equality, but more than this, they also fail to address the
underlying deliberative inequalities that have resulted in the need for such correctives altogether,
namely, exclusion of the minority group in question from full participation in the deliberative
processes leading up to the vote for which they have veto power (Bohman, 1996, p. 109). This
feature of Bohman’s account of deliberative equality is not a point of disagreement for me.
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(Bohman, 1996, p. 121). This is why later when he develops his capacity-based account
of deliberative equality he points to the significance of liberal institutions that protect free
speech as a place through which “emerging publics” can introduce new dialogues and
terms (Bohman, 1996, p. 136).
But Bohman’s capacity-based account reduces communicative inequality to what
I have called ‘disparate impact communicative inequality’. Recall that disparate impact
prabits are not directly informed by identity-prejudiced stereotypes but disproportionality
harm groups because of the force they get in social spaces of intergroup relations of
power where there is oppression and privilege and group-based social inequality.
Generally, they are neutral communicative and epistemic prabits that are, “interacting
with group-based power relations and norms that are already operative in the social
context” in ways that disproportionately impact an individual’s deliberative standing
because of her social identity.38
Bohman rightly shifts the focus in deliberative inequality theory from one’s
available material resources to access deliberative spaces, to their social and epistemic
power in those deliberative spaces. My worry for Bohman’s account, however, is that it’s
focus on deliberative capacities and functionings overshadows another significant
dimension of deliberative inequality that oppressed people must grapple with on a daily
basis, that is, the presence of identity prejudices on the part of their interlocutors in their
communicative and epistemic exchanges. On a capacity-based conception of deliberative
inequality, any corrective measures to address political poverty are vulnerable to
conditioning participation on assimilation to dominant constructions of deliberation.
Moreover, it will ignore the problem of identity-prejudiced communicative inequality,
38

I credit Theresa W. Tobin for articulating this point.
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that even when oppressed people assimilate their speech to the dominant discourse, they
are often vulnerable to identity-prejudiced prabits that marginalize their deliberative
standing.39 But as I have already pointed out, identity-prejudiced communicative
inequality is not resolved through attention to oppressed peoples’ capacities, but to
attending to the identity-prejudiced prabits that produce them!
My aim is to shift the focus in theorizing about deliberative inequality from
oppressed persons’ deliberative capacities for participation, to their deliberative uptake
by fellow deliberators, that is, from political poverty to identity-prejudiced
communicative practices, and ultimately, from what oppressed people can and should do
to be included, to what people with identity-prejudiced inflated deliberative standing can
and should do to include.
While Bohman’s account is important within deliberative theory for initiating a
turn towards the communicative dimensions of deliberative inequality, his treatment of
communicative inequality is underdeveloped in terms of some of the more recent work in
epistemology and social psychology that examines the relationships between prejudice,
knowing, and epistemic standing (e.g. Miranda Fricker). Here is where it is important to
turn to Miranda Fricker’s useful conception of testimonial injustice for support in
developing my account.
3. Contributions from Feminist and Resistance Epistemologies and Social Psychology
Empirical Research
Recall that Miranda Fricker introduces the label ‘identity prejudicial’ to denote
“prejudices against people qua social type” (Fricker, 2007, p. 4). Identity prejudices arise
39

I should note that I do not think that Bohman’s deliberative theory necessarily lacks the
conceptual tools to make this distinction, only that the distinction is underdeveloped in his
account.
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within relations of social power, and importantly, social power is exercised through both
practical social co-ordination and imaginative social co-ordination. Fricker explains,
“There can be operations of power which are dependent upon agents having…shared
imaginative conceptions of social identity” (Fricker, 2007, p. 14). For example, in the
case of the exercise of gendered identity power, “both parties must share in the relevant
collective conceptions of what it is to be a man and what it is to be a woman” (Fricker,
2007, p. 15).40 Fricker roots identity prejudices in “the collective social imagination
[which] inevitably contains all manner of stereotypes and … is the social atmosphere in
which hearers must confront their interlocutors” (Fricker, 2007, p. 38). In such contexts,
speakers from oppressed groups can suffer an injustice that is epistemic in nature because
they receive “deflated credibility from the hearer owing to identity prejudice on the
hearer’s part” (Fricker, 2007, p. 4).
Recall also that Bohman acknowledges that political participation “depend[s] in
crucial ways on the uncertain cooperation of others” (Bohman, 1996, p. 128). Fricker’s
account brings to light an important feature of communicative inequality, namely, the
persistence of identity prejudices in the cooperative context on which deliberative uptake
is dependent.
Fricker takes as the central case of testimonial injustice “identity-prejudicial
credibility deficits”. Such credibility deficits harm one primarily “in her capacity as a
knower” and because of the centrality of knowing to human functioning, she is
40

For an excellent example of this in racialized identity power, see Devine and Elliott (1995), whose
research at the University of Wisconsin seems to have revealed this collective social imagination about
blacks. Gendler summarizes, “The traits most frequently cited were: lazy, ignorant, musical, stupid,
unreliable, loud, aggressive, athletic, rhythmic, low in intelligence, sexually perverse, uneducated, poor,
hostile, and criminal (Devine and Elliott 1995, pp. 1144-1146; cited in Gendler, 2011, p. 43). Importantly,
even subjects who expressly rejected the accuracy of these stereotypic traits were aware of them,
demonstrating the persistence of the collective social imagination even in spite of explicitly held beliefs.
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“symbolically degraded qua human” (Fricker, 2007, p. 44). Identity-prejudiced
credibility deficits have a secondary harm for individuals, a potentially “ongoing process
of erosion” of one’s epistemic abilities, epistemic confidence, and even may hinder her
development of certain epistemic virtues like intellectual courage and perseverance
(Fricker, 2007, p. 50).
There is a mutually reinforcing relationship between the primary and secondary
harms of identity-prejudiced credibility deficits because the subject is “exclude[d] from
trustful conversation” and through this, is marginalized in the kind of participatory
practices that are essential for self-development (Fricker, 2007, p. 53). Linda Alcoff has
explained this poignantly, “Such exclusions have cumulative effects: being denied
credibility means that one is precluded from developing one’s intellectual abilities. Doubt
from others often leads to self-doubt, hesitation, reticence to speak, and thus an inability
to formulate clearly one’s thoughts” (Alcoff, 2010, p. 131). In this process of erosion,
“the subject of the injustice is socially constituted just as the stereotype depicts her”, and
it may even come to be “a causal force towards its own fulfillment” (Fricker, 2007, pp.
55, 57).
We should extend this account of harm onto identity-prejudiced communicative
inequality: (1) one is harmed primarily as a knower and political agent (and symbolically
qua human) and (2) one is harmed secondarily because she is deprived of the kinds of
safe epistemic and communicative spaces that are conducive to nurturing her political
capacities and agency.41

41

Indeed even the marginalize-ing interlocutor is harmed in this sense since through his marginalization
of the Other, he imposes restrictions on the epistemic potential of the communicative act.
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There is convincing empirical evidence for Fricker’s claim that identityprejudiced stereotypes can impact an individual’s assessment of another’s credibility and
competency.42 Perhaps where this has been most clearly evidenced is in literatures
examining credibility and persuasion in communications, marketing and advertising, and
criminal justice.43 Tess Neal found that in trial proceedings, perceptions of female
experts’ credibility was particularly low when female experts were not perceived as
likeable, but that likeability was not a significant factor for credibility for male experts
(Neal et al., 2012).44 In a later review of the literature, Neil explained that while expert
gender typically does not appear to influence ultimate decisions in criminal cases, it does
sometimes seem to influence damage awards in civil cases (Neil, 2014). In journalism
and media studies, Maria Brann and Kimberly Himes found that, after controlling for
physical attractiveness, televised male weather newscasters were perceived to be higher
in competence, composure, and extroversion than their female counterparts (Brann and
Himes, 2010).

42

This research has origins in work on social cognition and attitudes that investigated the breadth of the
halo effect, a cognitive bias in which, “the tendency for judgment of a novel attribute (A) of a person [is]
influenced by the value of an already known, but objectively irrelevant attribute (B)” (Greenwald and
Banagi, 1995, p. 9). Early studies on the halo effect demonstrated a cognitive bias to favor someone or
something on the basis of an association with attractiveness, height, fancy gift-wrapping, or even
association with a more prestigious institution. Anthony Greenfield and Mahzarin Banaji were among the
first to examine similar implicit attitude associations in application to socially stigmatized groups in their
(1995) groundwork publication, “Implicit Social Cognition: Attitudes, Self-Esteem, and Stereotypes”. Prior
to this much of the research on social cognition and attitudes focused on examining consumer attitudes,
self-esteem, and political ideologies.
43
For an excellent review of this literature, see Zhu et. al., 2016. They point to a number of
studies that evidence the persistence of the halo effect where “characteristics which should have
little or no bearing on whether a researcher is judged as credible” impact perceptions of credibility
and competence evaluations. Such factors include but are not limited to physical attraction, age,
demographic similarity to the perceiver, race and gender (p. 863). Indeed the presence of such
biases among jurors and judges is a major shared assumption of trial advocacy courses that
instruct law students in Voir Dire.
44
See also, Neal, 2014. For an additional, but more dated, investigation of race-motivated assessments
of credibility in the judicial system, see Sheri Lynn Johnson’s (1996) “The Color of Truth: Race and the
Assessment of Credibility”.
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Some more recent research has demonstrated gender disparities in perceptions of
competency within the STEM fields (science, technology, engineering, and math), fields
historically dominated by men. STEM faculty members were randomly assigned resumes
to evaluate. Corinne Moss-Racusin and fellow researchers found that despite having the
exact same qualifications, Jennifer’s were perceived as less competent than John’s and
were less likely to be offered jobs or mentoring opportunities as a result. When they were
offered jobs, Jennifer’s were hypothetically offered an average of 13% less than John’s
(Moss-Racusin, et. al., 2012).45
Identity-prejudiced stereotypes seem to be predictive of more general assessments
of character as well. Jason A. Okonofua and Jennifer L. Eberhardt (2015) conducted a
study at Stanford University on K-12 teachers’ perceptions of student infractions, and
importantly, teacher-perceptions of student behavioral patterns over time. Eberhardt and
Okonofua found that there was no racial disparity in recommended discipline for
students’ first infractions. However, there was a disciplinary racial disparity in
recommended discipline and faculty perceptions of students after a second infraction. At
this second-infraction level, teachers were more disturbed by the behavior of black
students, more likely to recommend severe punishment, and more likely to label the
student a “troublemaker”.
Fricker’s work focuses on testimonial exchanges and perceptions of credibility. I
do not think that deliberative standing is unlike testimonial standing. I am interested,
45

See also Marianne Bertrand and Sendhil Mullainathan’s (2004) widely cited study
demonstrating racial disparities in callbacks for interviews. Resumes with White sounding names
(Emily and Greg) received 50% more callbacks for interviews than resumes with Black sounding
names (Lakisha and Jamal). It is important to note, however, that this research does not
demonstrate perceptions of competency were a significant causal factor for callback disparities
and there could exist alternative motivations among participants (e.g., overt racism, feeling more
comfortable working with members of one’s own ingroup, or also assessments of competency).
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however, to develop a broader conception of how identity-prejudiced stereotypes impact
one’s deliberative standing than Fricker’s focus permits. I do this by examining not only
the role of identity-prejudiced stereotypes in perceptions of credibility, but also their role
in communicative and epistemic practices and habits that support the diminishment of an
individual’s deliberative standing.
One reason communicative democracy must broaden its catalog of identityprejudiced prabits beyond testimonial exchanges is that the type of communicative acts
and knowledge practices that testimonial exchange restricts itself to, promotes too narrow
and veritistic an account of knowing. That is, testimonial injustice focuses on assessments
of testimony, the communicative and epistemic act of uttering a declarative statement
about a fact of the matter, veritistic “truth-tracking” knowledge practices like those
embodied in a criminal or civil trial procedure. In a trial procedure, hearers in a
courtroom are tasked with evaluating the truth of statements brought forward by a
defendant and witnesses.46
But I have explained in Chapter 1 that the types of problems communicative
democracy is interested in identifying, defining, and strategizing resolutions for, are far
more like design problems in engineering than discovering the truth of a defendant’s
claim to innocence.47 Certainly speakers’ credibility weighs into their deliberative
standing in problem-solving discourse. One’s deliberative standing in this context is
powerfully affected by her perceived credibility when she makes declarative statements,
46

Fricker herself relies on Goldman’s veritistic social epistemology in her articulation of the damage
that testimonial injustice imposes on the epistemic system. To be fair to Fricker, she does seem to resist
some of this veritism and lean towards a standpoint epistemology through talking of “truths” rather than
“the truth”: “Prejudice presents an obstacle to truth, either directly by causing the hearer to miss out on a
particular truth, or indirectly by creating blockages in the circulation of critical ideas” (Fricker, 2007, p.
43).
47
For an introduction to the design approach for solving moral problems, see especially Whitbeck
(1996) and Cooper (2016).
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but it is also impacted by other communicative practices. Besides declarative speech acts
we have to consider a range of other communicative and epistemic prabits that are
impacted by identity prejudices, for example, habits of interrupting and speech
accommodation. A pragmatist feminist social epistemology will resist the tendency in
traditional, veritistic social epistemology to analyze knowledge practices solely in terms
of epistemic production. Owing to this, it will also resist thinking about epistemic
practices (and communicative practices of an epistemic nature) solely in terms of
declarative statements.
In what remains of this section I will introduce some examples of identityprejudiced prabits that support identity-prejudiced diminished deliberative standing. This
discussion is not intended to provide an exhaustive list of identity-prejudiced prabits, but
to introduce some examples that collectively demonstrate the wide range of
communicative and epistemic dimensions of communicative inequality. One of my
interests here is to examine some of the communicative prabits that promote and
deteriorate one’s testimonial credibility specifically, and one’s deliberative standing more
generally. It is important to note that estimations of credibility motivate48 some
communicative and epistemic practices and habits, so insofar as credibility is informed
by identity-prejudiced stereotypes, resulting communicative practices will be as well. It is
also important to acknowledge a reinforcing circle here: identity-prejudiced stereotypes
that are housed in the collective social imagination motivate identity-prejudiced prabits,
and identity-prejudiced prabits sometimes function to reinforce the problematic content
of the collective social imagination.
48

I use the term ‘motivation’ in the broad sense that social psychologists use it to denote underlying
causes for action and behavior that the agent may or may not be consciously aware of in general, or may or
may not be attending to in a given moment.
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Destructive language patterns often accompany identity-prejudiced estimations of
credibility deficit. One example from the clinical psychology literature is that of “crazymaking language” that questions the sanity of the speaker. This type of language often
invokes the norms of dispassionate speech discussed in Chapter 1 to dismiss the
testimony of an individual on the basis of its emotional delivery rather than it’s content.
Here an individual’s alleged testimonial credibility deficit is supported through a
communicative practice, as well as to bystanders.
It is reasonable to suggest that gender might be a salient trigger for crazy-making
language in light of some recent research on gendered emotion stereotypes that was
conducted by Lisa Barrett and Eliza Bliss-Moreau (2009). Barrett and Bliss-Moreau
found gender disparities in whether subjects would evaluate a frowning or sad target face
dispositionally (“S/he’s emotional.”) or situationally (“S/he’s having a bad day.”). Not
surprisingly, they found that women were far more likely to be perceived dispositionally.
This research demonstrates that someone’s gender is a significant indicator for
whether she will be perceived as being emotional, or as expressing emotion because a
particular situation warrants it (Barrett and Bliss-Moreau, 2009, p. 654). The identityprejudiced use of crazy-making language is situated within gender-inequality where
rationality has historically been associated with masculinity, whiteness, and more elite
social classes. Thus women and people of color may be particularly vulnerable to crazymaking language.
The use of rhetorical questions in communicative interactions can also function to
dismiss a speaker’s voice or marginalize her contributions. As Randi Gunther has
explained, such questions “are never true questions of inquiry” and attack a person’s right
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to even make a claim or argument” (Gunther, 2000). The use of rhetorical questions as a
form of dismissal, challenge an individual’s moral standing in a relationship or in the
community.
Perhaps less pernicious than crazy-making language or dismissive questioning, is
the communicative prabit of interruption. Evidence suggests that identity-prejudiced
stereotypes can motivate interruption. For example, while Adrienne Hancock and
Benjamin Rubin’s research did not find any notable differences in the language a
participant used when speaking with a woman vs. a man, they did find that participants
tended to interrupt more when their communication partner was a woman (Hancock and
Rubin, 2014).
Some political commentators have suggested that this research could explain
patterns of interruption that occurred during the first of three presidential debates during
the 2016 U.S. Presidential Race. Crockett and Frostenson (2016) reported that during the
September 26, 2016 debate, Donald Trump interrupted Hillary Clinton 51 times whereas
Clinton interrupted Trump only 17 times (Crockett and Frostenson, 2016). What is more,
they also counted that Clinton was interrupted 70 times by moderator Lester Holt,
whereas Holt only interrupted Trump 47 times (ibid.). In her analysis of the debate,
Peggy Drexier also found that Lauer provided a more diverse series of questions to
Trump than to Clinton (Drexier, 2016).
Like dismissive questioning, identity-prejudiced norms of interruption can
function to diminish a speaker’s standing to bring moral claims to her community. This
message of standing can be conveyed both to one’s interlocutor and to bystanders of the
communicative interaction. In the latter types of cases, the interrupter both assert’s his
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dominant moral standing to his interlocutor and communicates information about his and
his interlocutor’s relative epistemic standing to bystanders.
Identity-prejudiced stereotypes can inform one’s style of speech as well. There is
evidence that in competitive intergroup settings, there are often group-based linguistic
disparities in how ingroup vs. outgroup members are described.49 Researchers observed
racial disparities in how victims were depicted in media coverage of Hurrican Katrina
(Sommers, et. al., 2006). For example, authors pointed to “the widely circulated photo
captions that described a Black man as “looting” and a seemingly comparable White
couple as “finding food”” (Sommers, et. al., 2006, p.40). This speech adjustment in
describing outgroup members is particularly pervasive in political campaigns where one’s
speech is intended to be persuasive.50
There is also evidence that communicators will adjust their style of speech
according to the perceived characteristics of their interlocutor. Janet Ruscher explains,
“In intergroup settings, such assumptions often are based on the stereotypes associated
with the listener’s apparent group membership” (Ruscher, 2017, p. 12). For example,
communicators often use secondary baby talk (e.g., simplified and cute words, higher
pitch, simpler words, and shorter sentences) in interactions with an elderly person who is
demented or a person with a developmental cognitive disability, but owing to identityprejudiced stereotypes about the elderly as a social group and about the disabled as a
social group, they may also overextend this speech style to elderly people in general or to
a person with a physical disability who is not cognitively disabled (Ruscher, 2017).

49
50

For a review of some of this literature see Anoll, Zurloni, and Riva, 2006, p. 238.
See for example Anolli, Zurloni, and Riva, 2006.
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Speakers also sometimes under-accommodate speech for people when they do not
feel (on some explicit or implicit level) that the listener or interlocutor deserves care,
concern, or warmth. For example, speakers might be curt, dismissive, cold, or impatient
with foreigners and immigrants they identify as outgroup members, implying that they
“are not worthy of attention nor should they be accorded the privileges of valued group
members” (Ruscher, 2017, p. 13). This underaccomodation towards outgroup members
has also been observed in immediacy behaviors (e.g., smiling, leaning towards someone
when speaking, open posture, nodding, etc.) in intergroup communicative interactions
(Trawalter and Richeson, 2008).
Perhaps the most striking evidence for the impact of identity-prejudiced
stereotypes on one’s deliberative standing has been demonstrated in the healthcare
setting. Researchers found a correlation between physicians’ implicit bias levels and
patient perceptions of care. Patients were given a Primary Care Assessment Survey that
assessed perceptions of “patient-centered care”. This survey defined patient-centered care
as consisting of: (1) patient-centered interpersonal relationship (e.g., feeling that the
physician was caring and concerning), (2) communication (e.g., feeling that one’s
questions were answered), (3) trust (e.g., perception that the physician has knowledge),
and (4) contextual knowledge (e.g., feeling that the physician knows one’s values and
beliefs). Based on these surveys, researchers found that patients who were black were
much more likely to report having had unsatisfactory interactions when their physicians’
scored higher in implicit bias (Green et. al., 2007).51

51

For a thoughtful and empirically backed compilation of the stories of people of color in the healthcare
system, see especially Augustus White and David Chandoff’s (2011) book, Seeing Patients: Unconscious
Bias in Health Care.
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It is important to note that the survey defined patient-centered care in a way that is
consistent with shared decision-making models of patient care and physician-patient
interaction. Within the medical ethics literature, shared decision-making is commonly
contrasted with more paternalistic models which have been widely refuted on both
theoretical grounds52 and on empirical grounds for failing to be effective in producing
and supporting compliance in patients with their treatment plans.
One benefit of shared decision-making is its ability to mitigate a potential conflict
between respecting patient autonomy and fulfilling the physician’s obligation of
beneficence to the patient. On this approach the patient and physician are seen are moral
equals and work together to weigh the pros and cons of different treatment plans for the
individual patient according to her values and realistic compliance possibilities (Katz,
1992). Not surprisingly, in its early theoretical phases, some scholars referred to the
shared decision-making model as a ‘deliberative model of care’ (Emanuel and Emanuel,
1992). This research suggests that in some contexts, identity-prejudiced stereotypes can
function to fundamentally shift a communicator’s mode of interaction from one of mutual
epistemic respect and participation, to one of epistemic authority and elitism.53

52

For an excellent review of these arguments see Buchanan, 2002.
Jose Medina’s work introduces another important perspective here, namely, that of the more general
relationship between social identities and epistemic character. He hypothesizes that one’s tendency towards
epistemic vices or virtues may be determined by her social identity. That is, social privilege may incline an
individual towards epistemic attitudes and habits that contribute to the creation and maintenance of bodies
of ignorance – vices of epistemic arrogance, epistemic laziness, and closed-mindedness. He asks the
question, “Could the privilege of knowing (of always being presumed to know), of always being heard as a
credible speaker, of always commanding cognitive authority, sometimes spoil people?” (Medina, 2013, p.
30) By contrast, marginalized people may tend towards epistemic attitudes and habits that make them both
better knowers, and also vulnerable to abuse by epistemically spoiled people: epistemic humility,
intellectual curiosity and diligence, and open-mindedness. The interesting point to take from Medina’s
work is that social identity can problematize deliberative equality even in the absence of identity-prejudiced
prabits just in virtue of our epistemic vantage point.
53
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4. Individualistic Tendencies in Theorizing about Prejudice and the Collective Social
Imagination
Fricker situates identity prejudices in “the collective social imagination”. She
explains that “shared imaginative conceptions of social identity” constitute the collective
social imagination and this is the socially sustained and informed conceptual framework
through which identity power operates (Fricker, 2007, p. 14). Building from Fricker’s
model, I want to suggest that this conceptual framework also produces (and is informed
by) a wide range of identity-prejudiced prabits that support one’s testimonial standing,
and even more broadly, her deliberative standing.
Ultimately, I am critical that Fricker’s account of prejudice and construction of
the collective social imagination is not conceptually rich enough to capture the
pervasiveness of identity-prejudices in human interactions. Thus we need a broader
understanding of the collective social and epistemic hermeneutical context that frames
the role of identity-prejudiced stereotypes in communicative practices. In the next section
of this chapter I will look to the social identity approach within social psychology as an
ontological framework for doing this.
Fricker detaches credibility deficit from credibility excess. This is something I
want to resist in the account I am constructing here because it misses the interdependency
of oppression and privilege in power relations. Fricker resists connecting credibility
deficit to excess because she thinks this would reduce her account to a distributive
paradigm of justice that is inappropriate for measuring epistemic goods (because
epistemic goods are not material, finite, or in short supply) (Medina, 2013, p. 62).
But this does not mean that credibility deficits and excesses are not
interdependent in some contexts. One’s epistemic standing is the result of more
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integrated and complex communicative processes. As many career women know, one can
be made deficient in a meeting where her male colleague enjoys identity-prejudiced
inflated epistemic standing or identity-prejudiced inflated intellectual esteem. This logic
of interdependence applies to perceptions of moral esteem in social contexts as well,
when for an example, during in conversation at a party a stay-at-home-mom is made
deficient and invisible by contrast with a celebrated stay-at-home-dad who “even changes
diapers!”
This logic extends even further though, because the content of negativelyvalenced stereotypes for stigmatized groups are themselves informed and maintained
through relationships of comparison with positively-valenced stereotypes towards
dominant groups. The important point here is as Medina explains, “Perceptions of
credibility and authority are forms of social recognition that are bound to be affected by
the cultural habits of recognition available for differently positioned subjects with respect
to different social groups” (Medina, 2013, p. 63). That is, what Fricker has called
“negative identity-prejudicial stereotypes” are maintained in the same complex
“collective social imagination” where other [more esteemed and non-disparaging]
identity, prejudice, and stereotypes are cognitively and affectively housed. Moreover, the
content of these negative identity-prejudicial stereotypes is maintained in relation to
positively-valenced identity-prejudicial stereotypes. All this is all to say that Fricker’s
inclination to pull credibility deficit apart from credibility excess has individualistic
consequences for how we conceptualize the social relations that make up the collective
social imagination.
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Recall that I want to look to the social identity approach within social psychology
to fill out our conception of the collective social imagination. The purpose of this is to
both enhance my account of identity-prejudiced communicative inequality and to situate
my account more fully in a relational ontology. The social identity approach within social
psychology literature has important contributions to make to this project, specifically for
the critique it offers of individualistic conceptions of prejudice and for its appreciation for
the deeply relational nature of prejudices.
Before defending the approach as a mechanism for understanding the relational
nature of the collective social imagination and the identity-prejudiced stereotypes it
informs, I will briefly situate the approach in the social psychology literature. There have
been two trends in the social psychology literature on prejudice that have fueled and
maintained an individualistic conception of the collective social imagination: (1) defining
prejudice in terms of personality and (2) defining prejudice in terms of cognitive error.
As we will see, the social identity approach in social psychology theory challenges this
individualism and introduces a robust, relational account of the collective social
imagination. The post-World War II intellectual economy saw an explosion of social
psychology research on group processes that scholars suspected could explain the
political violence of the Holocaust (e.g., conformity, obedience to authority, and
prejudice).54 It is important to note that prior to this time, prejudice was not identified as a
social problem, but rather, was widely perceived as natural and unproblematic.55
54

Theodor Adorno explains the central problem that guided much of this research, to “explain the
willingness of great masses of people to tolerate the mass extermination of their fellow citizens” (Adorno,
1950, p. v).
55
For example, sociologist William Sumner introduced the term ‘ethnocentrism’ in his 1906
sociological book, Folkways, to explain individuals’ universal tendency towards favoritism of their own
group and negative evaluation of other groups by contrast with their own. His account is isolated from any
appreciation for relations of power, social inequality, oppression, and privilege. He writes, “Each group
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During this time, Theordo Adorno introduced the authoritarian personality model
to explain prejudice (Adorno, 1950). Rooted in Freud’s psychodynamic model, Adorno
constructed prejudice as a symptom of a personality structure in which repressed
aggression towards one’s authoritarian parents manifests itself as out-group prejudice.
The authoritarian personality is one where, “the individual respects and defers to
authority figures, is obsessed with rank and status, is intolerant of ambiguity and
uncertainty, has a need for a clearly defined and rigidly structured world, and expresses
hatred and discrimination against weaker others” (Hogg and Abrams, p. 33). Adorno
ultimately hypothesized that German upbringing in the 1920s created a society of people
with authoritarian personality disorders primed to participate in the Holocaust.
Also during this era of intense investigation of intergroup conflict, Gordon Allport
introduced the cognitive-error account of prejudice in his influential book, The Nature of
Prejudice (1954). Here he defined prejudice as a negative attitude, “an antipathy [that
may be felt or expressed] based on faulty and inflexible generalization” (Allport, 1954, p.
9). Theorists working in the social identity approach point out that one assumption on this
approach is that, “these attitudes are, in some deep sense, both unfounded and
unreasonable” (Reynolds, Haslam, and Turner, 2012, p. 48).
The cognitive-error construction of prejudice holds that they are the inevitable
results of individual cognitive processes, shortcuts that are necessary for navigating a
complex social world (Reynolds, Haslam, and Turner, 2012, p. 49). In this approach the

nourishes its own pride and vanity, boasts itself superior, exalts its own divinities, and looks with contempt
to outsiders. Each group thinks its own folkways the only right ones, and if it observes that other groups
have other folkways, these excite its scorn” (Sumner, 1906/2008, I.15). While Sumner is certainly not the
first to observe the ease with which individuals group and the resulting behavior of that grouping, his
introduction of the term ‘ethnocentrism’ marks the beginning of the modern, formal study of this
sociological and psychological phenomenon.
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social problem of prejudice gets reduced to “faulty and flawed”, yet necessary,
psychological processes (ibid.). So while personality constructions of prejudice reduce it
to individual personality, cognitive-error accounts run the risk of reducing prejudice to
individual cognitive processes that, while seen as universal, are also assumed to operate
in relative isolation from other individuals’ cognitive processes.
The “cognitivist revolution” of the 1970’s and 1980’s continued this project of
conceiving of prejudice in terms of cognitive error, emphasizing, “how normal
psychological and social processes foster and maintain prejudice and stereotyping”
(Dovidio, et. al., 2010, p. 4). Much of the research of this cognitive-error period
demonstrated some serious concerns for personality constructions of prejudice on the
basis of their predictive power. 56 Scholars whose research and theory would eventually
become the social identity approach were influential in making some of these objections
to personality models. Because they reduce prejudice to individual personality,
personality constructions of prejudice struggle to predict which outgroup will be the
target of social comparison as well as of the authoritarian’s aggression. Importantly, these
accounts also fail to explain why prejudiced aggression is so often a collective
phenomenon.
Against the personality model, Henri Tajfel believed that intergroup conflict
could be explained by far more ordinary cognitive processes and behavioral tendencies.
Rather than a personality disorder, Tajfel’s research on minimal group paradigms
demonstrated how basic and universal the tendency towards ingroup favoritism and
outgroup prejudice is. It is independent of conflict, affect or relationship, or even
perceived similarities. Researchers established group associations based in as
56

See especially Tajfel, 1970; Tajfel, 1972; Billig and Tajfel, 1973.
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meaningless shared identities as possible, such as preference for one of two paintings. In
his 1982 literature review, Tajfel points to a conservative estimate of 30 studies that all
showed ingroup-favoring bias as a result of minimal or near-minimal categorizations
(Tajfel, 1982, p. 24). The conclusion from this research is that social categorization is
itself sufficient to cause intergroup competition and conflict. One need only draw a line
in the sand.
Tajfel’s cognitive emphasis is not without its flaws, however, and this can be
demonstrated through turning to the recent research in implicit bias. Until now I have
avoided discussion of implicit biases in my account of identity-prejudiced prabits. This
may be strange in light of the vast amount of empirical research on it since the
introduction of the implicit-association test (IAT) by Anthony Greenwald and colleagues
(Greenwald, McGhee, and Schwartz, 1998). Here I want to sidebar briefly to explain why
I have avoided framing my account of identity-prejudiced communicative inequality in
terms of implicit biases.
Recently the implicit bias research has come under significant scrutiny.57 Critics
point out that often times the research pointed to in implicit training programs is not
examining subconscious beliefs specifically, but rather, is examining communicative
habits and patterns of prejudice more generally (without necessarily demonstrating how
implicitly or explicitly these prabits are held). That is, researchers have failed to meet the
burden of proof to sufficiently demonstrate that implicit biases are indeed implicit. A
number of meta-analyses of the implicit bias research shows that the IAT test has both a
low test-retest reliability and low predictability.58

57
58

It is outside of the scope of my project to indulge this empirical debate in much detail here.
See for example Oswald, et. al., 2013; Forscher, et. al., 2018; and Goldhill, 2017.
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Low test-retest reliability means that participants in a study could get better at
taking the test with practice. Since IAT tests are now quite popularized and can even be
taken online, one concern for low test-retest reliability is that a study on implicit bias
research cannot assess whether participants’ results are being affected by external
exposure and practice-sources. Take for example a participant in a gender-focused
implicit bias study who has high IAT scores but has expressed egalitarian views about
women. It is entirely possible that he could believe and regularly do a lot of very sexist
things but simply be quite good at, and motivated in the laboratory setting to, selfpolicing his responses to conform with what he knows are more “politically correct”
responses. Thus his high IAT score is only explanatory of what he really believes and
knows he believes, not an indication that he has beliefs about gender that he doesn’t
know he has. Take another example where a participant is good at both self-PC-policing
and adjusting lower-cognitive levels of bias as a result of practice. He could have sexist
beliefs, know that he has sexist beliefs, but be quite good at censoring those in both
expressive and interactive contexts with others. Or he could just be a very good
egalitarian person all the way down to his implicit core.
It is also entirely possible that the attitudinal dualism assumed in the social
psychology discourse is faulty. I have chosen to talk of identity-prejudiced practices and
habits in terms of ‘prabits’ so as to bracket this debate. Recall that I have defined an
identity-prejudiced prabits as any communicative or epistemic practice, habit, or modality
of body comportment that is based in identity-prejudiced stereotypes. This is because I
want to be able to refer to a collection of communicative and epistemic activities that as a
whole support diminished deliberative standing. On my account, identity-based prabits
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range on a spectrum between volitional activity and ‘attention to’ on one end of a
spectrum and non-volitional activity and habitual compulsion on another end of a
spectrum.
Suffice it to say that various forms of intergroup communication often function to
diminish the deliberative standing of stigmatized groups. In some individuals these biases
may be consistent to the core with their explicitly held racist or sexist beliefs that they
regularly indulge and ideologically maintain, and in some individuals these biases may be
habituated patterns of interaction that are not entirely consistent with their expressed and
perceived beliefs but are maintained and nurtured through the collective social
imagination. The important point about thinking of the more “implicit” prejudices in
terms of habit is that the language of “habit” captures the unfixed and developmental
nature of attitudes in a way that the implicit/explicit dichotomy fails to capture.59
One suggestion I want to make is that much of the contemporary discourse around
implicit bias research reiterates the cognitive-error construction of prejudice because this
discourse largely avoids discussion of, and in some cases even consideration of, the
social and communicative processes that inform the conceptual content of the implicit
biases themselves.60 61 What I would like to see the applications of implicit bias research

59

It is outside of the scope of this chapter to test and defend this developmental hypothesis, however,
this hypothesis would also seem to explain the low test-retest reliability for the IAT. I do not wish to deny
the empirical significance of a study’s meeting a basic threshold of re- testability, only to introduce another
perspective on people’s seeming ability to get better at the tests. Reframing lower-cognitive prejudices in
terms of habits makes space for us to conceive of them as potential sources for social change.
60
I suspect that framing implicit bias in this way – as cognitive-error – is precisely what makes it a
popular entry-point for talking about race- or gender- inequality among likely offenders. Olivia Goldhill
explains, “One likely reason implicit-bias testing and training became to popular is that it’s socially
unacceptable to be seen as prejudiced. Discrimination still clearly exists; we needed an explanation;
implicit bias provided one. It’s personally convenient to recast subtle forms of prejudice as unconscious
bias” (Goldhill, 2017).
61
I thank Officer Jarod Prado, part of a group within the Madison Police Department called Judgment
Under the Radar for sharing with me his experiences working with and developing contemporary implicit
bias training programs. Officer Prado’s approach appreciates the deeply relational nature of race-biases and
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avoid is conveying a restrictive picture of prejudices where an individual’s implicit
prejudices are understood solely in relation with that particular individual’s explicit
beliefs, thoughts, or judgments. That is, the contemporary discourse around implicit bias
research reduces prejudice to an internal dialectic that one has with oneself, dislocating it
of its deeply social foundation in the collective social imagination.
The important point to take from all of this is that these approaches ultimately
promote an individualistic ontology of prejudice that misses the larger, social,
institutional, and structural relations that inform the content of those prejudices (e.g.,
negatively-valenced stereotypes and categorical associations). The social identity
approach that I introduce in the following section of this chapter interrogates these
individualistic assumptions and argues that prejudice does not flow from faulty and
flawed cognitive processes, but rather, from faulty and flawed social realities and,
“through group identities and associated political and social ideologies, to shape the
psychology of the individual” (Reynolds, Haslam, and Turner, 2012, p. 50). Elizabeth
Anderson puts this nicely, explaining that universal and ordinarily innocent cognitive
processes can be “the vehicle[s] for spreading structural injustice to new contexts”
(Anderson, 2012, p. 170).
5. Grounding Identity-Prejudiced Communicative Inequality in a Relational Ontology
Through the Social Identity Approach
It is important to note that Henri Tajfel himself was careful to insulate his
research from the individualistic cognitive-error turn in social psychology. In his 1981
book, Tajfel explains that stereotypes do not create “intergroup social situations” and that

emphasizes the influence of power relations in society for sustaining what I am referring to as “the
collective social imagination” in this project.
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neither the origins nor contents of stereotypes can “be disassociated from the prior
existence and the special characteristics of a conflict of interests” (Tajfel, 1981, p. 225).
While early theorists like Tajfel who emphasized the social cognitive perspective of
intergroup relations were “clearly intrigued with the power of social categories, [they
also] understood that the intense negative sentiments that often accompany intergroup
dynamics were in fact the central problem to be addressed” (Park and Judd, 2005, p.
109).62
Tajfel’s colleagues explain that his research was, “anti-individualistic in
orientation in that it attempt[ed] to explain large-scale, shared uniformities in social
behaviour” and ultimately “derives social conflict and stability from people’s relations as
group members” (Turner and Oakes, 1997, p. 240). Tajfel does this through introducing
the concept of social identity, what he defines as, “the individual’s knowledge that he
belongs to certain social groups together with some emotional and value significance to
him of this group membership” (Turner, 1975, p. 7; citing Tajfel, 1972, p. 292).
Before Tajfel’s research and thought, social psychology had largely assumed a
fixed and fundamental personal self, and any social dimensions of that self were
conceived of as additives or as superimposed on top of that fixed personal identity
(Reynolds, Haslam, and Turner, 2012, p. 64). With Katherine Reynolds, Turner explains
that on Tajfel’s social identity theory (SIT), there is a crucial distinction between
individual self-esteem, which is rooted in one’s personal identity, and collective selfesteem, which is rooted in one’s social identity (Turner and Reynolds, 2001, pp. 13962

Park and Judd do point out that the cognitive approach did eventually come, “to define prejudice as a
consequence of outgroup stereotypes, rather than negative outgroup stereotypes as a consequence of
prejudice.” This launched a considerable amount of research that was, “devoted to stereotype elimination
and change as a mechanism for achieving more harmonious intergroup relations” (Park and Judd, 2005, p.
112).
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140).63 64 Social identity is the part of the self-concept “that is determined by social
categories” (Trepte and Loy, 2017, p. 4).
Tajfel and colleagues eventually theorized that ingroup favoritism and outgroup
prejudice are the results of attempting to achieve the positive distinctiveness of one’s
social group in order to maintain positive self-esteem. Tajfel explains, one’s ingroup,
“may provide a basis for the building up of a positive self-image, [particularly] if [the
ingroup] managed to preserve a system of positive evaluations about “folkways,” mode
of life, social and cultural characteristics” (Tajfel, 1982, p. 11).65
Turner clarifies social identity, “An individual defines himself as well as others in
terms of his location within a system of social categories – specifically social group
membership – and social identity may be understood as his definition of his own position
within such a system” (Tuner, 1975, p. 7). Turner theorizes that social identity cannot be
had in isolation from comparative social categorization.66 Social groups do not exist in
isolation from one another, and they do not come into existence merely through voluntary
association. To the contrary, “A group becomes a group in the sense of being perceived

63

For example, under some conditions individuals were found to endorse distributing resources in ways
that would negatively impact them as individuals, but would promote the positive distinctiveness of their
self-identified ingroup in contrast to an outgroup, showing that under certain conditions, the salience of
one’s social identity can become so powerful that that they will act against their own individual self-interest
(Turner, 1975). This research might explain the tendency of individuals to vote for candidates whose
policies are in direct conflict with their own self-interest, but who are self-identified by voters as part of
their ingroup.
64
On Turner’s clarification, positive distinctiveness is a cognitive activity of one’s social identity, not of
one’s personal identity.
65
For a review of the critique of this self-esteem thesis, see Turner and Reynolds, 2001.
66
As early as 1978 Turner began refining his thinking about the process of self-categorization and
eventually introduced the Self-Categorization Theory (SCT) (Turner, 1999). It is important to note that
Turner’s SCT is not an alternative to social identity theory (SIT), but might be more appropriately seen as a
development from it. Turner studied under Tajfel in the 1970’s and the two of them mutually researched,
developed, and advanced SIT and so both of these theories “share many of the two researchers’ mutually
developed ideas (Trepte and Loy, 2017, p. 1-2). I refer to this entire research program (SCT and SIT) as
‘the social identity approach’. For a concise review of the major intersections and distinguishing features
between SIT and SCT, see Trepte and Loy, 2017.
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as having common characteristics or common fate only because other groups are present
in the environment” (Turner, 1975, pp. 7-8; citing Tajfel, 1972, p. 295, the emphasis is
mine).
Tajfel’s early research on minimum group paradigms demonstrated the salience of
group-identity for intergroup conflict and prejudice. But this research struggled to
consistently demonstrate that social categorization was itself sufficient to predict ingroup
favoritism and outgroup prejudice. Tajfel’s findings only seemed to support the claim
that outgroup prejudice is a possible, not a necessary, result of intergroup relations
(Turner, 2005). Michael Billig calls this invariance of prejudice, “the waxing and waning
of warfare” and of prejudice (Billig, 2002, p. 178). That is, in intergroup relations,
“sometimes there is socially shared bigotry; sometimes there is not; sometimes an
ideology of tolerance might be widespread” (Billig, 2002, p. 178).
Billig points out that some additional explanatory component beyond selfcategorization is called for to account for the waxing and waning of prejudice. He
suggests that, “the additional elements are not psychological factors but are historical and
cultural elements” (Billig, 2002, p. 178). He also suggests that because Turner assumes a
cognitive approach to prejudice, even he fails to appreciate the affective dimensions of
ideologies and social myths about groups (Billig, 2002, p. 178).67

67

Billig’s suggestion is significant here because it interrupts the cognitive/affective dichotomy that is
often assumed in the psychology of prejudice. Billig’s point is that, “What is required is not merely the
addition of ‘emotional variables’ to the prevailing cognitive perspective but a theoretical reassessment of
the apparent distinction between cognition and emotion…The emotion within an ideology of hatred is not
something extra that is added to a cognitive interpretation; it is part of that interpretation” (Billig, 2002, p.
184). There is a strong potential connection between Billig’s social constructionist position here and Tamar
Gendler’s (2008; 2011) recent work on alief, but it is outside of the scope of this project to take this line of
inquiry any further here. Since this constructionist position emphasizes the social and discursive
construction of the emotions, it will also be interesting to consider how conceptualizing identity prejudices
in terms of aliefs and conceptualizing identity-prejudiced prabits in terms of habits, could potentially clarify
some of the assumptions that fuel the contemporary implicit bias debates.
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What Tajfel missed in his initial studies was the role that the experimenters
themselves played in introducing the salience of participants’ social identities. Turner
explains that, “the major independent variable was not simply ‘group classification’,” but
a temporary social identity that was provided by the experimenter (Turner, 1975, p. 14).68
Researchers were introducing variables for people to base grouping on, as well as the
insecure conditions that would motivate participants to try to maintain positive
distinctiveness through ingroup favoritism and outgroup prejudice. On the whole, the
laboratory setting itself made social identity salient, and it introduced the conditions that
motivate a shift from personal to social identity.
Like Billig, Turner (2005) is aware of the deeply context-sensitive nature of
intergroup conflict, explaining that power and prejudice have “a social, political,
historical, and ideological dimension which is in fact always at work in the experimental
demonstration of supposedly generic facts” (Turner, 2005, p. 18, the emphasis is mine).
In his later work, Turner examines how power emerges from, functions within, and
sustains these systems of social categories.69 The important point for Turner’s account is
that he sees group perceptions as indicative of social realities themselves, not
“simplifications or distortions” of social reality (Haslam, Reicher, and Reynolds, 2012, p.
207). So Tajfel’s initial experiments not only neglected the role the experimenter plays in
introducing the salience of social identity and instigating outgroup prejudice through

68

For an example of how stigmatized individuals are shifting the salience of social identities to their
advantage in order to challenge the constraints of gendered social identities in blue-collar workplaces, see
Amy Denissen’s (2010) paper, “The Right Tools for the Job: Constructing Gender Meanings and Identities
in the Male-Dominated Building Trades”. Denissen shows that women creatively manipulate gender roles
to exercise their agency and resist gender dualities in highly context-sensitive ways. One strategy she
observes is that women often shift the basis for membership in the workgroup itself by implicitly drawing
attention away from gender towards more shared identities such as class, regional identity, or race
(Denissen, 2010, p. 1061).
69
See especially Turner’s 2005 paper, “Explaining the Nature of Power: A Three-Process Theory”.
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making positive distinctiveness insecure, but they also neglected the various social,
political, historical, and ideological contexts that frame intergroup relations and instigate
outgroup prejudices.
On the social identity approach, understanding prejudice requires an orientation
not only to the nature of the cognitive and psychological processes that produce
prejudice,70 but also “to the way in which these processes reflect and are responsive to
variability in the social context and ongoing social and political dynamics” (Haslam et.
al., 2012, p. 202). Turner recognizes that human beings are both individual persons and
group members, and this is not just a social phenomenon, but a psychological one. Turner
and colleagues explain:
As well as being individual persons…people also have social identities that are
grounded in their group memberships. Social identities reflect the cognitive and
emotional significance of such groupings, and they are implicated in processes
that are critical in shaping and changing people’s minds, motivations and
behaviours. (Reynolds, Haslam, and Turner, 2012, p. 55; citing Turner, 1982)
In short, social identity formation does not happen in a vacuum from existing
social and political patterns of exclusion, inequality, and oppression. These social
relations make up the social world that social identity formation navigates. Far from
being a collection of individual inductions of social groups, the content of the stereotypes
and categorical associations relied on in self-categorization is the inherited result of
social, political, historical, and ideological forces. This complex social world is the
context that frames social grouping, social identity formation, and one’s efforts towards
maintain positive distinctiveness. Turner and Oakes explain that processes like social

70

On Turner’s framework these cognitive and psychological processes are possible sources of
prejudices, but are more generally, “processes that allow us to be social and cultural beings” (Haslam et al.,
2012, p. 202).
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influence and norm formation produce “a socially structured field within the individual
mind” that consists of “in-group–out-group categorizations [that] more or less directly
reflect social relations” (Turner and Oakes, 1986, p. 250). This “socially structured field”
is precisely how we should think about the collective social imagination that frames
identity-prejudiced prabits.
Indeed, this is quite how Young explains the interaction between social identity,
oppression, and situated knowledge: Individuals are thrown into “structured social fields”
that are “prior to their individual subjectivity, both ontologically and historically”
(Young, 1997b, p. 391). They are positioned in these structures through social processes
and interactions (ibid., p. 392). This robust framework is what leads Young towards a
pragmatist feminist social epistemology that necessitates more inclusive democratic
communication and a “transformative deliberation” where the diversity of individuals’
social perspectives and situated knowledge are looked to as a resource in democratic
communication (Young, 1997b, p. 402).71 This pragmatist feminist social epistemology
was embodied in Jane Addams’s work and practice at Hull House, and is exhibited in the
vibrant picture of democracy she shared in her writings. As Addams and her
contemporaries like John Dewey knew, however, its fruition requires genuine
communicative equality of the kind I have tried to develop in this chapter.

71

Young’s explanation of this is insightful and worth including in full here. “The idea of social
perspective presumes that differentiates groups dwell together within social processes with history, present
arrangement, and future trajectories larger than all of them, which are constituted by their interactions.
Each differentiated group position has a particular experience of a point of view on those social processes
precisely because each is a part of and has helped produce the patterned process. Especially insofar as
people are situated on different sides of relations of structural inequality, they have differing
understandings of those relations and their consequences” (Young 1997b, p. 394).
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6. Conclusion: A Relational Ontology of Prejudice as a Theoretical Basis for IdentityPrejudiced Communicative Inequality
In Chapter 1, I explored Young’s concerns with how liberal individualism
restricts understanding of social groups to individualistic, aggregative and associative
models. As we saw, deliberative theorists who assume this individualistic framework are
unable to conceptualize oppression as a structural and systematic feature of social
relations between social groups. Deliberative theorists also often assume elitist and noninclusive constructions of deliberation that privilege the communicative norms that are
common among the dominant group in society, and in so doing, theorize some people and
some problems out of deliberation. One goal of this chapter has been to show how this
individualistic account of the social group maps on to contemporary conceptions of
prejudice, and how this could potentially limit and restrict contemporary attempts to
understand the fullness of identity-prejudiced communicative inequality.
As was detailed in the previous chapter, non-elites and oppressed individuals may
have difficulty formulating problems into argument form as a consequence of their poorer
educational backgrounds (i.e., political poverty) or they may lack the kind of time and
material resources required for political participation (i.e., too high of participation costs).
But critiques of deliberation-as-argument and other communicative forms of cultural
imperialism only capture disparate impact forms of deliberative inequality where
communicative and epistemic prabits that are not directly the result of identity-prejudiced
stereotypes disproportionately harm individuals on the basis of their oppressed social
identity. In this chapter I introduced an account of communicative inequality that
includes, but goes beyond disparate impact communicative inequality.
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My claim has been that even if oppressed people do meet the conversational
restraints of various forms of cultural imperialism (e.g., deliberation as argument), they
are frequently subject to the identity-prejudiced prabits of their interlocutors in
deliberative spaces in ways that diminish their deliberative standing. In this account I am
ultimately trying to fill out Young’s depiction of the body aesthetic dimensions of
oppression – “interactive habits, unconscious assumptions and stereotypes, and grouprelated feelings of nervousness and aversion” – as they impact one’s deliberative
standing (Young, 1990, p. 148).
Identity-prejudiced prabits are surreptitious, pervasive, and systematic. They are
surreptitious because many of them often operate on lower levels of consciousness and
implicit levels below belief. They are pervasive because they result from universal
cognitive-affective tendencies. They are systematic because of a cyclical relationship
between the collective social imagination and the identity-prejudiced prabits that it
informs, and the ways in which these prabits reinforce the collective social imagination.
The picture of prejudice that the social identity approach provides, one that
locates the collective social imagination and identity-prejudiced stereotypes in existing
social realities, reveals that group processes are both a potential source of outgroup
prejudice and a potential source for social change. The following two chapters of the
dissertation draw on the contributions of American philosophers and social reformers,
Jane Addams and John Dewey, for imagining strategies for transforming the collective
social imagination in this way. Their radical, relational ontology and rich understanding
of group moralities and prejudice anticipates Young’s conception of social identity and
identity-prejudiced communicative inequality. And their writings and practice are rich
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with resources for strategizing institutions, practices, and norms that on the whole, aim to
challenge the identity-prejudiced stereotypes that fuel communicative inequality, and to
construct genuinely inclusive deliberative spaces that protect, restore and nurture the
deliberative standing of all individuals.
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CHAPTER 3
INSIGHTS FROM JANE ADDAMS AND JOHN DEWEY FOR COMMUNICATIVE
DEMOCRACY: DEMOCRACY AS SOCIAL ETHICS
1. Introduction
Chapter 2 of the dissertation focused on filling out the relational ontology of
communicative democracy through providing an account of communicatively structured
deliberative inequality that emphasizes its identity-prejudiced dimensions. In what
remains of the dissertation I will look to the thought and practice of American
philosophers Jane Addams (1860-1935) and John Dewey (1859-1952) to fill out the
pragmatist feminist social epistemology that I grounded Young’s communicative
democracy in, in Chapter 1.
Communicative democracy, I have argued, makes theoretical space to name
communicatively structured deliberative inequality as a problem for democracy. In doing
so, it also introduces two important projects for democratic theorists, practitioners, and
advocates: (1) imagining and constructing inclusive deliberative spaces in light of having
named and acknowledged the presence of communicatively structured deliberative
inequalities and (2) strategizing communicative practices and norms of interaction that
can themselves challenge identity-prejudiced stereotypes and mitigate their harmful
effects on individuals’ deliberative standing in communicative and epistemic interactions.
Addams and Dewey are important resources for my project for a number of
reasons. First, they were strong advocates of a robust conception of democracy and
democratic communication. Like Young, they believed that norms of democracy,
particularly conceptions of political equality and inclusion, were vital for realizing social
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justice in contexts of diversity, pluralism of values, social inequality and oppression. Like
Young, they worried that narrow constructions of democratic communication (e.g.,
deliberation-as-argument) and norms of impartiality, consensus, and correctness
problematized genuine inclusion.
Second, they were critical of liberal individualistic constructions of the self and
advanced a rich, relational ontology in its stead. Because they saw individuals in a given
society as interconnected and interdependent parts of a whole, they saw oppression as a
function of social relations. So like Young they were able to appreciate the complex ways
that individuals can be excluded, particularly as participants in democratic processes and
social life more generally.
Addams and Dewey’s thought and work is situated in the period of urban
industrialism of the late 19th and early 20th century, so they were not conscious of social
identity in the same empirically based way that I developed it in Chapter 2. However,
they were both ahead of their time in how they thought about social grouping and
prejudice and the impact of these on participatory exclusion. As they saw it, many of the
features of modern industrial capitalism – extreme wealth disparities, labor exploitation
and hostile labor relations, urban poverty, displaced migrant and immigrant populations –
exacerbated the epistemic limitations already inherent in human subjectivity through
producing group divisions, social group hierarchies based in inequitable relations of
power, and harmful prejudices towards more marginalized social groups.
Thus a third reason to look to Addams and Dewey as resources for
communicative democracy is because they saw democracy as itself a mechanism for
resolving many of these problems. As Matthew Festenstein has recently pointed out,
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Dewey appreciates that class hierarchies and social division distort social knowledge, and
he believes democracy can counteract this (Festenstein, 2018). Although they did not
articulate it in these terms, Addams and Dewey treated democracy as a type of social
epistemology that appreciates that knowledge is socially situated and looks to inclusive
communicative practices as a mechanism for identifying and resolving “problems of
practical interest” (Anderson, 2006, p. 13).72
Like Young, Addams and Dewey did not restrict their conception of democracy to
formal institutions, check and balances, the protection of rights, and electorate processes.
They saw such democratic institutions as “political machinery”, useful only insofar as
they promoted and realized human flourishing. Throughout his works, Dewey contrasts
political democracy with democracy understood as “a way of life”, and assuming this
wider and fuller understanding of democracy, Addams frequently refers to democracy “as
social ethics”.
As I understand it, to say that democracy is a way of life and is a social ethics is to
say that democratic norms of political equality, transparency, reasonableness, and
inclusion must govern all of our social interactions so that through the implementation of
those procedural values, human beings may fully participate in all of social life, including
the formation of more substantive values and norms that will govern their collective
social life. Dewey explains:
The key-note of democracy as a way of life may be expressed, it seems to me, as
the necessity for the participation of every mature human being in formation of
the values that regulate the living of men together: which is necessary from the
standpoint of both the general social welfare and the full development of human
beings as individuals. (Dewey, 1888/1996, LW 11. 217)
72

Anderson explains that Dewey characterized democracy as an experimentalist process that requires,
“the use of social intelligence to solve problems of practical interest”. In this description, she references
Dewey’s (1939) “Creative Democracy: The Task Before Us” and Putnam, 1990.
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By ‘social ethics’, Addams has in mind an evolution of morality from an
individualistic and narrow conception of one’s obligations to her familiars, to a wider
“acceptance of social obligations” to all of those with whom one is connected to under
modern urban industrial life (Addams, 1902/2002, p. 8). Charlene Haddock Seigfriend
explains Addams’s worries about an individualistic morality poignantly: “If, in our
contempt for others, we limit the circle of our acquaintances to those whom we have
already decided to respect, “we not only circumscribe our range of life, but limit the
scope of our ethics” (Seigfried, 1999, p. 209; citing Addams 1902/2002, p. 8). By
contrast, social ethics requires that citizens, “must turn out for one another, and at least
see the size one another’s burdens” (Addams, 1902/2002, p. 7).
Thus democracy as social ethics makes ethical demands on citizens that are of an
epistemic nature, ethical demands to know responsibly. Democracy requires “engaging
the participation of epistemically diverse knowers” and “collective, experimentally-based
learning from the diverse experiences of different knowers” (Anderson, 2006, p. 8). I will
refer to the cooperative and inclusive social practices and processes that promote social
knowledge, social inquiry.73 As Addams describes it, an ethics of “turning out for one
another” and understood as a way of life, democracy socializes our ethics and requires
responsible social inquiry. This requires an epistemic openness to inquire into the
problems that face those with whom we fail to acknowledge under individualistic
morality, and it requires an affective openness to be moved by these encounters.
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It is important to distinguish my usage of this term from Dewey’s. Dewey uses the term ‘social
inquiry’ in places to denote the application of scientific investigation to social life and interaction, and he
seems to have in mind the formal academic discipline of sociology which had been established at the
University of Chicago only a few years before his arrival there (1892). See especially Dewey’s Logic: The
Theory of Inquiry (1938/1996, LW 12).
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Addams and Dewey saw democracy as a way to resolve the epistemic limitations
of human subjectivity that are exacerbated in intergroup social relations of power where
there is oppression, privilege, and group-based social inequality. They believed that
through refinement from the grips of liberal individualism, democratic communication
and interaction could potentially combat social inequality, exclusion, and prejudice. And
like Young, they viewed difference as far from something that should be denied or
assimilated, but as an epistemic resource for democratic communication (Young, 1997b).
Many of the practices at Hull House aimed to combat group-based divisions
among diverse immigrant populations living in cramped quarters with one another.
Addams and Dewey saw Hull House as a model for what democratic relations could be in
society as a whole, a community of different socially situated individuals engaging in
cooperative and inclusive processes and practices of forming social knowledge.74 And,
Addams used her writings about Hull House neighbors to combat identity-prejudiced
stereotypes about marginalized citizens, the immigrant, the prostitute, and more
generally, the urban poor. These stereotypes and social myths, housed in the collective
social imagination, functioned to deteriorate the sense among social and political elites
that such individuals were and should be treated as political equals. Thus a fourth reason
to look to Addams and Dewey’s work and the practices at Hull House as a resource for
communicative democracy, is because it is rich with strategies for realizing the more
inclusive, democratic interactions that communicative democracy idealizes in light of
communicative inequality.
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See especially Addams’s series of speeches on the social settlement in Addams, 1893a; Addams,
1893b; and Addams, 1899. See especially Addams (1907/2005) Newer Ideals of Peace: The Moral
Substitutes for War where she looks to the Hull House community as a model for a “cosmopolitan
affection” for all of humanity that “breaks through the tribal bond” of the older ideals of peace (p. 6).
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In the next section of the chapter (Section 2) I introduce the reader to Jane
Addams, Hull House, and Addams’s and Dewey’s relationship. In Section 3 of the
chapter I introduce the relational ontology that informed their shared vision of
democracy. Here I draw some important connections between their thought and Young’s
critiques of preference-aggregative conceptions of democracy.
In Section 4 of the chapter I introduce the challenges that Addams and Dewey
identified for realizing this conception of democracy. Like many of the pragmatists,
Addams and Dewey were deeply worried about the epistemological and ethical
limitations of human subjectivity. They were especially concerned that many of the
conditions of modern industrial capitalism exacerbated this problem. They also
combatted individualistic trends in their constructions of the social group and of
prejudice, and in this, were remarkably ahead of their time.
Addams and Dewey saw democratic communication as a type of social inquiry
practice that could counteract exclusion. Although they do not specify it as such,
democracy for them is social epistemology. Section 5 of the chapter demonstrates how
they theorized democracy in this way, and in so doing, fills out the pragmatist feminist
social epistemology that I based communicative democracy on in Chapter 1 of the
dissertation.
This chapter establishes some significant connections between contemporary
communicative democracy rooted in the work of Iris Marion Young and Addams’s and
Dewey’s conceptions of democracy as social ethics and as a way of life. As a whole, the
chapter aims to begin to fill in the epistemology of communicative democracy by
showing that Addams and Dewey saw exclusion as a serious social and political problem,
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that they identified identity-prejudiced forms of exclusion, and that they looked to
democratic norms and practices as a resource for social justice. This chapter establishes
the basic ontological and epistemological framework of Addams and Dewey’s conception
of democracy in order to set the stage for the final chapter of the dissertation where I will
look more specifically at some of the practices, programs, and methods of inquiry that
Addams and Dewey made use of in order to address deliberative inequality.
2. Jane Addams, John Dewey, and Hull House
Jane Addams is most renowned for her leadership in the social settlement
movement and founding of Hull House in Chicago’s West Side during the industrial
revolution and American progressive era. While Addams is well known as America’s
first social worker, she is underappreciated within the historical philosophy canon for her
contributions to American philosophy. She is often recognized for her practical rather
than for her intellectual contributions to the progressive movement and pragmatist
thought. Thus she has wrongly come to be seen as the hands and feet of the thought of
American philosophers John Dewey, William James, and George Herbert Mead.
Recent scholarship has begun to challenge this assumption that Addams was
merely implementing American pragmatism in her work. Scholars have established that
Addams’s writings are themselves philosophically significant. Additionally, Addams
enjoyed intellectually rigorous friendships with John Dewey and George Herbert Mead,
professional philosophers at the University of Chicago. There is persuasive evidence that
professional philosophers like Dewey and Mead saw Addams as an intellectual peer and
they were strongly influenced by Addams and their time with her at Hull House.
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We should be careful not to reduce Addams’s contributions to American
pragmatism to classic gender stereotypes. Hamington explains that while Dewey is
remembered as “the great intellectual” and as “mind generating theory”, Addams is often
seen as the woman activist, “body experiencing and caring”, thinker and doer
(Hamington, 2009, p. 37). Against this historical memory of the two figures, Hamington
among others75 point to evidence that Addams’s intellectual contributions were an
important part of the development of Dewey’s thought, and that Addams’s writings were
themselves philosophically significant. Moreover, a pragmatist feminist framework will
challenge this dichotomies operative in such an assumption, dichotomies between
thought/action, mind/body, theory/practice, and reason/affect.
Addams co-founded Hull House in 1889 with her lifelong friend Ellen Gates
Starr. The site they chose for Hull House was at the intersection of a number of working
class immigrant neighborhoods on Halsted Street in Chicago. Hull House can best be
described as a type of community based organization and center for social reform. Hull
House coordinated social clubs and gatherings with the local neighbors and was a lively
center of intellectual and political debate and social reform. Addams modeled it after
Toynbee Hall, a social settlement located in a crowded and poor area in the East End of
London that Addams visited while traveling as a young woman. Toynbee Hall was part
of the social Christian movement within upper-middle-class circles in England. This
movement, one that inspired Addams, emphasized living among the poor and “social
cooperation among works and social cooperation across class lines” (Knight, 2010, pp.
62-3; citing Knight, 2009, pp. 66-69).
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See especially Deegan, 1988 and Seigfried, 1999.
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Residents of Hull House were women from privileged backgrounds who were
dedicated to doing social good among the poor and committed to realizing the core ideals
of the progressive movement (e.g., inclusive democratic communication, education, and
economic reform). Hull House residents visited the homes of the most impoverished
neighbors with charity baskets, but Hull House was far more than a mere charitable
institution. It regularly hosted visits and lectures from scholars at the University of
Chicago and leading social and political theorists, it provided seed money and meeting
space for neighbors engaged in collective action, and it hosted meetings between
employers and laborers. In this sense, it served as a forum for various democratic
processes and as a facilitator for democratic participation.
Addams’s leadership at Hull House was vital. One of the many roles she played
was that of a type of University Chair. She facilitated social clubs,76 provided leadership
in curriculum selection for these social clubs, and frequently lectured or hosted
discussion during them.77 Hull House social clubs were a hybrid of intellectual activity,
social activism, and play. Members were from different socioeconomic backgrounds and
would often meet to read and discuss an academic text, a piece of literature, or a play.
This time was deeply social and often followed by festivities like a dance or games.78
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Addams uses the term ‘social groups’ in places in her writings about these groups. She has in mind
voluntary associations, however, so I have chosen to clarify these as ‘social clubs’ throughout in order to
avoid confusion with my use of ‘social groups’ thus far in the dissertation. Addams clearly has in mind an
association here, since these were voluntarily entered, ironically, by people from different social groups.
77
Addams recalls her involvement in building curriculum for social clubs (Addams, 1910, p. 347), for
instance, through encouraging one social club to include Josiah Royce’s Aspects of Modern Philosophy so
that they could see that, “Herbert Spencer was not the only man who had ventured a solution of the riddles
of the universe” (Addams, 1910, p. 347).
78
Addams proudly wrote about the role that Hull House social clubs played an in the early education of
many of the neighbors, “I see scores of young people who have successfully established themselves in life,
and in my travels in the city and outside, I am constantly cheered by greetings from the rising young
lawyer, the scholarly rabbi, the successful teacher, the prosperous young matron buying clothes for
blooming children. “Don’t you remember me? I used to belong to a Hull-House club” (Addams, 1910, p.
345-6).
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In this project I draw on Addams and Dewey’s philosophy of democracy thought
without significant distinction. Thanks to the remarkable scholarship of pragmatist
feminists over the past 25 years, there is a substantial body of literature that has
established the mutual interdependency of Addams and Dewey’s thought about
democracy and social ethics.79 These thinkers have brought forward incredible evidence
for Addams’s influence on Dewey’s thought, and from this have concluded that their
work in this was mutually influential. Before moving on to provide an overview of their
shared picture of democracy, I want to briefly highlight some of the significant work that
has been done to connect their thought. Here I will also make a few humble contributions
to this work through drawing attention to some important intersections in their work that
has not yet been substantially explored in the literature, namely, their thought about
social issues that they believed exacerbated democratic exclusion.
Dewey moved to Chicago in 1894 to accept a research and teaching position at
the University of Chicago and shortly after established the experimental school
(Hamington, 2009, p. 37). He visited Hull house not long after it opened (1889) and
praised Addams for her work there and for “giving him insight into matters”
(Hamington, 2009, p. 37). Maurice Hamington (2009) comments that Addams and
Dewey were “intellectual soul mates” from this very first meeting (p. 37).
Dewey eventually became a regular speaker at and visitor to Hull House.80 As
Hamington explains, “There was much intellectual cross-fertilization between Hull
79

See especially Mary Jo Deegan (1988), Marilyn Fischer (2004, 2010), Maurice Hamington (2001,
2004, 2009), Charlene Seigfried (1991, 1993, 1996, 1999, 2002, 2004, 2013), Regina Leffers (1993), and
Judy Whipps (2004).
80
Addams mentions Dewey’s “many talks” at Hull House as well as a series of lectures he gave on
Social Psychology (Addams, 1910, p. 237, p.435). See also Deegan, 1988. She recounts that Dewey taught
at Hull House both in an official capacity through University of Chicago Extension classes and lectured in a
less formal capacity within various settlement social clubs (Deegan, 1988, p. 251).
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House and the University of Chicago” (Hamington, 2009, p. 37).81 Addams was seen as
an unofficial faculty member of the University of Chicago, and when Hull House
incorporated in 1897, Dewey became a board member.
Dewey’s thinking about democracy was deeply influenced by his friendship with
Addams, from his time at Hull House, from the many conversations and correspondences
he had with Addams, and from reading her writings themselves. Indeed he seems to be
drawing on his experiences at Hull House in Democracy and Education (1916)
(Seigfried, 1999, p. 213). And his daughter, named after Jane Addams,82 recounts in her
Biography of Dewey that, “his faith in democracy as a guiding force in education took on
both a sharper and deeper meaning because of Hull House and Jane Addams” (Deegan,
1988, 252; citing Jane Dewey, “Biography of John Dewey”, pp. 29-30).
Dewey frequently cites Addams’s speeches and writings in his work on social
ethics and political philosophy, and footnotes to many of these passages are included in
this discussion and throughout this chapter as a whole.83 A few of those passages in
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See also, Mary Jo Deegan (1988), who tracks Addams’s relationships with various intellectuals at the
Chicago School. Deegan notes that the “religious” Chicago school of men treated Addams as an ally and “a
vital leader, although primarily within women’s restricted sociological sphere” (p. 163). Mead, Thomas,
and especially Dewey had greater openness towards women as colleagues and professionals, in part due to
Addams influence on them. Deegan notes that Addams was an illustration to them of the intellectual
woman, providing them “access to empirical data, controversial audiences and speakers, and organizational
skills to fight for social change” (Deegan, 1988, 163). She concludes that Addams, Dewey, and Mead all,
“had a fundamentally similar approach to social science, democracy, and education that bound them
together as colleagues and friends” (Deegan, 1988, p. 250).
82
This in itself demonstrates the fondness with which Dewey thought of Addams. Additionally, Dewey
dedicates Liberalism and Social Action (1935) “To the Memory of Jane Addams” and frequently publicly
acknowledged the vital role of the social settlement and Jane Addams to the city of Chicago. See
especially, Dewey’s address to a Child Health and Protection Annual Meeting (LW 17.517) and Dewey’s
address to “Mrs. Swan, Mr. Chairman, Miss Addams and Friends” at his 70th birthday party where he
specifically writes, “I have learned many things from Jane Addams. I notice that with her usual modesty
she attributed to me some of the things in Chicago which she and her colleagues in Hull House did…” (LW
5.421).
83
Indeed Dewey’s own remarks about women in philosophy are evidence that he would have considered
Addams an intellectual peer. In “Philosophy and Democracy” (1918) he writes positively of diversity in
philosophy, “…when women who are not mere students of other person’s philosophy set out to write it, we
cannot conceive that it will be the same in viewpoint or tenor as that composed from the standpoint of the
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particular are worth drawing attention to because they demonstrate the influence of
Addams’s thought about social groups, prejudice, and social psychology on Dewey’s
thought, topics that are particularly relevant to my project in the dissertation.
For example, in his treatment of group behavior in Ethics (1908), Dewey engages
in a discussion where he identifies a number of criticisms of ingroup virtues like loyalty.
This discussion is brief, however, and he points the reader to Addams’s writings for
further development on the topic since, “the problems which [these ingroup virtues]
cause in modern democracy have been acutely described by Jane Addams” (Dewey,
1908/1996, MW 5.135-6).84
Maurice Hamington unveils a series of correspondences in which Dewey credits
Addams for having changed his mind in the course of one of their debates at Hull House
about a particular philosophical problem of antagonism (Hamington, 2009, pp. 37-38).
Dewey writes to his wife about the event that Addams had “converted him” (Hamington,
2009, p. 38; citing Menand, 2001, p. 313). Then he writes to Addams, “Not only is actual
antagonism bad, but the assumption that there is or may be antagonism is bad….I’m glad
I found out about this before teaching social psychology” (Hamington, 2009, p. 38; citing
Menand, 2001, p. 314, the emphasis is mine). Indeed Dewey includes her work among a
number of professional scholars in his list of references for his course, “Social
Institutions and the Study of Morals” (Dewey, 1923-4/1996, MW 15.269, 272).85

different masculine experience of things” (Dewey, 1918/1996, MW 11. 45). And later in his life he defends
her writings as both containing a philosophy and of being transformative of philosophic method itself
(Dewey, 1945/1996, LW 15. 195).
84
Here Dewey references Addams, Democracy and Social Ethics (1902), pp. 222-77 and Addams,
Newer Ideals of Peace (1907), Chapter V. Later in this chapter I discuss these passages in more detail.
85
Here Dewey references two specific discussions in Addams’s Democracy and Social Ethics (1902):
her accounts of the Pullman Strike and labor relations (Chapter 5: Industrial Amelioration) and her
accounts of political reform (Chapter 7).

132
I draw attention to these passages and correspondences because they demonstrate
the influence of Addams’s thought on Dewey’s, but also because the content of these
passages demonstrates that Addams and Dewey regularly conversed about intergroup
conflict and the conditions that exacerbated it. Dewey praised Addams’s work at Hull
House because he believed it embodied the kinds of communicative and epistemic
practices that could combat the intergroup social processes that fueled intergroup conflict,
processes I have identified as ingroup and outgroup biases and identity-prejudiced
stereotypes. Seigfried explains, “He thought especially noteworthy its ability to ‘provide
means for bringing people and their ideas and beliefs together, in such ways as will lessen
friction and instability, and introduce deeper sympathy and wider understanding’”
(Seigfried, 1999, 213).86
3. Situating Addams and Dewey’s Conception of Democracy in Their Relational
Ontology
Addams and Dewey’s conception of democracy is shaped by their ontology. Like
Dewey, Addams held that human beings are primarily social and relational creatures, not
isolated and atomistic individuals. Seigfried notes that this “principle of the
interdependency of persons on one another” is a central thesis in all of Addams’s writings
(Seigfried, 2013, p. 151). Regina Leffers praises Addams for her “distinctive ability to
see individuals as wholes that are interconnected and interrelated parts of ever-larger
wholes…When she saw the gentleman wearing a nicely finished suit, she saw at the same
time the woman who must have finished that suit in a rank and dingy basement” (Leffers,
1993, p. 69).
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See especially Dewey’s “The School as Social Centre” (1902/1996, MW 2. 91). Here he looks to Hull
House as a model for the school.
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Marilyn Fischer’s language of “organic interconnection” captures this feature of
their ontology nicely (Fischer, 2010, p. 51).87 Addams believes that as society becomes
more interdependent given the evolving and more complex organization of human
associative life under industrialism, it becomes more appropriate to conceive of it as an
“organic aggregate”.
Dewey also rejects the individualism assumed under classical liberalism, likening
the sociopolitical sphere to an organism.88 This relational ontology informs Dewey’s
conception of “individuality”, by which he has in mind political agency or political
agency:
The fact is, however, that the theory of the “social organism,” that theory that men
are not isolate non-social atoms, but are men only when in intrinsic relations to
men, has wholly superseded the theory of men as an aggregate, as a heap of grains
of sand needing some factitious mortar to put them into semblance or order…For
the picture which is drawn of democracy is, in effect, simply an account of
anarchy. To define democracy simply as rule of the many, as sovereignty chopped
up into mince meat, is to define it as abrogation of society, as society dissolved,
annihilated. (Dewey, 1888/1996, EW 1. 231)89
Not only does this passage give insight into Dewey’s relational ontology of
political agency, but it also reveals the tension he identifies between this relational
conception of political agency and a preference-aggregative conception of democracy.
Rather than seeing individuals as isolated individuals, Dewey defends a view of
individuals as relational where the wellbeing of each is inextricably linked to the
wellbeing of the whole. That is, we come into our fullest individuality (i.e., political
87

Fischer references and draws this language from Addams’s Philanthropy and Social Progress (1893)

here.
88

See especially two of Dewey’s earlier works on democracy, The Ethics of Democracy (1888) and
“Christianity and Democracy” (1893).
89
In “The Ethics of Democracy”, Dewey also defends an account of democracy that aims to protect it
from mob rule in the same sense as Joseph Bessette (1986), something I developed in Chapter 1 of the
dissertation. Dewey writes, “But the heart of the matter is found not in the voting nor in the counting the
votes to see where the majority lies. It is in the process by which the majority is formed” (Dewey,
1888/1996, EW 1. 234).
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agency) in and through relationships with others, not independently and apart from
society.90 Dewey sees that his notion of individualism cannot be realized through the
uncoordinated exercise of individual rights or through decision-making based on tallies
of citizens’ uncoordinated preferences. Rather, liberties and preferences must be
coordinated “with the pursuit of the social good of all” (Shook, 2013, p. 9).
Dewey challenges the individualistic assumptions built into his contemporaries’
conceptions of democracy. Assuming an atomistic and aggregative conception of
individuals, these conceptions of democracy reduce it to a framework more suitable to
aristocracy, where one special interest group of political and social elites coercively
governs another group. Liberal individualism maps this dichotomy onto a conception of
democracy, rendering a narrow account where democracy is reduced to those formal
institutions and mechanisms that protect the governed from abuse by the governing (e.g.,
checks and balances, individual rights and liberties, and electorate processes).
Democracy properly understood, however, ruptures this dichotomy between the
‘governing’ and ‘governed’ because it idealizes the government as itself the expression
and articulation of the will of the society. “Society, as a real whole”, for Dewey, “is the
normal order” (Dewey, 1888/1996, EW 1. 232). That is, political democracy is an
expression of society, not a distinct entity from that Society. A government can be said to
be democratic in this sense when it “represents men so far as they have become
organically related to one another, or are possessed of unity of purpose and interest”
(Dewey, 1888/1996, EW 1. 232).
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This resonates strongly with Young’s own account of the social group. See especially Young, 1990
where she writes, “Societies do not simply distribute goods to persons who are what they are apart from
society, but rather constitute individuals in their identities and capacities” (p. 27).
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On the individualistic ontology of classical liberalism, political agency is
constructed as something that is sacrificed, or undergoes a restriction, as a result of the
coercive force of government. When located in the relational ontology of Addams,
Dewey, and Young, democracy is reconceptualized – both in its formal, institutional
structures and as a feature of all social relations – as a mechanism through which
individuals can come into their fullest potentiality.
Addams and Dewey were critical of liberal individualistic conceptions of political
agency, what Dewey explains in some of his later works as an “opportunistic, laissezfaire conception of freedom”.91 For Dewey, individual freedom is not understood as
freedom from interference, but rather, as a freedom to participate in human social life and
through that, the completion of one’s own individuality. Democracy as a way life is the
process whereby the individual “is brought to completion” (Festenstein, 1997, p. 79).92
The language of deliberative democracy is useful for understanding the central
role of participation in Addams and Dewey’s thought. Addams and Dewey take it that
inclusive participation and communication is so valuable for democracy because it is the
means by which citizens explore and test their individual preferences in coordination with
others. During this social inquiry, wider preferences emerge and values evolve from
individualistic morality into social ethics. This is because as Matthew Festenstein
explains, “Traditions of shared communication [like those that Addams and Dewey
endorsed and practiced] tend to establish bonds of trust and sympathy and to lead
91

See, Liberalism and Social Action (1935) and Freedom and Culture (1939). See especially Dewey’s
essay, “The Future of Pacifism” (1917). Here Dewey both demonstrates his appreciation for Addams as an
intellectual and contrasts her pacifist position with “laissez-faire” accounts of pacifism that were
philosophically underdeveloped and “opportunistic” (Dewey, 1917/1996, MW 10.266-7; citing Addams’s
(1917) paper, “Patriotism and Pacifists in War Time”).
92
Robert Westbrook explains that Dewey saw any “limitations on full democratic participation in social
life [as]… a subtle way of suppressing individuality”. To the contrary, “the development of individuality
required the democratization of all social institutions” (Westbrook, 1991, pp. 433-434).
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individuals to identify their interests with those of the broader community” (Festenstein,
1997, p. 88). Democratic communication has a “transformative effect” on individuals
(Festenstein, 1997, p. 88). Thus institutions and social practices and norms that
emphasize inclusive participation, create space for individuals to explore their values and
transform them from self-interested, to more socialized interests.
This conception of political agency is remarkably consistent with Young’s
connection of social justice with two overarching values that are constitutive of the good
life, self-determination and self-development. Young defines self-development in contrast
with the social condition of domination, as the ability to “participate in determining one’s
actions and the conditions of one’s action”, and she defines self-development in contrast
with the social condition of oppression, as the ability to “develop and exercise one’s
capacities and express one’s experiences” (Young, 1990, p. 37). Young clarifies that
social justice is not itself the realization of these values, but “the degree to which a
society contains and supports the institutional conditions necessary for the realization of
these values” (Young, 1990, p. 37).
Although Young does not speak in terms of political agency here, the connection
she draws between social justice and the institutions and practices that enable for selfdetermination and self-development gets at the heart of Dewey’s individualism and the
conception of political agency that is central to communicative democracy (Young, 1990,
pp. 37, 39). This account of political agency is the logical consequence of a
communicative democracy framework that is based in a relational ontology, makes space
to name oppression through a rich conception of social identity, and views the inclusion
of diverse social perspectives as a vital feature of social inquiry practices and processes
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that aim to identify and define practical problems and social conflicts and coordinate
efforts to resolve them. In her later work where she specifically introduces
communicative democracy, Young explains that under ideal social and political
conditions of “inclusion, equality, reasonableness, and publicity”, citizens would fulfill
their political agency in this way (Young, 2000, p. 31).
Addams explains the notion of organic connection through the language of unity.
She explains that like an organism, in order to function well the various parts or an
organization or of society must work towards a common aim, “make an effort to unify it,
and protest against its over-differentiation” (Addams, 1893a, p. 23). But this should be
clarified from the type of forced consensus that communicative democracy is cautious of.
Addams does not understand efforts to unify the social organism as a process that occurs
at the expense of individuals. She idealizes democratic communication as a mode of
insulating the process of unification from a false consensus through moving from the
expressed needs of each individual part towards a conception of the good of the
organism.93
Like Young, Addams defines unity by contrast to coercion and false consensus.94
She was critical of the tendency among political leaders , as well as in social settlement
houses, to set goals for American social life without forming genuinely inclusive social
93

Regina Leffers (1993, p. 73) explains Addams, “Looking at the broader community as an organic
whole also requires us to value its individual parts and take into consideration the needs of the community
as a whole together with its resources. This broader scope requires that we investigate problematic social
conditions and do what we can to improve them, endeavor to refine our methods of democratic government
so that an ever-increasing number of voices are able to contribute to decision making, educate people of all
ages to value difference when it is expressed, appreciate and respect the voice of others, and
conscientiously work cooperatively with others.”
94
Dewey explains that at the heart of Addams’s philosophy is the goal of replacing coercion with the
full consent of the governed, and this consent is grounded in (1) education, (2) democratic institutions, and
(3) the process of forming common social ends among “the cosmopolitan inhabitants of this great nation”
(Dewey, 1945/1996, LW 15. 196; referencing Addams). It is worth noting that in this passage Dewey not
only provides an analysis of Addams’s conception of democracy as social ethics, but defends Addams’s as
having a philosophy.
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knowledge of the needs of the most marginalized. She explains eloquently, “No one so
poignantly realizes the failures in the social structure as the man at the bottom, who has
been most directly in contact with those failures and has suffered the most” (Addams,
1910, p. 183).95
Neither Addams nor Dewey endorsed a philosophy of assimilationism. For them,
unity does not entail uniformity. Dewey condemns the “melting pot” theory of
assimilation in a critical discussion of American nationalism: “Our unity cannot be a
homogenous thing like that of the separate states of Europe from which our population is
drawn; it must be a unity created by drawing out and composing into a harmonious whole
the best, the most characteristic which each contributing race and people has to offer”
(1916/1996, 10. 202-211).
And while Dewey does mention the value of the public school to ‘assimilate
different races to our own institutions’ in “The School as Social Centre” (1902), he
shortly thereafter clarifies this as a type of process of Americanization that is distinct
from de-nationalization. In de-nationalization, which he condemns, “[Children] lose the
positive and conservative value of their own native traditions, their own native music, art,
and literature” (Dewey, 1902/1996, MW 2. 85). Dewey’s writings on assimilation must
be understood in the context of the inclusive conception of communicative democracy
that he would have endorsed. In his advocacy of Americanization and assimilation to
American institutions, he has much more in mind an invitation to immigrants to
participation in political and social life, something much more akin to Addams’s
conception of organic connection and unity.
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See also Dewey, 1945/1996, LW 15. 196-7 where he verifies and celebrates this feature of Addams’s
thought.
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To borrow Young’s terms, the organic connection of the social organism requires
that the community as a whole attend to fostering the institutions, norms, and practices
that both protect and nurture each individual’s capacity for self-determination and selfdevelopment. This requires that the community advance institutions, norms, and practices
that protect and nurture each individual’s ability to bring forward moral concerns,
through protecting each individual’s epistemic and moral standing in her community to
bring such concerns forward and participate in processes of strategizing resolutions for
these problems.
Dewey praises Addams’s appreciation for diversity as an epistemic resource.96 As
Hamington explains in his development of Addams’s philosophy of diversity, “[Addams]
came to view culture as both a source of moral knowledge and as source of social
energy” (Hamington, 2009, p. 115). He continues, “She did not distinguish between the
moralities of different cultures – one being more desirable than the other. A culture with a
long history of development has a cache of moral wisdom to impart” (p. 117).97
Addams and Dewey’s appreciation for diverse social perspectives bears striking
resemblance to Young’s point in “Difference as a Resource for Democracy”, that
different social perspectives contain differently situated knowledge and, “from each
perspective some aspects of the reality of social processes are more visible than others”
(Young, 1997b, p. 394). And like Young, this shared feature of their thought is what
motivates all of these thinkers towards the endorsement of inclusive and responsible
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See especially Dewey’s introduction to the (1922/1945) reprinting of Addams’s Peace and Bread in
Time of War (LW 15. 537).
97
See especially Hamington’s (2009) Chapter 6, “Widening the Circle” for an excellent, but not
uncritical, consideration of Addams’s philosophy of diversity.
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social inquiry, a framework that I have labeled a pragmatist feminist social epistemology
in this project.
3. Epistemic Concerns
Thus far I have argued that Addams and Dewey saw democracy as a way of life
and as a social ethics that transcends formal political institutions. I have tried to
demonstrate that much like Young, they valued participatory democracy as an important
resource for theorizing and enacting social justice. Although Addams and Dewey do not
use the contemporary language of deliberative democracy, they idealized democratic
norms of political equality, inclusion, transparency, and reasonableness in much of their
work. Communication and interactions that are governed by norms of equality and
inclusion affirm the moral standing of each individual, and this inclusive participation is
epistemically valuable because it counteracts the epistemic limitations inherent in human
subjectivity, limitations that are exacerbated in intergroup social relations of power where
there is oppression, privilege, and group-based social inequality.
In this section of the chapter I highlight some of the problems that Addams and
Dewey constructed this account of democracy as social ethics and responsible social
inquiry, around resolving. While some of the specific problems they grappled with were
unique to their own context in an emerging industrial capitalist society (e.g., migration of
Blacks to Northern industrial cities in the aftermath of the Civil War, and immigration on
a scale that is massive in comparison to today’s numbers), my claim here is that they
identified group-based exclusion as the central ethical and epistemic problem for their
society, and they were critical of institutions, norms, and practices that exacerbated the
underlying identity-prejudiced stereotypes that enabled and sustained that exclusion. As
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we will see, Addams and Dewey seem to appreciate a more relational account of the
social group and of oppression, and this informed their conception of exclusion and their
resulting vision for an inclusive social epistemology that I will discuss in further detail
later in the chapter.
Addams and Dewey envisioned democratic communication, properly understood,
as a cooperative and inclusive practice and process of forming social knowledge, and this
is motivated by their pragmatist appreciation for the socially situated nature of knowledge
and the epistemic limitations of human subjectivity. The pragmatists rejected a spectator
theory of knowledge, and this was a particularly prominent feature of Dewey’s
epistemology. Dewey amusingly writes, “A standpoint which is nowhere in particular
and from which things are not seen at a special angle is an absurdity” (Dewey, 1931,
1996, EW 3. 14-15). So long as we remain spectators, we remain blind to the meaning of
another’s experience.
Traditional philosophy positively idealizes a disconnect from blindness (e.g.,
Descartes’ thinking self; Rawls’ veil of ignorance; Kant’s impartiality) and views the
spectator’s stance as a means to escape our subjectivity. But on the pragmatist account,
we are all spectators of the lives and meaning of others, and so objectivity is not had by
detaching oneself from her ‘subjectivity’, but by immersing oneself in the subjectivities
of the lives and projects of others with whom one shares associative life. Put simply,
objectivity is made through inclusive intersubjectivity.
Concerns with the epistemic limitations of subjectivity are a central feature of
pragmatist standpoint social epistemology. William James explained it in terms of
“blindness in human beings” and advocated the importance of moving towards an

142
understanding of the inner lives and meanings of others for forming more conclusive
social knowledge (James, 1899/1983). James’s essay explores the epistemic limitations of
human subjectivity, and moreover, reflects on the harms that arise from this, namely, a
failure to appreciate the inner meaning and significance of others’ lives. Seigfried (1996)
explains, “We…often misjudge the significance of lives different from our own…This
congenital blindness toward the feelings of peoples and creatures different from ourselves
is the greatest obstacle of the ethical life” (Seigfried, 1996, p. 222).98
Addams and Dewey were particularly concerned that some of the consequences
of their contemporary time exacerbated these epistemic limitations inherent in human
subjectivity. Thus they constructed democracy as a kind of social ethics and social
inquiry, what I am modeling a pragmatistic feminist social epistemology after in this
project, with this problem in mind specifically. What I am calling their pragmatist
feminist social epistemology attempted to grapple with these problems and protect and
advance their rich notion of human organic interconnection and political agency in light
of them.
They believed that the conditions of the modern city under industrial capitalism
introduced new social problems that were unique to their time. This evolving form of
associate life brought with it new ethical challenges: “growing ranks of the working poor
and unemployed”, the exploitation of workers, inadequate housing and labor conditions,
and the challenges of immigration and relocation from rural to urban settings which
included crime and social dislocation (Seigfried, 1999, 213). In response to this evolving
social context, one’s understanding of her moral obligations must evolve from
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Seigfried has in mind William James’s (1899/1983) essay, “On Certain Blindness in Human Beings”.
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individualistic morality to a wider acceptance of her social obligations to all of those with
whom she is connected to under modern urban industrial life.99
Most notably, Addams and Dewey believed that industrial economies increased
the interdependency and interconnection of citizens. But they also saw that the division of
labor and the complexity of society produce a façade of economic and social
independence. It is important to note here that one of the ways that this façade of
independence was sustained during this time was by Bootstrap theories of morality that
explained poverty as a function of individual failure rather than a structural social
problem.100
Under conditions of gross economic inequality, elites have the power to retreat
from the kinds of social experiences that are vital for responsible social inquiry into the
industrial system that frames collective life. That is, those that benefit from industrial
capitalism also enjoy the privilege of retreating from the suffering that this system
produces for others. This class-based spatial stratification has both moral and epistemic
dimensions and implications. Dewey explains the epistemic distortions that arise from the
interaction of human subjectivity with increasing wealth divides in society: “[The
aristocrats become ignorant of the needs and requirement of the many; they leave the
many outside the pale with no real share in the commonwealth” (Dewey, 1888/1996,
99

Addams was deeply influenced by John Stuart Mill’s thought. Louise Knight (2010) notes that
Addams read the The Subjection of Women (1869) when it was reissued in 1885 with On Liberty (1859)
(pp. 56-57). His thinking on the tyranny of tradition served as a basis for Addams’s pragmatist view that as
social structures evolve, so must our moral thinking. Addams’s and Dewey’s pragmatist habit of
questioning the origin and relevance of practices, norms, and mores echoes Mill’s concerns about the
tyranny of tradition, that is, that we must examine the original basis for and continued relevance of
traditions to ensure that they do not tyrannically impede human development and progress. Indeed, Addams
proclaims in rhetorical fashion in Newer Ideals of Peace (1907/2005), “How far are we responsible when
we allow custom to blind our eyes to the things that are wrong?” (p. 95). Addams also refers to his
philosophy of the individual in a society, in her discussion of the individual as part of a social organism
(Addams, 1902/2002, p. 117).
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Addams is critical of this discourse of poverty. In Chapter 4 I develop this in further detail through
analyzing her account of charity in Democracy and Social Ethics (1902/2002).
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EW1. 242).101 In this passage Dewey draws a connection between the epistemic
limitations of privilege and the exclusion of the oppressed from social life.
Addams’s articulates more precisely the implications of this on our ethics. She
explains that the patriotic sense of responsibility to one’s neighbors that is quite natural in
a small village become lost in the great city:
When the villager becomes a city resident and finds his next-door neighbors
prosperous and comfortable, while the poor and overburdened live many blocks
away where he would never see them at all, unless he were stirred by a spirit of
social enterprise to go forth and find them in the midst of their meager living and
their larger needs. (Addams, 1907/2005, p. 131)
Hull House residents did not insulate themselves from the poor spatially or
emotionally. Addams, residents, and visitors had epistemic access to the fact that, “all
about [them were] men and women who have become unhappy in regard to their attitude
towards the social order itself…All are increasingly anxious concerning their actual
relations to the basic organization of society” (Addams, 1902/2002, p. 6). In this way,
Hull House was an “epistemological portal into urban life”, and one aim of the final
chapter of the dissertation is to examine these practices and programs as a resource for
communicative democracy (Hamington, 2001, p. 106).
Addams and Dewey also both have a rich appreciation for how ingroup favoritism
and prejudices problematize democratic inclusion and deliberative equality. Addams
generally has in mind the social psychological phenomenon of ingroup favoritism in her
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It is worth citing some important passages in Dewey that remarkably parallel Young’s own
descriptions of marginalization, powerlessness, and self-determination (Young, 1988). In non-democratic
societies, “there are individuals who are not organs of the common will, who are outside of the political
society in which they live, and are, in effect, aliens to that which should be their own commonwealth”
(Dewey, 1888/1996, EW 1. 237). Dewey is here referencing those who are, for some reason, not free to
participate in the structuring of the social organism. The freedom is stifled when democracy slides into
aristocracy. Even if political elites can and sometimes do act wisely for the common good, aristocracy fails
for a second reason: it robs the individual of the possibility to find his or her own place in the social
organism because it coercively mandates their place (Dewey, 1888/1996, EW1. 243).
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discussions of “group moralities” (Addams, 1907). Addams and Dewey use the term
“prejudice” quite loosely in their work to refer to ingroup favoritism, stereotypes, and
prejudices as I have developed them in Chapter 2. However, there is reason to believe
that when they do have in mind outgroup prejudice, they do not theorize it in isolation
from the social and political historical patterns of oppression and domination that have
produced the specific group divisions of her time. They invoke neither a personality nor a
cognitive-error account of prejudice, but have a structural and relational one.
Addams overarching thesis in Newer Ideals of Peace (1907) is that older ideals of
peace – namely the virtues of group loyalty (i.e., ingroup favoritism), group identity
formation by way of opposition to another group (i.e., outgroup prejudice), and peace by
way of coercion – are inadequate for establishing peace in the changing American, and
even global, context.102 This context is one where peoples of different ethnicities,
religious traditions, and cultural mores are increasingly coming into more contact with
one another and, in the case of the modern American city immigrant, living amongst each
other. While perhaps necessary in earlier times. The older ideal of peace, “gets in the way
and prevents the growth of that beneficent and progressive patriotism which we need for
the understanding and healing of our current national difficulties” (Addams, 1907/2005,
p. 132).
Addams provides a host of examples where this patriotism of the clan harms
social relations: the conception of the immigrant had by her contemporaries, the
102

Addams (1907/2005) explains that “mutual hate” is often the basis for group affiliation, and that
while this “tribal fealty” may have roots in fellowship, “When it is carried over into civilized life it
becomes a social deterrent and an actual menace to social relations” (pp. 87-88). The attitude of the original
Americans (she has in mind the Framers and early-American colonizers) persists in her contemporary time,
to the detriment of democracy. She characterizes the framers as, “members of the newly conscious nation
[who] considered all those who were outside as possible oppressors and enemies, and were loyal only
towards those whom their imagination included as belonging to the national life” (p. 75).
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conception of “the criminal” held by the police officer and politician, the view that the
weak are justified in being dominated by the strong held by advocates of child labor, and
the conceptions employers associations and trade unions have of one another. It is
important to admit that in her discussions here, Addams largely talks of tribal loyalty in
terms of ingroup and outgroup biases (i.e., ingroup favoritism and outgroup prejudice)
and seems to depict these as functioning in a social context of relative social equality, and
this is particularly the case in her discussion of labor relations.103 So here her thinking
about prejudice does not move beyond the individualism of the cognitive-error ontology
of prejudice I brought criticism against in Chapter 2.
There is reason to believe that Addams was concerned with how some forms of
ingroup favoritism were connected with particular prejudices, however; and also, that she
saw that these disproportionately functioned to harm marginalized individuals in society.
Explaining the group morality of the ‘original American’ towards the new wave of
immigrants she writes that Americans have “not yet admitted them into real political
fellowship” (Addams, 1907/2005, p. 22). She explains that this is rooted in “an attitude of
contempt, of provincialism, this survival of the spirit of the conqueror toward an inferior
people” (Addams, 1907/2005, p. 29).104
Addams sees that stigmatizing attitudes towards immigrants are more than a mere
result of flawed cognitive processes. She understands that they are situated in structural
relations of power. Although she does not invoke the language of prejudice here, she
appreciates that the present power relations in society are in some way functioning to
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See especially Addams discussion of labor relations in Newer Ideals of Peace (1907/2005).
Seigfried notes that Addams is “far ahead of her time in her awareness of her own class and ethnic
privilege and in her insights into how such privilege subtly undermines the dignity and effectiveness of the
poor and working classes and less favored ethnic groups” (Seigfried, 2002, p. xii).
104
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inform the content of those prejudices and determine which groups will be targeted and
harmed through them.
For example, in “Our National Self-Righteousness” (1933), Addams discusses her
concerns with “the spirit of superiority” held by so many original Americans (In Elshtain,
2002). And in “Americanization” (1919), she proclaims that the collective stigma against
aliens in the United States is “particularly stupid” (In Elshtain, 2002, p. 246). Seigfried
characterizes Addams as having spent a life filled with “unceasing efforts to explain the
contributions of diverse ethnic groups to an American public that wanted to treat them as
an undifferentiated underclass” (Seigfried, 2002, p. xxxv). Addams often depicts the Hull
House residents as initially prejudiced towards the neighbors, and she uses stories of
these encounters between residents and neighbors to dismantle some of the popular
pejorative prejudices of the poor that were held by upper- and middle-class “original”
Americans.105 She does not make excuses for their prejudices or explain them away as
ingroup/outgroup processes, but rather, condemns them and corrects them.
Addams’s criticisms of group morality are insightful because they point to a basic
incompatibility between ingroup and outgroup biases and democratic communication.
The morality of group loyalty (i.e., ingroup and outgroup biases) is a morality of force,
rule by power and coercion. Addams admits that even some of the labor unions, which
she is generally charitable towards in her descriptions, are often hasty to wage war and
slow to diplomacy.
Addams and Dewey were remarkably ahead of their time in their understanding of
the impact on democratic social relations, of both the more general and universal
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See for example Addams’s discussion of the fictional charity worker in the chapter entitled,
“Charitable Relations” in Democracy and Social Ethics (1902/2002).
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cognitive processes of ingroup and outgroup biases, and of the socially informed
processes of identity-prejudiced stereotypes. This is particularly evident in Dewey’s
“Racial Prejudice and Friction” (1922). Unlike many of his contemporaries, Dewey sees
race as a social construct and explains prejudice in terms of a political and social history
of social relations.
Dewey situates the roots of racial prejudice in the universal cognitive tendency in
humans to fear what is new and strange (Dewey, 1922/1996, MW 13. 245). He seems to
have in mind here, the concepts of ingroup and outgroup bias and stereotypes. He
explains them in terms of pre-cognitive habits, “a spontaneous aversion which influences
and distorts subsequent judgments” (Dewey, 1922/1996, MW 13. 243).
But Dewey does not resort to the cognitive error account of prejudice held by his
contemporaries, that prejudices are reducible to universal cognitive processes of hasty
generalization (what he calls the popular “intellectualist” view). Rather, he seems to
profoundly appreciate the social, economic, and political factors that give content and
social life to particular prejudices about particular social groups. Race prejudices do not
exist in a society in an egalitarian way, that is, they do not equally disadvantage all
groups. Rather, they are conceived and nurtured in contexts of inequality and oppression.
Like John Turner, Dewey seems to take it that prejudices do not themselves cause
oppression, but rather, they are a result and reflection of problematic intergroup social
relations of power.
On this framework, Dewey would have worried that a more powerful, more
dominant group can introduce, frame, and maintain the negatively-valenced stereotypes
of marginalized groups as a function of maintain social power. Dewey seems to
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appreciate the fact that negatively-valenced stereotypes of identified outgroups often
function to justify the existing relations of power and social inequality in both the minds
of the dominant class and of the marginalized.106 As I have shown, Addams too seems to
appreciate this on some level. While she speaks of the problematic patriotism of the clan
as a universal human tendency, she does not see its negative effects as egalitarian. Groups
who occupy positions of social, economic, and political power influence and give social
life to the content of the prejudices of groups who lack power.
Dewey defends a rather unpopular view of race at the time that gives insight into
how he thought about social groups.107 He explains as a matter of scientific fact that races
are not biologically distinct categories, writing,
Race is an abstract idea; according to science it is largely a mythical idea, since all
peoples now powerful in the world are highly mixed. But mankind requires
something concrete, tangible, visible, audible to react against. Race in its popular
usage is merely a name given to a large number of phenomena which strike
attention because they are different. (Dewey, 1922/1996, MW 13. 246)
Addams also endorses this view, writing in the early pages of Newer Ideals of
Peace (1907),
Early associations and affections were not based so much on ties of blood as upon
that necessity for defense against the hostile world outside which made the life of
every man in a tribe valuable to every other man. The fact of blood was, so to
speak, an accident. The moral code grew out of solidarity of emotion and action
essential to the life of all. (Addams, 1907/2005, p. 6)
While Dewey sees that “scientifically, the concept of race is largely a fiction”, he
also has an appreciation for the “practical reality” that this social categorizing has had on
106

For example, Dewey mentions the large sums of money African Americans spend on “devices to take
the kinks out of their hair” to assimilate, demonstrating an appreciation for this complex social process
(Dewey, 1922/1996, MW 13. 246).
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Indeed, Dewey’s lecture, “Racial Prejudice and Friction” was given in 1922 at the height of a
eugenics movement among academics in the U.S. The 1915 World’s Fair in San Francisco hosted a
“Eugenics Booth” and the Museum of Man celebrated its 1915 opening in San Diego with an exhibit of 30
busts that purported to demonstrate seven distinct and hierarchical racial categories (See San Diego
Museum of Man, 2017).
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some groups (Dewey, 1922/1996, MW 13. 251). Gregory Pappas explains that Dewey
saw that “each racial prejudice has its own particular history and unique set of causes”
(Pappas, 1996, p. 54). Dewey believes that it can be “safely concluded” that the political
factors are the most responsible “for converting antipathy to the foreign into definite
racial friction” (Dewey, 1922/1996, MW 13. 249).
What is perhaps most striking about Dewey’s analysis of race prejudice and
friction is his appreciation for the ways that political opportunists exploit the universal
roots of race prejudice, the fear of what is new and strange. What has its roots in growth
and self-preservation is exploited by humans “as an efficacious way of accentuating the
antagonism between groups” (Pappas, 1996, p. 53). Dewey later writes in an address at
the 23rd Annual Gathering of the NAACP in 1932, “…those who want the greatest profits
and those who want the monopoly, power, influence, that money gives, can get it only by
creating suspicion, dislike and division among the mass of the people” (Dewey,
1932/1996, LW 6. 230).
Dewey’s sense is that political elites have and continue to introduce chaos and
division among the public so as to break down democratic social relations and enable for
the persistence of aristocracy. They prey on “race, color and creed, and…other things…to
divide people in order that a few may have a monopoly of privilege, power and
influence” (Dewey, 1932/1996, LW 6. 230). Because they divide so as to conquer, he
suggests here that the resolution for this breakdown is, “a cooperative economic and
social order” (Dewey, 1932/1996, LW 6. 230). As we will see in Chapter 4, many of the
cooperative and democratic social relations Dewey has in mind were embodied through
Hull House activities and programs.
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5. Democracy as Social Ethics
Addams and Dewey’s account of social inquiry, and what I am modeling a
pragmatistic feminist social epistemology after in this project, is critical of narrow
constructions of deliberation-as-argument, idealizations of impartiality, and veritistic
constructions of knowledge. Recall from the earlier discussion that on Addams and
Dewey’s framework, social inquiry as I have developed it in the Chapter is valuable
because it protects and fulfills political agency. But it is also valuable because it produces
better knowledge.
Like Young, the pragmatists were suspicious of the claim that one could observe
and theorize from an impartial standpoint. The epistemic limitations of human
subjectivity necessitate a kind of inclusive social standpoint epistemology for Addams
and Dewey. No individual knows from an impartial standpoint nor has perfect or
complete epistemic access to a fact or a truth.
Addams believes that the only appropriate response to an acknowledgement of
human subjectivity and interdependence is an epistemic openness to inquire into the
problems that face those with whom we fail to acknowledge under individualistic
morality. In closing Democracy and Social Ethics, her most notable defense of social
ethics, Addams points to the epistemic and moral implications of her relational ontology
in light of the problems of industrial capitalism:
We are all involved in this political corruption, and as members of the community
stand indicted. This is the penalty of democracy, - that we are bound to move
forward or retrograde together. None of us can stand aside; our feet are mired in
the same soil, and our lungs breathe the same air. (Addams, 1902/2002, p. 112)
Thus individuals who enjoy political, economic, and social power in societies
where there are group divisions, social group hierarchies based in inequitable relations of
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power, harmful prejudices towards more marginalized social groups, and resulting spatial
stratification have an obligation to seek out meaningful social relations with diverse
Others. Addams was sensitive to how class, race, and gender could limit one’s
knowledge of social problems, and also of how it could limit one’s epistemic and moral
standing in a community. Epistemic responsibility in this context requires unveiling
faulty assumptions of objectivity and privileged social perspectives, what Young has
articulated in terms of “cultural imperialism” (Young, 1988).
Addams came to realize that privilege enables for people to avoid encountering
the poor and the powerless, and that power enables for people to avoid taking seriously
the knowledge claims of the poor and powerless. Yet to get to a full understanding of a
social system, one must consider the totality of subjective experiences of that social
system. Addams explains, “No one so poignantly realizes the failures in the social
structure as the man at the bottom, who has been most directly in contact with those
failures and has suffered the most” (Addams, 1910, p. 183). Thus privilege and power
exacerbate the epistemic limitations of one’s subjectivity and enable for social ignorance,
as well as the perpetuation of social myths about marginalized groups.
Gaining epistemic access to how diverse others experience shared systems of
associative life (e.g., industrialism) is a necessary requirement of evaluating those
systems of associative organization.108 In fact, Judy Whipps (2004, 127) explains that
Addams’s “stress on the importance of diversity and pluralism” is rooted in pragmatist
concern that “multiple viewpoints are essential to the process of philosophical
epistemology.” Building from Addams, Whipps characterizes knowing on the pragmatist
108

For a discussion of Addams’s social epistemology in relation to recent literature in standpoint
epistemology, see Reginal Leffers’s (1993) paper, “Pragmatists Jane Addams and John Dewey Inform the
Ethic of Care”, especially page 70.
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model as: (1) a social endeavor (2) that is experience dependent and (3) always
conditional in that it rests on multiple voices which are always being introduced.
The emphasis on responsible social inquiry is a central feature of Addams’s social
ethics. She proclaims in the first pages of Democracy and Social Ethics, “We are under a
moral obligation in choosing our experiences, since the result of those experiences must
ultimately determine our understanding of life” (Addams, 1902/2002, p. 8). Addams
assumes that a wide range of experiences with diverse others will result in sympathy and
habits of care towards them.109 She sees this resultant sympathy as the basis for the health
of the social organism and “the foundation and guarantee of Democracy” (Addams,
1902/2002, p.7).
Dewey understands what I am calling “social inquiry” in terms of a “method of
cooperative intelligence” whereby intelligence gets “socialized” (Dewey, 1935/1996, LW
11. 39). He explains that democracy requires far more than political machinery like
voting110 and the protection of individual rights, but cooperative and inclusive knowledge
practices that permeate all of society.111 Here Dewey connects this social epistemology to
his account of political agency, explaining that the use of these cooperative processes of
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See Hamington (2009), especially Chapter 4, where he develops Addams’s belief in the potential of
genuine embodied encounters with different others for stimulating affective and active habits of care.
110
While voting is an important democratic institution, Dewey believes that it merely acknowledges the
current pulse of the organism and marks an open-ended decision in the life of the society. Dewey values the
quality of public discussion more than the consensus had through voting. See especially Anderson, 2006,
who explains, “On Dewey’s model, votes and talk reinforce one another, the votes helping to insure the
government officials take citizens’ verbal feedback seriously, the talk helping to define and articulate the
message conveyed by votes” (p. 14). See also Pappas, 2012, who explains that for Dewey, public
discussion aims for “the amelioration of a particular shared problem that affects everyone to different
degrees” (p. 66).
111
See Anderson 2006, who explains, “Dewey stressed that for democracy to work, it was not enough to
simply institute legal arrangements such as representation and periodic elections. Culture had to change
too, so the citizens at large, interacting with one another in society, welcome diversity and discussion, and
take an experimental attitude toward social arrangements” (p. 14).
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intelligence is the means by which to develop the capacities of each individual for the
health of the social organism.
In social inquiry, agents move from disagreement towards universalization
through public deliberation about knowledge claims that have been put forward as
“candidates for universalization” (Droege, 2002, 175). Much like in the natural sciences
and in the design approach I developed in Chapter 1 of the dissertation, better knowledge
is produced when the process is one of cooperative and inclusive, ongoing dialogue and
when the conclusions these processes yield are viewed as experimental and open-ended.
Another benefit of this open-endedness is that it insulates knowledge practices from a
false consensus.
In order for social inquiry to be democratic, it must be possible for individuals of
all backgrounds to bring forth knowledge claims, and those claims must be
acknowledged and validated by the community and then fairly and collectively
interrogated. Dewey takes it that disagreement in this process can often be a sign that the
parties to dispute are not similarly situated, that some factor from one of their standpoints
has failed to have been considered in the assertion of the fact (Droege, 2002, p. 175). This
resonates with Bohman’s point that when a group in society fails to get a hearing in the
community, this is an indication that there is some kind of faction in society that begs
address. Such factions are not remedied on an institutional level through laws and
policies, but in social relations themselves.
The practice of bringing forth knowledge claims for public consideration is
educative and potentially preference-transformative for citizens, and it is central to
Dewey’s conception of political agency. Participation in democratic forms of life
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cultivate what Dewey calls ‘the scientific morale’ which he characterizes in Freedom and
Culture (1939) as,
…[A] willingness to hold belief in suspense, ability to doubt until evidence is
obtained; willingness to go where evidence points instead of putting first a
personally preferred conclusion; ability to hold ideas in solution and use them as
hypotheses to be tested instead of as dogmas to be asserted; and (possibly the
most distinctive of all) enjoyment of new fields for inquiry and of new problems.
(Dewey, 1939/1996, LW 13. 166)
Another important feature of Addams and Dewey’s understanding of social
inquiry is that it challenges the tendency in academic philosophy to divorce epistemology
from ethics. Addams and Dewey would have agreed with Fricker that, “It does seem…a
pity that ethics has not traditionally taken our epistemic conduct into its remit” (Fricker,
2007, p. 2). The connection between our epistemic and ethical lives is poignantly
conveyed in Addams’s objections to “shutting one’s self away from that half of life” that
struggles and suffers. Here she explains that such a retreat from the knowledge of others
is, “to live out but half the humanity to which we have been born heir and to use but half
our faculties” (Addams, 1893a, p. 2).
6. Conclusion: Intersecting Voices
Like Young, Addams and Dewey were critical of epistemological norms of
impartiality, consensus, and correctness, norms that are assumed in narrow constructions
of democratic participation (e.g., deliberation-as-argument). They were also concerned
that social inequality and oppression and domination could produce false and coercive
consensuses. Because of this, they rejected conceptions of knowledge that idealized
impartiality, and favored a standpoint social epistemology instead. They did not see
democratic communication as a mechanism for arriving at correct answers, but rather,
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envisioned democracy as “a community of critical inquiry” much more akin to the design
approach I developed in Chapter 1 than to a veritistic social epistemology (Festenstein,
1997, p. 79).
As in design, citizens must first identity the various stakeholders to a problem and
consult them as epistemic resources for identifying and articulating it’s various
dimensions. During that process we may come to understand the problem in new ways.
Much like deliberations in engineering design problems, this inclusive participation is
instrumental to citizens’ self-development because it creates space for the expression of
one’s political agency and it fosters the social conditions for citizens to nurture their
political agency through discourse with others.
As in design where there are limited resources, time constraints, and competing
obligations to stakeholders, deliberations must be inclusive of the various stakeholders to
the problem, and those stakeholders must be seen as both an epistemic resources and
moral authorities for designing and evaluating possible resolutions for the problem. This
is because as in design, the uniquely correct solution or remedy rarely just presents itself.
When the problem-solving communicative exercise is framed as a cooperative rather than
an antagonistic one, this can motivate people to consider the perspectives of others and be
open to reconsidering their own perspectives in light of that hearing. If it comes down to
deciding between two possible remedies, deliberators determine which alternative is
better than the other. Group processes of defining the “better” and “worse” alternatives
will inevitably bring to the forefront values and assumptions that themselves can become
subject to deliberations in the decision-making process. The language of “correctness” in
such group processes is out of place.
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Design thinking relies on listening and engagement with stakeholders, and thus it
can be empathetic. It relies on collaborative brainstorming for potential remedies and
discussion that weighs the various pros and cons of these potential remedies for the
various stakeholders considered. In this sense, design thinking can be cooperative and
inclusive. It also involves the eventual implementation of the selected “better” remedy,
and thus it is active. It frames this remedy through the scientific attitude. The remedy is
seen as a temporary and intermediary solution, one that we are comfortable continuing to
monitor for shortcomings or when newly effected stakeholders or problems emerge from
the evolving systems that the remedy operates in. Thus design thinking is critically
reflective, fallibilist, experimental, open-ended, process- rather than production-aimed,
and systems-oriented.
As Addams and Dewey envision it, democracy is about a way of living together
and a way of knowing one another, and thus, it requires habits conducive to that aim.
Pappas suggests that these habits include, “the virtue of openness, with a willingness to
test and revise”, “a certain sensitivity to context”, “sensitivity to whose interest counts in
one’s community”, patience and an ability to not always expect “a quick fix or result”,
and an ability to “embrace uncertainty” (Pappas, 2012, p. 72).
I think Addams and Dewey have the beginnings of something like this in their
philosophy of democracy and practice of it at Hull House, and I introduce this in Chapter
4 as a political virtue of sympathetic inquiry. In this chapter I also look to the programs at
Hull House, as well as to Addams’s writings about Hull House, for examples of practices
and norms that attempted to challenge the intergroup cognitive processes that fuel
identity-prejudiced communicative inequality and to construct genuinely inclusive
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deliberative spaces that protect, restore and nurture the deliberative standing of all
individuals.
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CHAPTER 4
DEEPENING COMMUNICATIVE DEMOCRACY: WIDENING INGROUPS AND
RECONSTRUCTING THE COLLECTIVE SOCIAL IMAGINATION
1. Introduction
In Chapter 3 of the dissertation I aimed to show that Addams and Dewey were
deeply concerned with various forms of group-based participatory exclusion in order to
set the stage for the fourth and final chapter of the dissertation. In this Chapter I will turn
to their thought as well as the activities, programs, and practices at Hull House as a
resource for the two projects I identified for communicative democracy when I opened
Chapter 3: (1) imagining and constructing inclusive deliberative spaces in light of having
named and acknowledged the presence of communicatively structured deliberative
inequalities and (2) strategizing communicative practices and norms of interaction that
can themselves challenge identity-prejudiced stereotypes, work towards reconstructing
the collective social imagination that houses them, and mitigate their harmful effects on
individuals’ deliberative standing in communicative and epistemic interactions.
Like Young, Addams and Dewey endorsed a broader understanding of
deliberation and democratic communication than traditional deliberative theorists. As
Dewey powerfully explains, “argument alone breeds misunderstanding and fixes
prejudices” (Dewey, 1902/1996, MW 2.91). For Addams and Dewey, democratic
communication transcends argument. It involves habits that “go beyond the intellectual
capacities associated traditionally with reason and logic” (Pappas, 2012, p. 61).
Modes of communication and interaction like play, storytelling, and even activism
are important facilitators of justice. Addams and Dewey believed that these types of
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practices were a means for reducing prejudices and widening “ingroups”, and to borrow
the language of Young, “for speaking across difference” (Young, 1997b). Hull House
was the experimental locus for this investigation, and for this reason, it is the subject of
this final chapter of this dissertation.
Hull House activities and social life embodied the broadened account of
democratic communication that Young idealizes, and Addams exemplifies methods of
forming social knowledge responsibly in intergroup contexts that are based in social
relations of power where there is oppression and privilege and group-based social
inequality. Thus there is good reason to look to their work for resources for
communicative democracy, specifically for imagining new ways of relating and
communicating with one another that appreciates the complex ways that intergroup
processes of ingroup and outgroup biases and identity-prejudiced stereotypes function in
communicative contexts to deteriorate deliberative standing.
Recall from Chapters 2 and 3 that I contrasted ingroup and outgroup biases (i.e.,
ingroup favoritism and outgroup prejudice) from identity-prejudiced stereotypes.
Borrowing from Fricker, I initially defined an identity-prejudiced stereotype as, “a widely
held disparaging association between a social group and one or more attribute, where this
association embodies a generalization that displays some (typically, epistemically
culpable) resistance to counter-evidence owing to an ethically bad affective investment”
(Fricker, 2007, p. 35). Identity-prejudiced stereotypes have origins in the universal
cognitive tendency towards ingroup and outgroup biases (i.e., ingroup favoritism and
outgroup prejudice). But as I developed in Chapter 2, they should be clarified from these
intergroup processes in two senses: (1) they operate in a specific social context of social
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inequality between two or more social groups, and (2) they function in those intergroup
relations to sustain the dominance or elite status of one group over the other(s). That is,
identity-prejudiced stereotypes are unique from universal, cognitive tendencies of
ingroup and outgroup bias in that they target a particular social group and are a result and
reflection of intergroup social relations of power where there is oppression, privilege, and
group-based social inequality.
The chapter begins (Section 2) by looking to some of the Hull House
programming and activities as examples of democratic social inquiry in practice. In this
discussion I specifically focus on Addams’s appreciation for Play and Education in
democratic relations, and how this emphasis informed her leadership in Hull House
programs and activities. I use this discussion as a way of developing and demonstrating
the conception of social inquiry that is at the heart of the pragmatist feminist social
epistemology of communicative democracy that I introduced in Chapter 3. Recall that in
Chapter 3, I explained social inquiry as, “the cooperative and inclusive social practices
and processes that promote social knowledge”, and I anticipated this in my discussion of
the design approach in Chapter 1. As will demonstrate, Addams was drawn to these
forms of human interaction because of their potential for combatting intergroup processes
of ingroup and outgroup bias and widening ingroups.
Section 3 of the Chapter introduces Addams’s method of sympathetic inquiry as a
regulatory mechanism for social inquiry. Addams believes that Hull House neighbors,
people from diverse immigrant populations, could widen their perceived ingroups and
enjoy meaningful social life with one another because of a spirit of sympathetic inquiry.
Similarly, Hull House residents who were from more privileged social standpoints than
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immigrant neighbors were able to have responsible and meaningful epistemic encounters
with neighbors because they practiced sympathetic inquiry.112 In this sense, sympathetic
inquiry can function to both widen one’s ingroup and to combat identity-prejudiced
stereotypes about marginalized citizens, the immigrant, the prostitute, and more
generally, the urban poor.
Because of socially and economically based spatial stratification in the modern
industrial city, the reach of Hull House programs and activities was limited to neighbors
who lived near Hull House and to progressive social elites who visited there. In Section 4
of the Chapter, I demonstrate how Addams makes use of her writings about Hull House
to reach a wider public in order to combat identity-prejudiced stereotypes about the poor,
and to educate this wider public in the method of sympathetic inquiry itself.
Addams does not develop sympathetic inquiry as a political virtue, but she does
introduce it often in her discussions of political virtues that she is critical of for failing to
enact, or blatantly contradicting, democracy as social ethics. Thus there are some benefits
to thinking about Addams’s method of sympathetic inquiry in a virtue ethics framework.
I consider how constructing sympathetic inquiry as a type of hybrid epistemic-moral
political virtue might be particularly useful for combatting communicatively structured
deliberative inequality and for communicative democracy more generally.
2. Communicative Democracy in Practice at Hull House
Dewey called Hull House as “a social clearing house”, a place where there was “a
mixing people up with each other…under conditions which will promote their getting
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This is especially evident in Addams’s reflections Twenty Years at Hull House (1910).
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acquainted with the best side of each other” (Dewey, 1902/1996, MW 2. 90). His
characterization of it paints a vibrant picture that is worth including in full here.
It is not merely a place where ideas and beliefs may be exchanged, not merely in
the arena of formal discussion – for argument alone breeds misunderstanding and
fixes prejudices – but in ways where ideas are incarnated in human form and
clothed with the winning grace of personal life. Classes for study may be
numerous, but all are regarded as modes of bringing people together, or doing
away with barriers of caste, or class, or race, or type of experience that keep
people from real communion with each other. (Dewey, 1902/1996, MW 2. 90)
Play performed a vital role in establishing social conditions for people from
diverse backgrounds to get acquainted in this way, “with the best side of each other”.
Addams believed that play was an important mechanism for creating community. Hull
House hosted a variety of social events and social clubs that were facilitative of play, and
the imaginative processes of play were vital to Addams’s philosophy of education.
Addams was deeply sympathetic of young people living in the modern industrial
city, which seemed to be deprived of space for play.113 Unlike earlier forms of work on
the homestead, industrial labor provides no outlet for expression, play, or creativity.
Addams values play for a host of reasons. First, play provides joy to its participants and
offers an escape from the monotony of factory work. Second, observing the Play of
children can be a source of great pleasure for members of the community. The vibrant
imagination of the child “reaffirm[s] the beauty and joy in the world” and can be “a
wellspring of refreshment to a jaded city” (Addams, in Elshain, p. 416).
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Addams applies this sympathetic view to an analysis of restless and problematic youth in the city.
She explains that the thrill of being chased by the “coppers” among urban boys is not unlike the “the
practice of country boys who go forth in squads to set traps for rabbits or to round up a [rac]coon”
(Addams, 1902/2002, p. 26). Both are expressions of the spirit and restlessness of youth. Here she draws
attention to the shared desires and needs of the original American and the immigrant, but the different
social structures that frame those desires and needs.
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Third, play is particularly valuable for marginalized people because it generates a
space where one can, “be at ease in a ‘world’,” with others who may be different from
them (Lugones, 1987, p. 12). María Lugones draws attention to the fact that marginalized
people must often travel to worlds where they cannot be at ease, because in those worlds,
they must be constantly be subjected to the “arrogant perception” of those who occupy
positions of privilege within the existing social relations of domination and oppression
(Frye, 1983). Arrogant perception imagines the Other as for him, or as Frye explains,
“organize[s] everything seen with reference to themselves and their own interests” (Frye,
1983, p. 67).
Play, however, makes new worlds for people to share. Lugones is clear that it is
an attitude of playfulness, not the game itself, that generates this social space. Much like
the pragmatist feminist conception of social knowledge, playful activities are
experimental and open to surprise. They have no rules, or at least, have no fixed rules that
are sacred. In the world that is generated through playful activity, individuals interact
intentionally and creatively, but they “are not wedded to a particular way of doing things”
or to playing a particular role competently (Lugones, 1987, p. 16).
And fourth and finally, play generates a world where oppressed people who are
regularly subjected to the identity-prejudiced stereotypes of the collective social
imagination, can be at ease. But it also generates a new world where people who occupy
different positions in structural relations of inequality, can discover one another and one
another’s worlds, where arrogant perception is transported into loving perception.
Lugones depicts this as epistemically valuable particularly for combatting privileged
people’s epistemologies of ignorance:
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We discover that there are “worlds” in which those who are the victims of
arrogant perception are really subjects, lively beings, resistors, constructors of
visions even though in the mainstream construction they are animated only by the
arrogant perceived and are pliable, foldable, file-awayable, classifiable. (Lugones,
1987, p. 18)
Besides this social value, Addams also sees that play has epistemic and social
value. Play is a facilitator of the imaginative life. It promotes and trains participants in the
skills necessary for social inquiry. Addams suspects this is the reason that so many artists
are preoccupied with trying to recapture the spirit of youth (Addams, in Elshain, p. 417).
She celebrates the diverse group of immigrants’ children who play with one another at
Hull House, demonstrating another reason why play is both epistemically and socially
valuable. Play with diverse others gives citizens opportunities for imagining possibilities
with others as well as for imagining oneself into the lives and experiences of other
individuals’ worlds. Play cultivates the imaginative capacities that are epistemically
valuable for imagining creative resolutions for social problems in social inquiry. It also
gives participants practice at considering the contributions of diverse socially situated
knowers.
Hull House responded to the deprivation of space for play and time for recreation
in the modern industrial life through establishing various forums for play (Addams,
1893b).114 Besides organizing adult social clubs, Hull House started a kindergarten and
hosted boys and girls clubs for teenagers. They added an art gallery in 1891, a
playground of almost a full acre in 1892, a gymnasium that included rooms for men’s
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In “The School as Social Centre”, Dewey (1902/1996, MW 2. 91-2) specifically points to Hull House
activities as an example of how to realize democratic education through play. Dewey remarks that he
“sometimes think[s] that recreation is the most overlooked and neglected of all ethical forces”, explaining
further that, “there is no force more likely to count in the general reform of social conditions than the
practical recognition that in recreation there is a positive moral influence which it is the duty of the
community to take hold of and direct.”
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clubs and a “diet kitchen” for providing food to the poor and sick in 1893, a club house in
1898, and a theater with a coffee house in 1899 (Knight, 2010).115 At its peak, Hull
House involved over thirteen buildings over an entire city block. Further additions
included a swimming pool, art studio, music school, library, labor museum, drama
groups, and a boarding club for girls (Knight, 2010).
Addams’s appreciation for the value of play, game, and recreation in a democratic
society developed out of her intellectual relationship with George Herbert Mead (18631931). Mead came to the University of Chicago in 1894 by invitation from Dewey
shortly after Dewey’s appointment there (Hamington, 2009, p. 38). Like Dewey, Mead
enjoyed an intellectual friendship with Addams and spent time visiting and lecturing at
Hull House.116
Mead does not develop an ethics in his writings, but his general way of thinking
about the self as a social process echoes Dewey’s conception of “individuality” (i.e.,
political agency) has ethical implications. He introduced a social interaction theory of the
self, and this is a foundational principle of identity that is assumed by social identity
115

While many of the activities at Hull House were important features of social life in the neighborhood,
the playground project at Hull House is worth mentioning specifically. At the time of its inception, the
notion of a playground was a relatively new idea that became widely publicized due to Jane Addams’s
influence, which initiated what sociologists refer to as “the playground movement”. Addams served as a
vice-president of the Playground Association of American (PAA) when it was formed in 1907 and
furthered the movement more still with her defense of the value of play in her 1909 publication of The
Spirit of Youth and City Streets. The PAA went on to implement many of the first urban playgrounds in
America. Hull House’s playground boasted open space of almost an acre, sandboxes, swings, outdoor game
areas and play structures, and indoor play areas. See Frost, 2010.
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For an excellent historical account of their relationship, see Deegan (1988, pp. 118-121). Deegan
explains that Mead and his wife, Helen, became involved in Hull-House almost immediately after their
arrival in Chicago. Mead was an advocate for women’s rights, and wrote significantly on “issues directly
related to Addams’s interests; education, war, democracy, labor, immigrants, social settlements, and the
relation between theory and practice” (p. 106). Besides a list of social programs the Mead worked on with
Addams, Deegan also provides an in depth analysis of how Addams’s thought and practice influenced
Mead. She cites correspondences in which Mead thanks Addams for her “very remarkable paper”,
compliments her on her recent publication of Twenty Years at Hull House, and offers a charitable review of
Newer Ideals of Peace. In the last of these, Mead criticizes some of the logical organization of Addams’s
argument, but nevertheless validates and reiterates Addams’s argument, “that government must reflect the
will of the people instead of being an arm of repression” (p. 119).
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theorists as well as by Young. For Mead, the self “arises in the process of social
experience and activity”, that is, it is a product of social interaction (Mead, Mind, Self
and Society, 1934, 135; cited in Keith, 333).117 Heather Keith explains, “Mead’s
commitment is to a vision of the self as always growing within a wider ecology of others
– a web of relationships – while still retaining the uniqueness of an individual organism”
(Keith, 1999, p. 333). Because society emerges from the self, which is always understood
in relation with other selves, there arises from this interdependency an obligation to
attend to the social institutions and social practices that frame the formation and
cultivation of that self.
Like Mead, Addams saw Play and Game as vital parts of nurturing political
agency. Play and Game are important social process for the developing social self
because they stimulate the process of thinking and feeling in terms of others. Young
children engage in role-playing when they play ‘house’ or ‘cops and robbers’, an activity
that involves taking on the attitudes and perspectives of others. Game, a more advanced
form of play, introduces an entire complex system of social interaction that frames these
various forms of role-playing. At this higher level of social interaction, individuals begin
to think of themselves (or their role) as parts of a whole, anticipating the reactions of
others and envisioning their role in the establishment, maintenance, and evolution of the
system.
It is important to note that when Addams and Mead conceive of Game as a more
advanced form of Play, they do not have in mind the strategic, rational-choice conception
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See especially Keith (1999). Keith argues that Mead’s conception of the social self serves as an
important psychological foundation for politicizing an ethics of care.
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of Game advanced within Game Theory.118 In her descriptions of children doing Play,
Addams avoids describing it in agonistic terms like “contest, winning, losing,
battling”.119 Unlike the playful attitude, Game assumes rules, “rules that inspire
hostility”, the importance of competence, and the spirit of “a conqueror, and imperialist”
(ibid.). This form of play is hostile to the cultivation of cooperative skills. And it is the
antithesis of loving perception among differently socially situated individuals.
Play was a vital part of Addams’s social ethics because it created safe worlds for
differently situated individuals to see themselves as political equals. It also enabled for
people to cultivate the imaginative, creative, and cooperative skills necessary for social
inquiry. Hamington argues that Addams extends Mead’s conception of play much further
than he himself does (Hamington, 2009). She sees that the social interactions and
imaginative processes that occur in children’s play are themselves “the basis for a
democratic citizenry that can sympathetically understand diverse community members”
(Hamington, 2009, p. 153).120
I wish to highlight two additional features of Addams’s social ethics that are
brought forward in this discussion of Play at Hull House (and that might be a valuable
lesson for contemporary community-based organizations). First, Hull House residents
resisted the urge to paternalistically coordinate Play at Hull House. Addams explains that
118

It is outside of the scope of this project to provide a developed critique of Game Theory. However, it
should be noted that as a kind of social choice theory, Game Theory is subject to a number of the critiques
of a preference aggregative model of democracy that I outlined in Chapter 1 of the dissertation.
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See Lugones, 1987, who uses these descriptors in her account of agonistic play (p. 15).
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See especially, Hamington, 2009, who explains, “Play is the great social stimulus, and it is the prime
motive which unites children and draws them into comradeship. A true democratic relation and ease of
acquaintance is found only among the children in a typical factory community because they readily
overcome differences of language, tradition and religion, which form insuperable barriers to adults. ‘It is in
play that nature reveals her anxious care to discover men to each other’ and this happy and important task
children unconsciously carry forward day by day with all the excitement and joy of co-ordinate activity.
They accomplish that which elders could not possibly do, and they render a most important service to the
community” (p. 153; citing Addams, 1905, p. 132).
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the organizing and running of adult spaces for Play was itself “a neighborhood affair”
(Addams, 1893b). Second, this insulated them from introducing the kinds of agonistic
Games of the conqueror. The conquering player destroys the types of worlds where one
can be at ease with herself in communion with differently socially situated others.
Addams’s philosophy of education emphasizes the significance of Play as I have
developed it here. Like her picture of Play, Addams believed education was valuable
insofar as it prepared citizens for responsible social inquiry through cultivating skills in
“cooperative intelligence, contextual relevance, connected learning, and imaginative
exploration” (Hamington, 2009, p. 151).
Addams is critical of the conquering attitude within many of the adult education
programs made available to immigrants and the poor. She explains that while these
programs may equip some with the tools of reading and writing, it “gives them no real
participation in the industrial and social life with which they come in contact” (Addams,
1899). It is important to note, that Addams connects this failure to provide the kinds of
educational opportunities that might prepare and enable people for participation, with the
identity-prejudiced stereotypes of educators (i.e., social elites) towards their students (i.e.,
Hull House neighbors who were immigrants and poor). She explains this identityprejudiced stereotype as connected to a social myth among educators, “that it is not
possible for the mass of mankind to have experiences which are themselves worth
anything, and that accordingly, if a neighborhood is to receive valuable ideas at all, they
must be brought in from the outside, and almost exclusively in the form of books”
(Addams, 1899).
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On Addams’s and Dewey’s conception of democracy, education that prepares
people for citizenship should nurture political agency in the sense I developed it in
Chapter 3. This is nurtured through the bringing of people from differently socially
situated perspectives together under ideal conditions that will promote their ability to get
to know one another sympathetically and equip them with the skills in social inquiry.
Dewey praises the programs at Hull House for embodying this, “Classes for study may be
numerous, but all are regarded as modes of bringing people together, of doing away with
barriers of caste, or class, or race, or type of experience that keep people from real
communion with each other” (Dewey, 1902/1996, MW 2. 91).121 In this way, Play and
Education as Addams understands them can be facilitative of developing the capacities
among marginalized people that are vital for fuller participation.
Thus in this way, Addams’s leadership in Hull House programs and activities can
be understood as an attempt to respond to the “political poverty” form of deliberative
inequality that was highlighted in Chapter 2.122 But Play is also facilitative of reducing
communicative inequality. When implemented properly, Play and Education have the
potential to facilitate both imaginative and real space that is conducive to cultivating
sympathetic understanding among diverse community members and equipping them with
the kinds of habits that are necessary for social inquiry.
What is interesting about the facilitative role of Play and Education in producing
the habits necessary for responsible social inquiry, is that social inquiry is itself
facilitative of widening ingroups. So in this way, these activities are not only facilitative
121

And throughout her writings, Addams celebrates the great example children are for society in this:
“They readily overcome differences of language, tradition and religion, which form insuperable barriers to
adults… [accomplishing] that which elders could not possibly do, and [rendering] a most important service
to the community” (Addams, 1905, p. 132).
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See especially Bohman, 1996, p. 110.
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of combatting the political poverty form of communicative inequality, but they are also
facilitative of combatting the identity-prejudiced form of communicative inequality.
It is helpful to turn back to John Turner’s work at this point to support my claim
here. On Turner’s approach to social identity theory, social competition (i.e., ingroup
favoritism and outgroup prejudice) is one among three ways that individuals can achieve
positive distinctiveness of one’s social group in order to maintain self-esteem. Social
competition is triggered where social identity is made salient and where it is made
insecure by unstable power hierarchies (Turner and Reynolds, 2001). Thus because Play
and Education reduce the salience of social identity through widening the ingroup
through appealing to more shared identities, and because they generate space that
alleviates some of the insecurities that are operative in unstable power hierarchies, they
reduce social competition.
This is precisely why Addams’s uses Hull House as an example in many of her
writings, but particularly, in Newer Ideals of Peace (1907) where she develops her
pacifist position. Here she condemns the older, coercive source of peace in “tribalistic
morality”, in favor of a newer ideal of peace that results in “cosmopolitan affection”
(Addams, 1907/2005, p. 131). Whereas past eras brought people together through
opposition to a common enemy (e.g., war), Addams believes her current time requires the
bringing of people together through social sympathy, what I am characterizing here in
terms of widening ingroups.
3. Addams and Dewey’s Philosophy of Perplexity and Method of Sympathetic Inquiry
In the opening pages of Democracy and Social Ethics (1902/2002), Addams
points out that one’s experiences determine her understanding of life, and this occasions
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an obligation to choose diversified experiences. This obligation flows out of Addams’
epistemology: each is epistemically limited by her subjective experiences of the social
world, thus each can only gain fuller knowledge of social problems and possible
resolutions for those problems through more diversified encounters with other subjective
experiences of that social world.
At the heart of both Addams’s and Dewey’s social epistemology and conceptions
of democracy is a philosophy of perplexity. Seigfried (2002) has introduced this as a
method of perplexity and Hamington (2009) has called its result ‘sympathetic
knowledge’. He explains sympathetic knowledge: “[It] entails openness to the possibility
of caring for others,” which has the potential for motivating individuals to “act on behalf
of others so that they may flourish and grow” (Hamington, 2009, p. 71).
For Addams and Dewey, democratic social relations depend on more than mere
exposure to difference, that is, on more than diversified human experiences, particularly
because of the features of industrial capitalism that exacerbate the epistemic limitations
of human subjectivity. Exposure to diversity alone is inadequate to address the social ills
of industrialism, particularly if it rests on misunderstandings of, and indifference towards,
one another. Thus for Addams and Dewey, exposure to differently socially situated
Others must be conditioned on sympathetic social inquiry. Building from our definition
of social inquiry, sympathetic social inquiry (hereafter sympathetic inquiry) is: the
sympathetic, cooperative, and inclusive social practices and processes that promote social
knowledge.
As Dewey and Addams develop perplexity, it is an uncomfortable and
“bewildering” experience occasioned by new and strange experiences that the agent lacks
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the resources to explain, understand, and resolve (Addams, 1910, p. 68).123 Perplexity is a
cognitive-affective with significant epistemic potential, a possible starting place for
learning and deeper understanding. This uncomfortable emotional phenomenon
postulates a choice for the agent: either grant or deny perplexity its epistemic potential,
“either continue to hold onto her assumptions or call them into question” (Seigfried,
2002, p. xxvi).
Dewey’s contrast between mental habits of uncritical thinking and reflective
thinking is helpful for thinking about the choice that perplexity prompts. Uncritical
thought is a habit of holding onto assumptions, whereas reflective thought is, “an attitude
of suspended conclusion”, a willingness “to maintain the state of doubt and to carry on
systematic and protracted inquiry” (Dewey, 1910, MW 6. 191).
Similar to Dewey’s model of moral development, for Addams perplexity
functions to initiate further inquiry that can lead to wider understanding and as Seigfried
notes, “more effective value orientation” (Seigfried, 2002, p. xxix).124 The epistemic
potential of perplexity is only fulfilled, however, when the agent moves beyond uncritical
thinking towards reflective thinking, when the agent begins to engage the perplexing
encounter with a kind of sympathetic inquiry. This move happens when the perplexed
agent chooses not to explain away the encounter, but to engage in the encounter with
sympathetic inquiry. Dewey explains the choice to inquire further as “more or less
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Addams describes the bewildering experience of perplexity at poverty in Twenty Years at Hull House
(1910, pp. 68-9; as cited in Knight, 2010, p. 49). And interestingly, Dewey cites this fear of new and
strange experiences as the very source of race prejudice and friction (Dewey, 1922, MW. 13. 243).
Although the term was not formally introduced in psychology until 1957 by Leon Festinger, I suspect what
Dewey really has in mind in his development of perplexity is a type of cognitive dissonance.
124
Seigfried also notes that Addams shows in her writings, “how social sympathy can be aroused and
developed through the perplexities we feel in the normal course of everyday life, specifically those caused
by the clashes of beliefs, habits, and interest inevitable in highly diversified societies” (Seigfried, 2002, p.
xxiii).
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troublesome” because it requires that the agent have a “willingness to endure a condition
of mental unrest and disturbance” (Dewey, 1910/1996, MW 6. 191).
Because perplexity is so unsettling, people often attempt to resolve it as quickly
and easily as possible with past experiences and existing knowledge, accepting the first
and easiest explanation at its “face value” (Dewey, 1910/1996, MW 6. 191). Because
prejudices are framed by complex social histories and social myths operating in the
collective social imagination, the mind often has prejudicial resources readily at its
disposal for explaining away encounters with Others that occasion perplexity.
Sympathetic inquiry is epistemically valuable because it is attentive to the
collective social imagination and not determined by it. Assuming the experimentalism of
a pragmatist feminist social epistemology, sympathetic inquirers consider other
perspectives, try on arguments, imagine differently socially situated perspectives.
Eventually through the practice of sympathetic inquiry, individuals can come to care for
the problems others face, expand their sense of obligation beyond their own “world”, and
coordinate their preferences with the pursuit of the social good of others. Sympathetic
inquirers form a conception of “shared interests” with the Other, and this makes it
possible for them to acknowledge problems that face the Other as public problems.125
Wider preferences emerge and values evolve from individualistic morality into social
ethics.
Dewey explains that sympathy has a kind of moral knowledge that brings an
individual to an appreciation for “the claims of others” (LW 7.270):
Sympathy, in short, is the general principle of moral knowledge…because it
furnishes the most reliable and efficacious intellectual standpoint. It supplies the
125

This language of “shared interest” is particularly prominent in Dewey’s Democracy and Education
(1916) and “The Public and Its Problems: An Essay on Political Inquiry” (1927).
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tool, par excellence, for analyzing and resolving complex cases…sympathy
supplies the pou sto for an effective, broad, and objective survey of desires,
projects, resolves, and deeds. (MW 5.303; cited in Pappas, 2008, p. 199)
On my reading, Addams’s conceives of sympathetic inquiry as the formation of
narrative knowledge where narrative knowledge is understood as narratively based
understanding and where ‘understanding’ and ‘knowledge’ are seen as an experimental
and ongoing epistemic process of coming to understand and appreciate as opposed to a
more traditional definition of knowledge as a completed, and closed results of inquiry.126
Its constitutive properties are epistemic patience and non-paternalistic listening. The
result of this process is kind of empathy as analogical thinking, a cognitive-affective state
of wider social understanding and appreciation of the Other.
Narrative knowledge plays an important role in sympathetic inquiry. Whereas
statistical knowledge arises as a result of looking in on and observing the Other, narrative
knowledge arises in the process of engaging with the Other. Statistical knowledge avoids
perspective taking and a genuine encounter with the Other, thus it fails to escape an
individualistic ontology. Acceptance of a relational ontology and an appreciation for the
epistemic limitations of subjectivity, exacerbated by industrial capitalism, necessitates
moving beyond statistical and observational knowledge to narratively based and
perspectival types of understanding.
The formation of authentic narrative knowledge requires the suspension of
prejudicial cognitive explanations that might be more readily available to the inquirer.
This suspension of judgment is the epistemic patience Dewey has in mind in his account
of reflective thinking. Addams speaks to the importance of epistemic patience and
suspension of immediate judgments in “The Subjective Necessity for Social
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I use the terms ‘narratively based understanding’ and ‘narrative knowledge’ interchangeably hereafter.
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Settlements”. Here she explains that Hull House residents ought to have “a scientific
patience in the accumulation of facts” (Addams, 1893a, p. 23). They cannot compromise
the philosophy of the solidarity of the human race on the basis of one “drunken woman”
or “idiot boy”, and they must be “emptied of all conceit of opinion and all self-assertion,
and ready to arouse and interpret the public opinion of their neighborhood” (Addams,
1893a, p. 23).
Pointing to Hull House as an example, Addams emphasizes the importance of
non-paternalistic listening in the formation of narrative knowledge and resolution of
social problems. She explains that Hull House functions in a diverse neighborhood
without preconceived notions of the needs of the neighborhood residents. Rather, Hull
House waits for interaction with neighborhood residents to prompt and articulate its
purpose. Addams defends this conception of non-paternalistic listening and care
consistently throughout Democracy and Social Ethics (1902) as well as in “The Function
of a Social Settlement” (1893).127
Unlike a charitable institution, Hull House residents under the leadership of
Addams emphasized working with the poor, rather than for them. For instance,
Hamington points out that Hull House provided, “seed money and organization support
for [the] start-up… of a boarding club that would accommodate working women and
provide flexibility in rent collection should hard times, such as strike, arise,” but the
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Addams’s practice anticipates Tronto’s four-pronged model of care, particularly the last requirement
of responsiveness. As Tronto (2009) develops this feature of care, care giving requires both competence
and responsiveness to the needs of the care receiver. This entails that one use the needs of the care receiver,
as well as the care receiver’s response to the care giver, as an epistemic resources for providing care.
Developing on this, Sheldene Simola explains, “Sensitivity and responsiveness to the feelings, concerns,
and particular circumstances of individuals is critical” (Simola, 2003, p. 354). Working within the business
ethics literature, she points to examples of crisis management resolutions that both succeeded and failed to
condition care on this feature of responsiveness, and in more successful cases, company’s “sought to hear,
understand, and be responsive to the subjective voices, experiences, and contexts of community members
… rather than operating on an assumed knowledge of the members” (Simola, 2003, p. 358).
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club’s leadership was turned over to working women themselves (Hamington, 2001, p.
113). In this way, Hull House sought to arrive at an understanding of human needs
discursively, and to politically empower the poor and oppressed.
Narratively informed social knowledge sees problems that the observer may miss.
What is more, the process itself of forming narrative knowledge – listening and
interacting with another as she tells her story, and perhaps even exchanging one’s own
story – is a deeply social activity during which a kind of deliberation happens. Beliefs,
commitments, customs, and decisions are socially and historically framed for one
another. Explaining one’s beliefs, commitments, and customs through the storytelling act
itself and answering questions about those beliefs, commitments, and customs for the
story listener is a type of deliberative negotiation process during which values and
preferences are shared, compared, and perhaps revised in light of newly formed
understanding of the Other.
4. Widening Ingroups and Combatting Identity-Prejudiced Stereotypes
Many of the Hull House activities and programs aimed to disrupt ingroup and
outgroup biases among Hull House neighbors, immigrants who stood in relations of
relative socioeconomic equality with one another. In the larger context of American
society, however, Hull House neighbors were stigmatized cultural minorities who lived in
or near poverty. Addams observed the persistence of identity-prejudiced stereotypes
among her contemporaries, people of affluence and influence that did not directly come
into contact, let alone have meaningful encounters, with Hull House neighbors. Such
citizens played important roles in maintaining and benefiting from industrial capitalism,
one benefit being the ability to spatially remove themselves from the neighborhoods of
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the working poor. Given their unacknowledged interdependence, Addams saw this
insulation of the privileged from the poor as epistemically irresponsible.
Spatial stratification that is based in socioeconomic or racial grouping poses a
significant challenge for Addams’s conception of deliberative equality because it enables
for people with socioeconomic and political power to retreat from meaningful encounters
with those who are different from them. Addams’s speeches, papers, and books offer
more than a mere recounting of Hull House programs and residents’ experiences with the
neighbors. Her writings are themselves an important part of advancing her social
epistemology and combatting identity-prejudiced stereotypes about the immigrant groups
and marginalized neighbors of Hull House.
In the opening pages of Democracy and Social Ethics (1902), Addams provides
expressed permission of it’s reprinting in The Atlantic Monthly, The International
Journal of Ethics, The American Journal of Sociology, and The Commons. Ellery
Sedgwick describes the editors, writers, and reading public of The Atlantic Monthly as a
progressive “high-cultural elite” with “waning influence” on the political and social
climate of the day (Sedgwick, 1994, p. 2). Given Addams use of these forums for
distributing her writings, as well as the high illiteracy rates concentrated among the
industrial urban community, it is reasonable to conclude that Addams is using her
writings to reach a broader audience than she interacted with on a daily basis at Hull
House.
Addams is concerned about the public perception of social settlements, and she is
concerned to ensure that communication about settlements to the reading public do not
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misrepresent and soften the urban challenges neighbors and residents faced.128
Hamington explains, “Addams used what she learned through listening to people’s stories
to inform her writing and activism” (Hamington, 2004, p. 109). More than this, Addams
used what she learned through listening to people’s stories to inform others through her
writing, and this writing was a part of her activism.
Addams frequently relies on narrative throughout her writings to challenge
identity-prejudiced stereotypes of immigrants and the poor in an effort to reconstruct the
collective social imagination of her contemporaries. Her arguments for economic and
political reform are most always accompanied by the stories of marginalized people’s
experiences of industrial capitalism, the urban youth, the immigrant, the prostitute, or the
factory worker.129 Addams’s fictional charity visitor in Democracy and Social Ethics
(1902) is probably not an actual person, but rather, an example of what Hull House
residents are like upon their arrival at Hull House. The charity visitor “is a young college
woman, well-bred and open-minded” (Addams, 1902, p. 12). Yet she struggles at first to
understand her encounters with the working poor. She is awkward, she lacks experience
of their ways, and she is quick to cast moral judgment on them.130
In her story of the fictional charity visitor, Addams emphasizes that the charity
visitor at first feels a kind of discomfort and bewilderment as she observes the visited
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This is most clearly evidenced in the Preface to what she calls her “reminiscences”, 20 Years at Hull
House (1910). Addams explains two purposes for the book, the first of which is to offer some insights into
the early struggles of Hull House in the hopes that this would combat an increasing public perception of the
“superficiality” of social settlements. Her second motive, what she considered a more “unworthy” one,
stems from her desire to “extinguish” two proposed biographies that depicted life at the Settlement as “all
too smooth and charming” (Addams, 1910, p. viii).
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Indeed Addams’s approach to social and political philosophy, a rhetorical approach that develops her
argument in accompaniment with narrative, is perhaps why many traditional philosophers have failed to see
her philosophical contributions. In response to this I reiterate Dewey’s point that argument alone “breeds
misunderstanding and fixes prejudices” (Dewey, 1902, MW 2.91).
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Addams’s own reflections on the early mistakes of residents at Hull House demonstrate that she
probably sees the charity visitor, a good-willed but naïve young woman, as a reflection of herself when she
first opened Hull House (Twenty Years at Hull House, 1910).
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family. She is confused by many of their practices, she is judgmental of how they
prioritize their financial decisions given their state of poverty, and at times she is even
disgusted by them. She is shocked by the head of the visited family’s familiarity with the
“horrors of the salon,” disturbed by the daughter’s imprudent spending on dresses despite
her pitiful home furnishings “little decorations, [and] scanty supply of books”, concerned
about the ease with which the visited family greets the early marriage of their daughters,
and morally reproachful of urban gangs of boys who are so frequently arrested.
The reader becomes more acquainted with the visited family through the charity
visitor. The head of the family has recently been blacklisted in a strike. In his absence
from work, he has “sunken down into martyrdom,” content to visit the public library
daily to indulge in reading and take visitations from other workman, counseling them in
their efforts in labor relations (Addams, 1902, p. 13). Meanwhile, his wife shows no signs
of disdain for this, and even supports him with a “scanty income” earned through sewing
and cleaning. The charity visitor initially concludes that this man is lazy and his
supportive wife imprudent.
At this point it is important to note that Addams is doing something important
with her story of the charity visitor here. She is demonstrating for the reader what a
failure to greet perplexity in a responsible way looks like. Thus far the charity visitor has
explained away her perplexity, accepting the first and easiest explanation at its “face
value”, which in her case is based in identity-prejudiced stereotypes (Dewey, 1910, MW
6.191).
Addams pushes the story of the charity visitor further, however. She means to
demonstrate not simply how the charity visitor initially fails to realize the epistemic
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potential of perplexity, but to also demonstrate how one might embrace and fulfill that
epistemic potential through continued processes of sympathetic inquiry. The charity
visitor continues to visit the family and in the process, gets to know their stories. She
even begins to think analogically about her own experiences and those of the visited
family.
The charity visitor reflects on some of her own experiences and begins to
compare them with her growing understanding of the visited family. She thinks of two of
her own friends from more privileged backgrounds who are presently supporting their
husbands. Her companions actually encouraged their husbands to pass on employment
opportunities that were inconsistent with their moral convictions and might tarnish their
reputations in their social circles. Both the head of household of the visited family and the
charity visitor’s friends’ husbands are enjoying a life of reading and political
engagement as a result of their temporary unemployment.
The charity visitor gains a new appreciation for the choices of the visited family
because she perseveres towards sympathetic inquiry in response to an initially perplexing
experience. Her moral condemnation of both the head of household and his supportive
wife become reframed for the reader in a way that disrupts socioeconomically
constructed differences and distance. The charity visitor begins to realize a certain
inconsistency about praising her own friends’ moral character for supporting their
husbands while rebuking the striker’s wife for her imprudence. She sees that the striker’s
wife has made the greater sacrifice than her own friends because the stakes are so much
higher. The charity visitor begins to wonder if the wife of the visited family is actually
more morally mature than her own acquaintances.
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After further investigation, the charity visitor sees that the clothing the daughter
spends all of her earnings on ‘imprudently’ is a social necessity for her. She uses it to
communicate a higher social standing than she holds, and through that, gain entrance into
more elevated social circles. Early marriage limits the amount of mouths that need fed in
a household. The prospects for a family are even better if one’s daughters marry into a
more elevated social circle. The charity visitor comes to see that the thrill of being chased
by the “coppers” among urban boys is not unlike “the practice of country boys who go
forth in squads to set traps for rabbits or to round up a coon” (Addams, 1902, p. 26). The
problem for urban youth is not a moral failing on their own parts, but it is based in a
social problem that results from industrial capitalism: the universal restlessness of youth
attempting to navigate an urban environment with limited outlets for play. The charity
visitor comes to see the social systems that frame the lives and choices of the visited
family.
Through her use of the narrative of the fictional charity visitor, Addams invites
her insulated reading public into the perplexity experienced Hull House residents
themselves. She puts their perplexity on display and then directs the reader through the
proper response to perplexity, which for Addams is through sympathetic inquiry towards
wider social understanding. This process is made more accessible to the reader because
the narrative is told from the perspective of someone like them: the charity visitor is an
important mediator for social comparison. Vicariously and imaginatively, the reader is
invited on the charity visitor’s journey towards wider social knowledge. Through this
mediation the reader learns “to penetrate to deeper levels of meaning – to go below the
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surface and find out the connections of any event or object, and to keep at it” (Dewey,
1916, MW 9.335).
Addams believes that narrative has important epistemic power. Unlike the
newspapers, she appreciates literature because it brings people into “contact with social
experience” (Addams, 1902, p. 8). On this she writes, “The popular books are the novels,
dealing with life under all possible conditions, and they are widely read not only because
they are entertaining, but also because they in measure satisfy an unformulated belief that
to see farther, to know all sorts of men, in an indefinite way, is a preparation for better
social adjustment – for the remedying of social ills” (Addams, 1902, p. 8). Indeed, the
most profound stories and characters are often based in authors’ real experiences with
different people and their ability to bring readers to a genuine encounter and
understanding of those characters. And the moral wisdom of a reader or literary critic is
rooted in her wide range of experiences with different socioeconomically and spatially
located characters.
As Richard Rorty has explained, narrative is valuable for moral thinking because
it introduces readers to, “strange people (Alcibiades, Julien Sorel), strange families (the
Karamazovs, the Casaubons), and strange communities (the Teutonic Knights, the Nuer,
the mandarins of Sung)” (Rorty, 1989, p. 80). Narratives enable readers to imaginatively
explore potential resolutions to problems and their meanings for the parties involved.
They function to reveal, “how a situation comes to be the particular problem that it is”
(Walker, 2007, p. 72). Unlike a moral dilemma posed in an ethical theory course
textbook, narrative more authentically represents moral problems because it brings
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forward the values and obligations, and most importantly, the relations, that frame the
moral problem and moral decision-making of the character (Walker, 2007, p. 116).
Another important feature of narrative is its ability to make us vulnerable to the
Other. When we read a novel, we quite naturally indulge in an open-minded
consideration of the perspectives shared through the story. We sympathize with the
villain. We grasp the complexities of an immoral act without despising the actor herself.
Yet in real life encounters with the Other, the persistence of prejudices are such that we
frequently avoid taking on this novel-like sympathy.
Novel-like sympathy is difficult to implement in everyday interactions for a few
reasons. Many of the social spaces in which our real life encounters with the Other
happen, fail to make space for or even discourage the exchanging of our narratives.
Additionally, we may avoid taking on this novel-like sympathy in real life encounters
because unlike the solitary activity of reading a novel, real-life encounters require making
oneself vulnerable to another person. While reading a novel, one can safely suspend her
own beliefs, commitments, and customs without feeling a sense of jeopardizing her
identity. One can pretend to agree with the main character without fearing that her own
beliefs, commitments, and customs will be lost in social space, without fearing that her
listening, appreciation, and understanding will go unreciprocated or be abused. Thus SI
requires an openness to seeking out narratively based understanding, and the formation of
this kind of understanding requires a kind of social trust in the Other.
True perspective taking requires trying on the beliefs, commitments, and customs
of the Other. Importantly, and particularly in contexts when we disagree strongly with the
beliefs, commitments, and customs of the Other, this requires considering how the Other
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could have come to form those beliefs, commitments, and customs and why she might
feel a sense of communion with them. This perspective-taking feature of the formation of
narrative knowledge moves the listener to a kind of analogical thinking, and interestingly,
analogical thinking is an important feature of empathy.131
There is a kind of meta-narrative process at work in Addams’s tale of the charity
visitor and in Addams’s use of the first-person perspective in much of her writing more
generally. The charity visitor, and Addams’s herself when she writes from the first
person, are more readily available analogical references for Addams’s readers. The reader
can ease into the perplexing experience through her connection with the charity visitor or
her connection with Addams. Addams’s story of the charity visitor is a narrative about
someone forming narratively based understanding of the Other, and that ‘someone’ is
someone very much like Addams’s readers.
Because of how the political ideologies and social myths propagated by the more
powerful can highjack the narratives of the marginalized, Addams’s introduction of
alternative narratives through her writings has the potential to challenge the collective
social imagination towards reconstruction through challenging the validity of these
narratives as well as to “show how restricted the scope of the dominant identities
[themselves] really [are]” (Walker, 2007, p. 155).
5. Conclusion: Beyond Mere Method, Sympathetic Inquiry as a Political Virtue
Addams does not develop sympathetic inquiry as a political virtue, but she does
introduce it often in her discussions of political virtues that she is critical of for failing to
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enact, or blatantly contradicting, democracy as social ethics (e.g., charity).132 There may
be some benefits to thinking about Addams’s method of sympathetic inquiry in a virtue
ethics framework, however. In this final section of the Chapter I want to consider how
constructing sympathetic inquiry as a type of hybrid epistemic-moral political virtue
might be particularly useful for combatting communicatively structured deliberative
inequality and for communicative democracy more generally.
In her discussions of social ethics most specifically, Addams expresses a concern
for citizens to extend the sympathy that is more naturally felt towards one another within
familial and private institutions to the larger social and political institution (Addams,
Democracy and Social Ethics, 1902/2002).133 In her concerns to widen sympathy,
Addams demonstrates an appreciation for the fact that, unlike the concern and care that is
felt naturally for familial relations, concern and care for the Other must be worked at and
cultivated. Indeed, the sympathy that is called for in sympathetic inquiry may not
naturally arise. Thus like the virtues, it may be something the agent has to actively work
towards cultivating and habituating if not trained in the proper way towards it.
Sympathetic inquiry does seem to be more of a habit than a skill, however.
Indeed, Dewey develops thinking in these terms, as thinking habits and habits of inquiry.
He also believes that these thinking habits have implications for the moral life. While
132

Pragmatists were deeply rooted in Aristotle, and I think it can be argued that they would have
developed sympathetic inquiry in terms of the virtue ethics framework. However, it is outside of the scope
of this project to defend Addams and Dewey as virtue ethicists.
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On this she writes, “Just when our affection becomes large enough to care for the unworthy among
the poor as we would care for the unworthy among our own kin, is certainly a perplexing question. To say
that it should never be so, is a comment upon our democratic relations to them which few of us would be
willing to make” (Addams, 1902/2002, p. 31). See also, Whipps (2004, p. 123) who explains, “Addams
believed that to stay isolated from people engaged in the daily struggle for survival “deadens the
sympathies and shrivels the power of enjoyment”…Addams understood that neither individuals nor groups
could have a meaningful existence or advance in complex industrial and technological societies without
jointly creating societies that allow space for public work together towards mutual aims. Interdependence,
diversity, or the need for hearing the voices of “others,” is essential to Addams’s pragmatist and feminism –
indeed she believed that having many diverse experiences was a moral responsibility.”
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Dewey does not expressly discuss the role of sympathy for reflective thought in How We
Think (1910), in his discussion of social feeling in Psychology (1887) he emphasizes that
“it is impossible to over-estimate [its] importance in the emotional life” and that it is “the
source of all moral feeling” (Dewey, 1887/1996, 2. 285, 288). As Gregory Pappas (2008)
explains, “Dewey insisted on emphasizing the habits of inquiry required to find out what
a present morally problematic situation calls for” (p. 126).134
Because communicative democracy as I have developed it in this project consists
of interactive practices, sympathetic inquiry can be conceptualized in terms of the
regulatory habits (virtue) that govern those practices. The pragmatist feminist social
epistemology of communicative democracy rejects the possibility that moral reasoning
can be conducted from a neutral, impartial standpoint, healthy habits of inquiry in social
relations are critical. The ability to take on the attitude of others is how the self comes
into its completion, and the habit of sympathetic inquiry promotes that. It brings people
into their fuller “individuality”135 so that they may flourish, by making possible the
overarching values that are constitutive of a good life, self-determination and selfdevelopment.136
Sympathetic inquiry is a political virtue because it brings individuals into their
political agency through the interactive practices of communicative democracy. That is, it
is conducive to expanding one’s orientation to a wider public. As I explained earlier,
through the practice of sympathetic inquiry, individuals can eventually come to care for
the problems others face, expand their sense of obligation beyond their own “world”, and
134

Pappas cites Dewey: “Wide sympathy, keen sensitiveness, persistence in the face of the disagreeable,
balance of interest enabling us to undertake the work of analysis and decision intelligently are the
distinctively moral traits – the virtues of moral excellence” (1920/1996, MW 12.173-4). Dewey
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See Dewey, 1888/1996, EW 1. 231.
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See Young, 1990, p. 37.
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coordinate their preferences with the pursuit the social good of others. Sympathetic
inquirers form a conception of “shared interests” with the Other, and this makes it
possible for them to acknowledge the problems that are problems for the Other, as shared,
public problems.
On a virtue ethics framework, sympathetic inquiry would be understood as a
mean response (between excess and deficiency) to some sphere of action or feeling,
which in our case, is perplexity. Recall that I have defined sympathetic [social] inquiry as
the sympathetic, cooperative, and inclusive social practices and processes that promote
social knowledge, and I developed its constitutive properties as epistemic patience and
non-paternalistic listening.
I want to suggest something like Marilyn Frye’s (1983) conception of arrogant
perception may be a good candidate for an epistemic-moral vice that is deficient of the
mean in its response to perplexity. The arrogant perceiver assimilates the Other to his
own use, and through this, subverts her political agency and her deliberative standing.
The arrogant perceiver denies recognition to the Other’s needs and in so doing,
diminishes her moral standing. He denies her the communicative context to express those
needs effectively, and in so doing, diminishes her epistemic and deliberative standing.
Because the arrogant perceiver sees the Other as for him, he comes close to missing, or
misses entirely, experiencing the perplexity that the encounter occasions itself, because
the Other is not even an Other in relation to him, but is an object under and for him.
I also want to suggest that something like dis-authorized perception may be a
good candidate for an epistemic-moral vice that is an excessive of the mean in its
response to perplexity. By contrast with the arrogant perceiver who misses perplexity, the
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dis-authorized perceiver is paralyzed by it. He is baffled and disoriented by his
appreciation for the radical subjectivity and differently socially situated perspective of the
Other. She is too much an Other for interaction and communication. I borrow the
language of “dis-authorization” from Linda Alcoff’s use of it in a critique of the popular
resistance to speak for others among academics as the result of a [proper] appreciation for
the epistemic salience of one’s privileged social perspective.137 In this case, the radical
subjectivity of the Other, “is taken as an absolute dis-authorization of all practices of
speaking for” (Alcoff, 1991-2, p. 29). Because the dis-authorized perceiver experiences
the perplexity that the encounter with the Other occasions so severely, she marginalizes
the Other. Rather than subverting the Other’s political agency like the arrogant perceiver,
the dis-authorized perceiver abandons the Other’s political agency to seclusion and
isolation from all of social life.
What is interesting about this thought experiment is that in both arrogant
perception and dis-authorized perception, there are signs of a perceiver who has little
practice interacting in meaningful ways with differently socially situated others. The
arrogant perceiver lacks a wide range of experiences of relations of social equality, so he
is unmoved by perplexity. The dis-authorized perceiver lacks a wide range of experiences
of relations of social inequality, so he is overwhelmed by perplexity. This points to the
significance of some forms of “exposure therapy” for the cultivation of the political
virtue of sympathetic inquiry, which I would like to suggest can be observed at places
like Hull House.
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Sympathetic inquiry is a substantive virtue in the weak sense of arising from the
assumption of democratic norms of political equality, transparency, reasonableness, and
inclusion. But it is procedural in the sense that it does not itself endorse a particular
account of these norms in practice, but rather, methodologically regulates the epistemic
and communicative practices that define them (a process which is ongoing, experimental,
and open-ended). Because sympathetic inquiry is procedural in this sense, it insulates
itself from two common critiques of the virtue ethics tradition. First, there is the charge
that the virtues are too culturally relative, and as such, can be distorted in ways that
benefit the dominant class and sustain the existing power relations in a given society.138
But sympathetic inquiry is not substantive enough to produce this problem, and it is
constructed with the expressed aim of remedying this kind of cultural imperialism.
Then there is the charge that the virtues are too individualistic and that they do not
readily map on to ethical concerns about structural relations of power. Elizabeth
Anderson has raised this concern for Miranda Fricker’s (2007) virtue-based resolution for
testimonial injustice, the epistemic virtue of testimonial justice” (Anderson, 2012). As
Anderson explains, testimonial injustice is a transactional and structural form of injustice
in that it arises from “particular exchanges or interactions between one person and
another” (Anderson, 2012, p. 164-165). Fricker herself constructs it in this way. But then
she looks to an “individual virtue-based remedy” that Anderson worries may not be able
138

For an example of this type of argument, see Susan Okin’s (1998) paper, “Feminism, Moral
Development, and the Virtues”. Okin argues that Aristotle’s political and ethical picture is so dependent on
the exploitation of oppressed classes that it is not, without substantial revision, a salvageable theory.
Maurice Hamington (2001; 2009) also worries about this and resists developing sympathetic inquiry in the
virtue ethics framework because of it, preferring instead to develop it in an embodied ethics of care.
Hamington believes along with Nel Noddings that one concern for virtue theory is that it “does not
challenge liberal notions of isolated individualism the way that care theory does” (Hamington, 2015; citing
Noddings, 2010, pp. 125-137). I do not object to Hamington’s construction of sympathetic knowledge as
such, I simply want to try on the virtue ethics framework here to see if it is useful for thinking about the
relationship between sympathetic inquiry and deliberative equality.
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“to address structural epistemic injustices that may have locally innocent (nonprejudicial) causes” (ibid., p. 167). Linda Alcoff frames the problem with the
interrogative: “Can volitional epistemic practice correct for non-volitional prejudices?”
(Alcoff, 2010, p. 128).
As Anderson explains, there are other ways beyond identity-prejudices that
“disadvantaged social groups can be unjustly denied credibility” (Anderson, 2012, p.
169). She cites ingroup favoritism and shared-reality bias as examples. Both are universal
cognitive tendencies with epistemic advantages in some contexts. What is interesting
about Anderson’s critique, for my purposes here, is that she ultimately points towards
some kind of conception of epistemic democracy as the virtue of epistemic justice for
transactional injustice of this kind!
And this is precisely how I have tried to develop sympathetic inquiry, as a hybrid
epistemic-moral political virtue that is constituted through social processes rather than in
individuals. If “group segregation along lines of social inequality”, is the vector that turns
innocent cognitive biases into “vehicles for spreading structural injustice to new
contexts”, then perhaps the picture of communicative democracy and sympathetic inquiry
as I have developed it in this dissertation are conducive for remedying communicatively
structured deliberative inequality (Anderson, 2012, pp. 171, 170).
If responsible social inquiry is constructed as a capacity that is brought to fruition
through relational and developmental processes like Play and Education,139 then it may be
a candidate for being nurtured as the corrective habit for reconstructing the collective
social imagination and its identity-prejudiced habits of social inquiry and communication.
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Sympathetic inquiry should not be understood as a practice of “controlling one’s
biases and prejudices”, mind over matter.140 I have tried to show in this chapter that
properly cultivated, sympathetic social inquiry has affective dimensions and reaches
down into disposition, and that this can stimulate the natural widening of ingroups. And it
can challenge identity-prejudiced stereotypes and in so doing, begin the processes of
reconstructing the collective social imagination that houses them for the sympathetic
inquirer. Thus understood as a political virtue of sympathetic inquiry, it could be
potentially transformative for affectively reconstructing the experience of perplexity
itself, and it could in this way, be an incredibly robust potential resource for alleviating
the harmful effects on individuals’ deliberative standing in communicative and epistemic
interactions.
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developing sympathetic inquiry in the virtue ethics framework, is that it creates the conceptual resources to
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CONCLUSION
Addams and Dewey would have agreed with Young that democratic norms of
political equality, reasonableness, publicity, and inclusion are a vital starting place for
theorizing justice. Although they were separated by almost a century in time and
grounded in distinct philosophical traditions, they valued and developed a construction of
democracy that promotes open and transparent reason-giving processes in politics. They
rejected power-based and preference aggregative constructions of democratic decisionmaking, that gets implemented through special interest group politics.
Addams and Dewey would have also agreed with Young, that because
deliberative theory has largely developing these norms through the lens of liberal
individualism, it has failed to appreciate the ways that relations of power, oppression,
privilege, and social inequality impact the realization of those norms in both formal
democratic institutions and in all of social life.
The very core of communicative democracy, I have argued, is a relational
ontology that makes theoretical space to name communicatively structured deliberative
inequality and to identify, identity-prejudiced epistemic and communicative practices and
habits. Relations of power that produce oppression, privilege, and social inequality have
consequences on our deliberative standing, on whether we will be received, included,
acknowledged, and genuinely respected and heard by others as a political equal, as a
Deliberator.
Deliberative theorists put forward a refined and narrow construction of
deliberation-as-argument that excludes people who lack the opportunities to develop the
capacities necessary for this form of participation (i.e., political poverty). Argument
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emphasizes the importance of agreement as a starting place and/or goal for discussion,
and because of this, it can function as a vehicle for the perpetuation of culturally
dominant norms.
There is a second layer to the cultural imperialism of deliberation-as-argument.
The discourse of argument idealizes the speaker as dispassionate, articulate, quick-witted
and clever, and impartial. This functions to privilege elites, who are more likely to be
educated and skilled in the cultural traditions of argument. In the context of social
inequality, oppression, and privilege, the assumption of argument itself functions as a
form of cultural imperialism where it is normalized and is assumed as a neutral discourse.
Because argument has historically been valorized as the appropriate method for
discovering truth both within modern philosophy and in the American judicial system,
and because truth has historically been conceptualized within the liberal tradition as
discoverable and as singular, this conception of deliberation-as-argument struggles to
map on to more complex problem-identification and problem-solving processes like those
that societies must grapple with.
But even more than all of this, the assumption of deliberation-as-argument
reduces a robust and wider world of democratic communication solely to deliberation,
and in doing so, it limits the scope of our social knowledge. Young, Addams, and Dewey
appreciate both the moral and the epistemic benefits of inclusion. At its best, inclusive
democratic communication can protect, restore and nurture the deliberative standing of
all individuals, and it yields better social knowledge.
Beyond narrow constructions of deliberation-as-argument, Addams in particular
saw that the emotional and imaginative domains of human social life are vital features of
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communication.141 To borrow from Dewey again, “argument alone breeds
misunderstanding and fixes prejudices” (Dewey, 1902/1996, MW 2.91). Young
introduces five additional communicative methods in her work: greeting and
acknowledgement of one’s interlocutors, rhetoric, narrative (Young, 2000), and even
questioning (Young, 1997) and protest (Young, 2001). Anticipating Young’s
communicative democracy, Addams takes up Young’s invitation to situate argument in
narrative. And she looks to activities and practices like Play as a mechanism for
producing epistemic goods, like imaginative inquiry, practice at cooperative exploration,
and practice and appreciation for diverse social perspectives.
In Chapter 3 I argued that Addams and Dewey were deeply concerned with
ingroup and outgroup biases as well as identity-prejudiced stereotypes. Recall that
identity-prejudiced stereotypes are unique from universal, cognitive tendencies of
ingroup and outgroup bias, in that they target a particular social group and are a result
and reflection of intergroup social relations of power where there is oppression, privilege,
and group-based social inequality. Thus prejudice harms particular socially situated
groups. I have made the case that Addams and Dewey saw this, and that they were
motivated to construct their conception of democracy around resolving it.
There is a tendency in the contemporary political discourse to overlook the
significance of ordinary communicative processes in our understanding of democracy.
Deliberative theorists also tend to limit the expanse of democratic communication in
assuming that its appropriate place is in formal, institutionalized political venues (and
perhaps only even in a representative form). To the contrary, communicative democracy

141

Dewey advocates the role of imagination and emotional sensitivity even in his account of
deliberation in the natural sciences (Pappas, 2012, p. 61).
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widens democratic communication to include a broad range of interactive practices and it
challenge us to think of democratic space as boundless.
Addams and Dewey go so far as to say that social space is the proper place and
origin of healthy democratic communication and democracy more generally, and that the
institutionalization of democracy into formal processes only a side effect. They would be
critical of contemporary democratic experimentalism programs that tend to reduce their
focus for democratic reform to institutions. Such programs do not go deep enough. The
emphasis on arriving at formal principles for the design and structure of democratic
institutions misses an integral aspect of democracy for Dewey, namely, “the embodiment
in citizens of certain virtues” in their ordinary communicative and epistemic practices
(Pappas, 2012, p. 71).
It is interesting that Young eventually looks to “City Life” as a normative ideal
for communicative democracy, especially in contrast with Addams’s and Dewey’s
concerns with the negative potential effects of the modern urban city for social
knowledge and meaningful social life (Young, 1990). But all of these theorists
appreciated the fact that in the city, “being together entails some common problems and
common interests” (Young, 1990, p. 238) and that because of this, “we are bound to
move forward or retrograde together” (Addams, 1902/2002, p. 238).
Hull House protested the challenges of the modern city, and so I believe Young
would have felt quite at home there. The city is filled with problems but boundless in its
potential for enriching social life. Hull House was a laboratory for democracy and
democratic communication and inquiry. So there is good reason to continue to look to
activities and programs, as well as Jane Addams’s and other thinkers’ writings about Hull
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House, for further resources for strategizing democracy, and deliberative equality more
specifically.
Young suggests four virtues of the normative conception of the city: social
differentiation without exclusion, variety, eroticism, and publicity. Future research should
develop the political virtue of sympathetic inquiry in the context of this ideal city.
Speaking specifically to the eroticism of the city, Young describes it in terms of a place
where one can “lose one’s identity” and where we can “take pleasure in being open to
and interested in people we experience as different” (Young, 1990, p. 239). There is
much more to be said about this erotic mystery and Play as I developed it in Chapter 4. I
am particularly interested to explore this line of research further as a way of constructing
an account of public reason. This account would develop democratic rationality in terms
of the design approach of Chapter 1, and would function to fill out Addams’s and
Dewey’s conception of social inquiry.
The language of “implicit bias” is becoming increasingly more popular in
mainstream culture, and organizations – private and public – have increasingly been
looking to “implicit bias training programs” as a way to affirm the importance of
inclusion and diversity. But this discourse has struggled to escape the individualistic,
cognitive-error account of prejudice that I developed and expressed concerns about in
Chapter 2. I also mentioned in this chapter my resistance to two dualisms within the
social psychology literature, between cognitive and affect and between implicit and
explicit attitudes. I am hopeful to further my critique of this discourse through examining
how conceptualizing identity-prejudiced communicative activity in terms of a habit may
interrupt both of these dualisms. This may give us conceptual space to interrogate what is
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really going on in “implicit bias”. It will be interesting to explore the possibilities of
sympathetic inquiry if communicative inequality is reconstructed in terms of habit.
One worry for sympathetic inquiry is its dependency on narrative, as I have
constructed it. While narrative can give us access to the inner meanings of Others,
narratives can also be used to propagate social myths and motivate divisiveness. So much
more work needs to be done that establishes ways to protect sympathetic inquiry from
this risk. I suspect that one way to insulate sympathetic inquiry from this problem is to
emphasize its attitudinal and relational context, a spirit of inclusive, experimental, and
open-ended communicative practices among diversely situated social perspectives.
Young, Addams, and Dewey all looked to practice as an inspiration for theorizing
about social justice and democracy. This reorientation of philosophic method brings into
focus the significance of practice and activity in the social world. In conceptualizing
democracy, the arrogant perceiver sees a thing to be had, something you can get, possess,
own, with the right political machinery. This mechanization of participation
compartmentalized it from our ethos, from our way of life and of interacting with and
knowing one another. The dis-authorized perceiver is overwhelmed by the difference, the
complexity, the potential chaos, and retreats from participation. But these perceivers both
miss something important, namely, that democracy is not a thing, but it is a verb. We do
democracy, and we do it together.
…As members of the community [we] stand indicted. This is the penalty of
democracy, - that we are bound to move forward or retrograde together. None of
us can stand aside; our feet are mired in the same soil, and our lungs breathe the
same air. (Addams, 1902/2002, p. 112, the emphasis is mine)
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